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American presidents and their top brass

Mark Urban | 22:42 UK time, Thursday, 7 August 2008

BOSTON - Talking to Admiral William Fallon here, it is striking how politicised America's military campaigns in the Middle East have become. This has big implications for whoever takes over in the White House.

fallon_203.jpgAdm Fallon stepped down in March as the head of Central Command - that most turbulent of the USA's military fiefdoms, taking in Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and much of Central Asia. It was widely reported that he had argued with the White House about the need for subtlety and engagement n dealings with Iran rather than megaphone diplomacy or sabre rattling.

Some painted Adm Fallon as a knight errant, slaying the dragon of another neo-con misadventure (ie in Iran). In fact, talking to him at length it is evident that his views are much harder to categorize and that in many respects, like so many senior military men, his is conservative with that small "c", whatever his personal politics may be.

As we talk, Adm Fallon cautions against setting arbitrary deadlines on withdrawing troops from Iraq. When I suggest that is exactly what Barack Obama's campaign has been doing, he repeats his advice against setting calendar dates and suggests the next president should set overall policy but, after that, "let's let those that are best equipped to work the details of this... there are lots of people in the food chain who can deal with this pretty effectively".

This sounds like a clear tilt at Mr Obama who has insisted recently that he will be making the decisions on this matter. Never mind that President Bush and the Iraqi government have also had to become increasingly explicit about how long US combat troops will stay in Iraq, as they negotiate a treaty on their future strategic relationship, the admiral's real point is that timing should be left to the experts.

All of this makes me wonder how difficult Mr Obama's future relations with the military might be. He is no ignoramus on military matters or ¾±²Ô²µÃ©²Ô³Ü±ð in talking to military officers, having done his time on the Senate Armed Services Committee. But he does not have the natural empathy with them that a decorated fighter pilot and former prisoner of war like John McCain does.

If President Obama were to set himself on a collision course with military chiefs - be that on budgets or getting out of Iraq - that would undoubtedly cause him potent political difficulties. The terms of these military debates formerly so dry, and policy-wonk dominated have become very emotive since 9/11. Many millions of Americans still consider the nation is at war, and that the blood of thousands lost in Iraq or Afghanistan should not have been shed in vain.

Given the enormous strains of the past years - caused in part by the Administration's epic mis-management of the invasion of Iraq (and early years of occupation) - it is actually remarkable how limited the strains have been with President George Bush. True, one or two major generals gave damming testimony in Congress. True also that many military families share the wider public's opposition to long term operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. But for the most part President Bush has maintained a cosy relationship with his top brass.

General Jack Keane, former head of the US Army, and a key advocate of the Iraq surge strategy, once told me that things had gone wrong in Iraq because the president had been "too deferential" to his generals. That seems hard to credit, given the way America was driven into the Iraq war by ignorant "policy types", but Gen Keane's remarks make sense when one considers that having got into Iraq, the president gave his commanders a pretty free hand about how to get out, even when, in 2005-6, it started to become obvious that America's rushing for the door was making things in that country markedly worse rather than better.

While the standard liberal critique of General David Petraeus, the commander in Iraq who has been nominated as Adm Fallon's successor at CentCom, is that he is too close to the White House, and has been too ready to implement their surge policy, this has never seemed very convincing to me. Based on my own observations of Gen Petraeus and those around him, I think it was more a case of the general believing that avoiding defeat in Iraq was an imperative mission, which he, the professional military, and the president could make their common cause. Like so many of his generation, Gen Petraeus was determined to avoid "another Vietnam", and the president, having pinned his political legacy on Iraq was willing to give the general the resources to succeed.

Thinking back to times before 9/11, I can certainly remember that relations between President Bill Clinton and his military chiefs, often seemed pretty poisonous. One regularly heard them disparage him as ignorant of military affairs and bereft of any big ideas. President Clinton gave the US military directives - for example designed to avoid casualties during Nato's 1999 Kosovo campaign - that they considered idiotic, and some of them certainly let us know about it.

