The IAEA report on Iran
I have been reading on your behalf the full text of the latest report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Iran鈥檚 nuclear programme. Yes, I know, my devotion to duty knows no bounds.
It is, as we reported on The World Tonight last week, a report which contains a mixed message. So I thought you might like to see the key passages for yourself (words in brackets have been added by me for the sake of clarification).
Here they are:
鈥淧ara. 30: On 3 November 2007, the Agency (IAEA) verified that Iran had finished installing eighteen 164-machine cascades at FEP (the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz) and that UF6 (Uranium hexafluoride, or "hex", which is used to produce fuel for nuclear reactors and for nuclear weapons) had been fed into all 18 cascades. There has been no installation of centrifuges or centrifuge pipework outside the original 18-cascade area. Work to install feed and withdrawal infrastructure and auxiliary systems is continuing.
鈥淧ara. 31: Since February 2007, Iran has fed approximately 1240 kg of UF6 into the cascades at [Natanz]. The feed rate has remained below the expected quantity for a facility of this design. While Iran has stated that it has reached enrichment levels up to 4.8% U-235 at [Natanz], the highest U-235 enrichment measured so far from the environmental samples taken by the Agency from cascade components and related equipment is 4.0%.
鈥淧ara. 39: The Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material, and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities 鈥 However, it should be noted that, since early 2006, the Agency has not received the type of information that Iran had previously been providing, pursuant to the Additional Protocol and as a transparency measure. As a result, the Agency鈥檚 knowledge about Iran鈥檚 current nuclear programme is diminishing.
鈥淧ara. 40: Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities 鈥
鈥淧ara. 42: Iran has provided sufficient access to individuals and has responded in a timely manner to questions and provided clarifications and amplifications on issues raised in the context of the work plan. However, its cooperation has been reactive rather than proactive. As previously stated, Iran鈥檚 active cooperation and full transparency are indispensable for full and prompt implementation of the work plan.
鈥淧ara 43: In addition, Iran needs to continue to build confidence about the scope and nature of its present programme. Confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran鈥檚 nuclear programme requires that the Agency be able to provide assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material, but, equally importantly, regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. Although the Agency has no concrete information, other than that addressed through the work plan, about possible current undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran without full implementation of the Additional Protocol. This is especially important in the light of Iran鈥檚 undeclared activities for almost two decades and the need to restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme 鈥︹
Which boils down, I think, to this: the IAEA has found no evidence that Iran is working on a nuclear weapons programme, but is still not able to say that no such evidence exists.
This was the reaction from the US envoy to the IAEA, Gregory Schulte: "The key thing from the director general's report is that Iran's cooperation remains selective and incomplete. So Iran has not met the world's expectation that it would disclose information on both its current and past programs.鈥
Now that you鈥檝e had a chance to read the IAEA鈥檚 words for yourself, what鈥檚 your reaction?
"Which boils down, I think, to this: the IAEA has found no evidence that Iran is working on a nuclear weapons programme, but is still not able to say that no such evidence exists."
I think that conclusion stinks. I think Iran is trying as hard as it can as fast as it can to build atom bombs to be used on the US (the Great Satan), Israel (the Little Satan) and anyone else who gets in its way including the UK.
"the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran without full implementation of the Additional Protocol. This is especially important in the light of Iran鈥檚 undeclared activities for almost two decades and the need to restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme 鈥︹"
These weasel words translated into plain English mean that the IAEA doesn't have a clue as to what is going on behind closed doors and out of sight in Iran.
I say based on the experience of Europe not having discovered Germany re-arming before it was too late, the UN inspectors not having discovered Iraq's nuclear weapons program from 1991 when it was supposed to disclose it until 1995 when Saddam Hussein's brother-in-law told the world about it in Jordan because he ran it, that North Korea was not stopped from trying to build an atom bomb after having said it wasn't, that Libya's advanced nuclear weapons program was not discovered until it revealed it to the world itself after America threatened to bomb it after Iraq, that we bomb the everliving crap out of Iran before it is too late. Besides this would rattle cages all over Europe and they are getting much too close to the US for comfort because they are about to ask for lots of help for their failed superstate and big one sided sacrifices to the US economy to slow global warming. How nice it would be to have just nuked Teheran before we tell Europe again to go to hell (95-0 last time re Kyoto.) Mr. Bush, what are you waiting for, push the button. Push it NOW!
Complain about this post"proactive not reactive" means "they gave us what we asked for and not what we didn't ask for"
The IAEA can't prove the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran . . . or 40 other countries in the world. It is not a valid basis for suspicion.
Complain about this postForgive me for writing this here, but I don't know how else to reach you.
Complain about this postI have just listened to your item this evening on the approaching crisis in Kosovo which gave a clear and interesting summary of the situation. Mischa Glennie also spoke clearly and interestingly. However, there was no mention whatever of a fact that I undestand which is that the Americans have created a major military base in Kosovo. THat fact is hadly immaterial to their determination to recognise the country (describged by Glennie as a centre for organised crime) as a sovereign nation, is it?
"Which boils down, I think, to this: the IAEA has found no evidence that Iran is working on a nuclear weapons programme, but is still not able to say that no such evidence exists."
I have no evidence that you beat your wife
but I cannot say whether such evidence exists.
This sort of absurd logic was used to make a case for attacking Iraq.
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