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Despite the extreme violence of 1972, it was not until March 1973 that the British government released proposals for the future of Northern Ireland.

The British Government decided to replace Stormont with a new Assemblyand Executive.

There were a number of elements to this new system:

• Members of the Assembly would be elected using proportional representation.
• Members of the Executive would come from both unionist and nationalist parties.
• There would be an Irish Dimension in the form of a Council of Ireland that would allow politicians from North and South to meet and discuss issues relevant to both parts of the island.

In addition, London would retain control of security and justice.

As usual, there were very different reactions to the British government’s plans.

Unionist politicians were divided by the proposed solution:

• Former Prime Minister Brian Faulkner supported the plans and some of his party members agreed with his position.
• Many unionists – including the rest of Faulkner’s party, the DUP and the new Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party (set up by William Craig to oppose power-sharing) - were angry at the plans. These different groups came together to form the United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC). Their plan was to oppose the plans for power sharing and an Irish Dimension.

Nationalist politicians were generally happy with the plans for a power sharing Assembly and Executive.

The first elections for the new power sharing Assembly were held in June 1973.

The results were as follows:

The results showed that:

• The parties in favour of power sharing had won the most seats.
• The number of unionists elected who were against power sharing was greater than the number of unionists who supported power sharing.

In late November 1973, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, William Whitelaw, announced the make-up of the new power sharing Executive.

The Chief Executive was to be Brian Faulkner; his Deputy was to be SDLP Leader Gerry Fitt.

The numbers of ministries to be held by the different parties were as follows:

The Executive was also to have an additional four members but they would not have the right to vote.

Two of these non-voting members were to be from the SDLP, one from the Faulkner unionists and one Alliance Party member.

With the plans for power-sharing in place, attention turned to the Irish Dimension.

Northern Ireland’s political leaders joined with leading politicians from Britain and Ireland at Sunningdale in England to work out their plans.

At first, Ian Paisley and William Craig, the leaders of the anti-power sharing unionists, were not invited to attend although at one point they were invited to join the conference.

Both men refused.

On 9 December 1973, the Sunningdale Agreement was signed.

It set out plans for the creation of a two part Council of Ireland:

• A 14-member Council of Ministers (seven from the power-sharing Executive, seven from the Irish Government). The Council would help develop North-South co-operation and would eventually be given decision-making powers.
• A 60-member Consultative Assembly (30 from the power sharing Assembly, 30 from ��á���� Éireann). It was to have ‘advisory and review functions’ only.

In addition:

• The British Government agreed not to oppose Irish unification if a majority of the people of Northern Ireland wanted it.
• The Irish Government accepted that Irish unity could only ever be achieved peacefully and with the consent of the majority of the people of the North.
• At some future date, control over internal security issues would be returned to the Stormont Assembly.
• Approval of the decisions made at Sunningdale was to take place at a future conference.

The Sunningdale Agreement looked like a real breakthrough; however, it soon became clear that unionist and nationalist leaders believed that they had agreed to different things:

• Brian Faulkner did not believe the Sunningdale Agreement was very important or had changed very much. He later explained that he had only agreed to sign it to get the Irish Government to accept that Northern Ireland was part of the UK.
• The SDLP believed that the Agreement would be a major part in helping to create much closer ties between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic.

Sunningdale was opposed by paramilitaries from both sides too:

• The day after the Sunningdale Agreement was signed, loyalists announced that they were setting up an Ulster Army Council. It would resist any significant ‘Irish Dimension’.
• The PIRA showed its disapproval by exploding a number of bombs in London just before Christmas.

On 1 January 1974, the Executive and Assembly took power.

However, before long, the future of power sharing looked bleak.

This was because:

1. On 4 January, the ruling committee of the Ulster Unionist Party voted to reject the Sunningdale Agreement. In response, Brian Faulkner resigned as leader of the Party; 19 of the 21 Ulster Unionist Assembly members resigned with him.
2. At the end of February 1974, a General Election for the Westminster Parliament was held. All but one of the seats in Northern Ireland was won by UUUC MPs who opposed power sharing.

The General Election also resulted in a change in government in London, with Labour returning to power under Harold Wilson.

Despite calls for its removal, the power sharing Executive and Assembly worked on.

As a result, anti-power sharing unionist politicians, trade unionists and paramilitaries decided to set up the Ulster Workers’ Council (UWC).

On 14 May, the UWC began a general strikeas a way of bringing the power sharing government down.

At first, the strike looked as if it might not be getting much support.

This changed, however, as a result of:

• The UDA stopping people from going to work (using roadblocks and intimidation).
• Improved co-ordination by the UWC.

By the end of the week, Northern Ireland was more or less shut down.

Only 200 people turned up to support a back to work demonstration.

Tensions across Northern Ireland were further increased on 17 May 1974 when bombs – believed to have been planted by loyalist paramilitaries - exploded in Dublin and Monaghan.

27 people died immediately while five of the injured died later of their wounds.

1. By the middle of 1974, 17,500 soldiers were based in Northern Ireland. Despite its strength, the Army was reluctant to use force to end the strike, arguing that it was a political protest and not a terrorist action.
2. Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister, was rapidly losing patience with the strike; he showed his anger in a television speech on 25 May in which he condemned the ���°�’s actions and described those involved in the strike as ��ٱ�DzԲ������’.
3. Northern Ireland’s unionist population saw Wilson’s words as an attack on everyone, rather than just a condemnation of the UWC. As a result, support for the strike increased.
4. Realising this, the British Government ordered the Army to take control of Northern Ireland’s fuel supplies so that petrol would be available for ‘essential workers’.
5. The UWC responded by ordering its supporters to bring Northern Ireland to a complete shutdown.
6. On 28 May 1974, Faulkner resigned his post; the other unionists in the Executive did the same. He did this because of the refusal of the British Government (and the SDLP) to negotiate with the ���°�’s leaders. As a result, power-sharing ended.
7. On 29 May 1974, the UWC declared its strike was over; the next day, the power-sharing Assembly was suspended and Direct Rule re-introduced.

For more information, including archive clips, on this subject, visit ����ý: Ten Chapters of the Northern Ireland Troubles ()