The challenge of supporting Afghans without breeding dependence
There is a basic contradiction on show here and I don't know how it is going to be resolved.
The international community is fed up with poor performance by the Afghan government. It wants results. It is piling in more soldiers, administrators, and development experts.
Yet the more of these people who go there, the less capable the Afghan state must appear to its people.
There are of course explanations about how this square can be circled. If many of the soldiers and aid workers are actually going there to mentor or train Afghans then it should be possible for Afghanistan to stand on its own two feet more quickly - that's the theory.
It ought to work, but the US and other Nato countries are just so impatient to get results that this plan to stand up more reliable Afghan institutions could easily be undermined.
Talking at the conference to Kai Eide, the outgoing UN Special Envoy to Afghanistan, it is obvious that he is quite concerned about certain moves making the Afghans more dependent on foreign help rather than less.
He caused a stir by suggested in a recent press interview that the US troop surge could have this effect.
Seeing at first hand during a recent operation in Helmand how the Afghan army provided only around 10% of the troops and their men were used to enter homes and handle detainees, while much larger numbers of US troops fought the Taliban, I can see Mr Eide's point.
Pouring that number of Americans, with all their immense firepower into that district sent its own message about who was in charge and who was subservient.
The US military, under orders from the White House, wants quick results. But this business of building governance or "capacity" is inherently a long and drawn out one.
If the Afghans are not ready to clear an area or build a road, it is the foreigners who are stepping in to get it done.
The Chinese have a programme to train Afghan government officials. They instructed 500 so far, and are planning the same again.
Other nations have some similar projects and much of this involves university-level courses outside Afghanistan.
This is the other end of what was discussed at the London conference - slow, unspectacular capacity building.
So if the new capacity is growing only slowly where will this leave those districts being cleared of Taliban during the coming months at such a high cost in lives and money?
One possibility is that the international effort will simply falter as the areas are turned over to Afghan officials and police.
In trying to resolve that dilemma generals and diplomats are now placing increasing emphasis on the plans to turn Taliban by financial and other incentives.
The task of standing up a bigger, better, Afghan state will after all be much easier if the forces that oppose it can be undermined.
It's a good theory anyway.