Afghanistan: could bribery work?
You may have noticed: Afghanistan is not yet a stable, functioning, multi-party democracy.
The recent elections were, shall we say, less than perfect. The military campaign against the Taliban is, how can we put it, still some way short of a declaration of total victory.
So here's a thought: if encouraging change through the ballot box doesn't work - and if waging war doesn't work - what about trying some heavy-duty bribery?
The American military and security analyst , of Slate.com, wrote a couple of days ago: "[Bribery] does tend to work, at least in the short run. In the spring and summer of 2003, during the early days of the Iraq occupation, this was how Gen. David Petraeus, then commander of the Army's 101st Airborne Division, pacified much of northern Iraq." (It was also also quite useful, incidentally, when General Petraeus was encouraging Iraqi Sunni militiamen to turn against al-Qaeda.)
And the foreign affairs commentator wrote in the Washington Post: "The central problem in Afghanistan is that the Pashtuns, who make up 45 percent of the population and almost 100 percent of the Taliban, do not feel empowered. We need to start talking to them, whether they are nominally Taliban or not. Buying, renting or bribing Pashtun tribes should become the centerpiece of America's stabilization strategy, as it was Britain's when it ruled Afghanistan."
Does the idea offend you? Do you find it distasteful, even immoral, to use tax-payers' money to bribe local officials and politicians who, all too often, are already corrupt?
, who worked in Kabul from 2003 to 2009 first for the Institute for War and Peace Reporting and then as a senior analyst for the International Crisis Group, thinks bribery is a terrible idea. She wrote for Foreign Policy online: "Rented allies are not reliable allies. Simply buying or bribing more commanders of whatever ilk will mean more instability in an environment where entrenched interests in a war economy are already playing the international community -- not the other way around. Money is leverage and the populations of both Afghanistan and the U.S. need to be involved in debating how it is spent, rather than grubby backhanders."
But suppose you agree that the current strategy isn't working. Here are your options: you could send in more troops to try to secure more land and create more space in which the Afghan government and security forces can operate. Or you could just pull out and leave them to it. Or you could try something new.
Option One may well be what the US and UK are about to try. I have no way of knowing whether it will make much difference. Option Two involves a real risk of the Taliban returning to power in Kabul, although that doesn't necessarily mean they'll immediately invite Osama bin Laden back. (It probably does mean, however, that they'll be able to create more mayhem in Pakistan.)
Which brings us to Option Three. Money talks, they say, and it was certainly helpful in Afghanistan back in late 2001, when the US-led anti-Taliban coalition was being assembled. So might it be helpful again now?
Could cash encourage rival politicians to put aside their differences? Could cash encourage militia leaders, insurgents and warlords to switch sides? Could cash encourage local police chiefs to arrest a few more drugs dealers and poppy growers?
I should make it clear: I'm not advocating the use of bribery. I'm simply asking the question: do you think it's worth trying? If you don't, what would you prefer?
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