So Adm Fallon's views appear to constitute a warning against the doctrinaire approach - be that the neo-con one on Iran or the Obama campaign's presumption that withdrawal from Iraq can be driven entirely by political imperatives. Perhaps it is a plea also for whoever is elected president to take senior military advice seriously, unless they want to risk a turbulent relationship with their top brass.

Watch Mark Urban's interview with Admiral Fallon on Newsnight, Friday 8 August on ´óÏó´«Ã½ TWO.

Comments

  • Comment number 1.

    The gulf between military expediency and political necessity has always been greater than any observer can be comfortable with.

    The problem is that generally speaking a politician and a general will have two different view points - normally the general is only interested in the going in, he wants the politician to take command of the getting back out.

    It was true in WW2. Ike et al were perfect at getting in for the final days, of dealing the final blow to Hitler. But it was a very uncomfortable political coalition between UK/US, France and an already paranoid Russia that tried to sort out the aftermath.

    Where Iraq went wrong was that both Bush and Blair put vast amount of faith into a military designed and lead solution, and did not handicap the military to the issues of the exit strategy. Cosy relationships may have been had all round - but it is not want you want or need. It works better when the military and the politicians are at odds - then there is a chance that ALL scenarios get aired. When they are in agreement, things get forgotten.

    "Leave it to the military" is a very bad strategy; they are superb at their job, but their structure makes them fundamentally incapable of truly understanding, or even seeing, the bigger picture.

  • Comment number 2.

    #1 Gurubear

    Very sound points.

    However about the only thing that Honest John Major ever said that I strongly agreed with was "There was never any exit strategy".

    It was always obvious that the bridges had been burnt behind them and getting out without complete victory on all fronts was never going to be easy.

    So are there two view points or one and another "further down the food chain"?

    Therefore to me whilst your points are valid the strategic failure was political and to a largely unfair extent its the US military reputation that will probably carry the scars - metaphorically and literally.

    I think Mark Urban's point about the politicisation of the military campaign is important. Can they carry on with that approach and is that the coded message from Fallon to Obama?

    I agree with Obama about getting out, and he has said "with care". He has a view to the "contract" with the voters. Fallon naturally has a view to the "contract" with the soldiers who will get shot up if they stimulate resistance.

    But I have confidence in Obama so far and I think he will listen to reason. He is not a blinkered ideologue.


  • Comment number 3.

    Robin Lustig has quoted a well-informed article about the threats against Iran, most particularly from Israel.

    It is claimed that the visit of the current CJCS to Israel "did not give a green light"
    to Israel's attack.

    But that, in addition to "bunker-buster" bombs already delievered, advanced anti aircraft and rocket missiles were promised.

    Funding and giving offensive weapons to Israel has always been a mistake. However, even defensive weapons can used by the fanatics who control Israel as even more reason to launch an attack with impunity.

    Can the Chairman of the US Joints Chiefs of Staff ever be a military man who will NOT play with the politicians?

  • Comment number 4.

    #3 - Xie_Ming

    'Can the Chairman of the US Joints Chiefs of Staff ever be a military man who will NOT play with the politicians?'

    Hopefully yes.

    For the first 20 years or so after the second world war, almost every head of government had some experience of military service. We are now well into the second generation of leaders who have none. Now more than ever, it is incumbent on senior military officers to spell out quite clearly and unequivocally what is and is not feasible and what the cost will be in terms of money, manpower and possible collateral damage because the politicians simply do not know.

  • Comment number 5.

    1. At 11:29pm on 07 Aug 2008, Gurubear wrote:

    "The problem is that generally speaking a politician and a general will have two different view points - normally the general is only interested in the going in, he wants the politician to take command of the getting back out."

    Sorry, I don't agree at all and your Ike analogy proves it. The US and UK armies STILL haven't left Germany.

    A soldier is concerned with fighting and winning a battle. Once the fight is over he wants to go back home. Its the politicians that keep the soldiers abroad for decades for political, not military gain.

    #4. Bush's military service in the air national guard was pretty minimal, but its not true to say he had no military service.

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