 |
Press Releases
Newsnight reveals exclusive story of Al Qaeda spy
|
Newsnight last night revealed on 大象传媒 Two the extraordinary story of Omar Nasiri - not his real name - who spent seven years working as an agent for European intelligence services and as an Al Qaeda operative.
听
He provides a unique insight into how Al Qaeda was far more organised, coherent and determined in the Nineties than was appreciated at the time and how its reach spread to London.
听
It is believed to be the first time any journalist has had access to someone who has operated within Al Qaeda as a spy.
听
Nasiri has told Newsnight that a senior Al Qaeda operative who played a key role in the intelligence justifying the war in Iraq deliberately planted information to get the United States to fight Iraq.
听
He made the claim in an exclusive interview shown on Newsnight last night (Thursday 16 November 2006).
听
In the interview Nasiri claims that senior Al Qaeda operative Ibn Sheikh Al-Libi deliberately planted information to get the US to fight Iraq.
听
Al-Libi was captured by US forces in late 2001, handed over to the Egyptians and allegedly tortured. During interrogation he claimed that Al Qaeda had been training Iraqis.
听
This information would be the primary source for the claims of US officials.
听
Reporter Gordon Corera asks Nasiri if al-Libi or others would have told the truth if they were tortured. He answers: "Never".
听
Questioned further on whether he thought al-Libi had deliberately planted information to get the US to fight Iraq, he replies: "Exactly."
听
Asked why, Omar replies:
"Because he need Iraq like him and the others... Needed the conflict in Iraq because months before I heard him telling us when a question was asked in the mosque after the prayer in the evening, where is the best country to fight the jihad? Then he will say but before to get them, we need to have back one of the Muslim country in our sight, and the weakest of them is Iraq."
听
Nasiri's story began in the mid-Nineties in Belgium after his brother became involved with a group of Algerian Islamic activists - the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA).
听
To make money Nasiri began to supply the cell with guns.
听
But after stealing some cash from the Algerians, he realised his life was in danger and turned to the French Consulate in Brussels.
听
He was given a new identity in return for becoming a spy.
听
As part of his work undercover within the GIA he was asked to drive a car loaded with explosives from Belgium through France and Spain.
听
A few weeks later a car bomb ripped through the packed downtown streets of Algiers. Forty people were killed.
听
Questioned about the bomb Omar admits he feels responsible but denies he is a terrorist saying he did it to convince them he was one of them.
听
In March 1995 a series of raids were carried out across Belgium - including at Nasiri's house - which netted a number of important figures.
听
The material discovered in that raid proved to be one of the first signs of emerging links between jihadist groups - and of the role of Al Qaeda, according to Belgian police.
听
As well as weapons, a training manual was found. The first page of it was dedicated to Osama Bin Laden.
听
Around the same time the French had begun to hear of training camps in Afghanistan. They wanted Nasiri to investigate.
听
He says: "My mission (was) to find the route of Jihad through Pakistan and Afghanistan... No leads, no names, no address, nothing. Just go find the route of Jihad."
听
Through a series of contacts he found his way to Peshawar where he met Abu Zubaydah, the gatekeeper of the Afghan training camps who would be captured soon after 9/11 and was recently transferred from a secret CIA prison to Guantanamo Bay.
听
His first stop was Khalden, one of Al Qaeda's key training camps.
听
Others who are known to have attended the camp include Mohammed Atta - the ringleader of the 9/11 attacks; Richard Reid - the so called "shoebomber" who tried to detonate explosives on a trans-Atlantic flight; and Ramzi Youssef - who carried out the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre.
听
Nasiri's portrait of life in the camps provides new details of just how comprehensive Al Qaeda's operations were in the mid-Nineties.
听
He describes how recruits were provided with not only intense military training but also spiritual preparation. They were also trained how to resist interrogation and provide false information.
听
Naisri was one of a select few chosen to graduate from basic training and make it into the Darunta, one of Al Qaeda's elite camps.
听
At Darunta, recruits learnt how to make explosives and detonators from scratch, using everyday household items.
听
Nasiri tells Newsnight how they also were given chemical training, including how to make cyanide, and how to test what they had made.
听
He also reveals that he witnessed chemical weapons experiments - including the use of gases on rabbits - far earlier than had been previously reported.
听
With his training complete, Abu Zubaydah despatched Nasiri back to Europe with instructions to set up a sleeper cell and to remain in contact.
听
Nasiri says: "He asked me to go back in Europe, no specific country, no city, nothing, just go back to Europe... and begin to make a list of all targets."
听
After resuming contact with his French handlers, Nasiri was sent to London. The French were worried that Islamic radicals were using London as a base.
听
So Nasiri was run jointly by French and British intelligence.
听
He began to infiltrate Finsbury Park Mosque and spy on its Imam, Abu Hamza, as well as another radical, Abu Qatada.
听
He passed messages back between Pakistan and Afghanistan and London.
听
Abu Zubaydah even sent him back his own notebook which had been left in Afghanistan and in which he had detailed how to make explosives.
听
He was told by his handlers to focus on Abu Hamza rather than Abu Qatada, a decision he disagreed with.
听
Nasiri reveals that MI5 and French intelligence were watching Abu Hamza and Abu Qatada in London from as far back as 1997.
听
He says he informed them that Abu Hamza was carrying out combat training and detailed how he listened in to conversations relaying messages between Abu Qatada and the training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
听
At that time British police and security officials were focused on whether Islamic radicals posed a threat to the UK but were not necessarily focused on the larger international picture.
听
Bob Milton worked on the issue at the Metropolitan Police Special Branch between 1996 and 1998.
听
"At the time we didn't think that the growing threat from Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden was sufficient to put more resources on it," he says.
听
"We were monitoring what he was doing, certainly working with the US and European colleagues to do that. But at that time we were still unsure what the threat would be."
听
Notes to Editors
听
Any use of this material should be credited to 大象传媒 Newsnight. 听
KR
听
|
Printable version