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With the takeover of General Sir David Richards as Chief of the General Staff (CGS), or head of the Army, the Nato campaign in Afghanistan will become an increased priority.

As the Army fights it out for diminishing resources in the Defence Review widely expected to start in the next year, it will now be headed by a man who believes that some of the major weapons or capabilities needed for inter-state warfare may have to be sacrificed in the interests of gaining success in southern Afghanistan.

It is not as if his predecessor, General Sir Richard Dannatt was indifferent to success in the field nor did he want to spend money on a load of white elephant weapons.

But Gen Richards' time spent commanding Nato troops in Afghanistan has given him intimate knowledge of the country, excellent contacts with its leaders, and a passionate sense that the mission cannot be allowed to fail.

In some of his statements, Gen Dannatt appeared to imply that foreign interventions in Muslim countries, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, could not produce success.

Gen Richards on the other hand has been frank with his colleagues that he thinks Britain was defeated in southern Iraq due to half measures and that the same cannot be allowed to happen in Afghanistan.

The debate within the British Army about how this might be done has been sharpened by the sense that US forces achieved a dramatic security turn around in much of Iraq and are now committing greater resources to Afghanistan.

An influx of US marines into Helmand this summer, taking over large parts of the province, shows that the US colossus is watching even more closely and that failure would be highly damaging to the British army's wider reputation.

Gen Richards though cannot single-handedly garner the resources needed to defeat the Taliban.

The Whitehall battle over how many troops to send to Afghanistan this summer - one where the wider MoD endorsed the view that a substantial reinforcement was needed only to have Downing Street reject its advice - was instructive.

The formal powers of the CGS are quite limited, with little influence on the actual conduct of operations.

It was frustration with the constitutionally defined limits of the job that led Gen Dannatt into his occasional outbursts of public advocacy.

The great challenge of his tenure as CGS was getting the Army the funds to make sure it was not broken by the simultaneous strain of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Now that Iraq is over, the allowances, pay and some equipment issues have been addressed, the future challenge will be about insuring operational success while protecting the Army's long-term position in the Defence Review.

Gen Dannatt gained a reputation as a plain speaking soldiers' general.

His successor is more likely to use Whitehall black arts - cultivating opinion formers, using his international contacts, and undermining the case of the other two services in the forthcoming Defence Review.