The challenge of supporting Afghans without breeding dependence
There is a basic contradiction on show here and I don't know how it is going to be resolved.
The international community is fed up with poor performance by the Afghan government. It wants results. It is piling in more soldiers, administrators, and development experts.
Yet the more of these people who go there, the less capable the Afghan state must appear to its people.
There are of course explanations about how this square can be circled. If many of the soldiers and aid workers are actually going there to mentor or train Afghans then it should be possible for Afghanistan to stand on its own two feet more quickly - that's the theory.
It ought to work, but the US and other Nato countries are just so impatient to get results that this plan to stand up more reliable Afghan institutions could easily be undermined.
Talking at the conference to Kai Eide, the outgoing UN Special Envoy to Afghanistan, it is obvious that he is quite concerned about certain moves making the Afghans more dependent on foreign help rather than less.
He caused a stir by suggested in a recent press interview that the US troop surge could have this effect.
Seeing at first hand during a recent operation in Helmand how the Afghan army provided only around 10% of the troops and their men were used to enter homes and handle detainees, while much larger numbers of US troops fought the Taliban, I can see Mr Eide's point.
Pouring that number of Americans, with all their immense firepower into that district sent its own message about who was in charge and who was subservient.
The US military, under orders from the White House, wants quick results. But this business of building governance or "capacity" is inherently a long and drawn out one.
If the Afghans are not ready to clear an area or build a road, it is the foreigners who are stepping in to get it done.
The Chinese have a programme to train Afghan government officials. They instructed 500 so far, and are planning the same again.
Other nations have some similar projects and much of this involves university-level courses outside Afghanistan.
This is the other end of what was discussed at the London conference - slow, unspectacular capacity building.
So if the new capacity is growing only slowly where will this leave those districts being cleared of Taliban during the coming months at such a high cost in lives and money?
One possibility is that the international effort will simply falter as the areas are turned over to Afghan officials and police.
In trying to resolve that dilemma generals and diplomats are now placing increasing emphasis on the plans to turn Taliban by financial and other incentives.
The task of standing up a bigger, better, Afghan state will after all be much easier if the forces that oppose it can be undermined.
It's a good theory anyway.
I'm Mark Urban, and I'm Newsnight's diplomatic and defence editor. I deal with war and peace around the world, so with apologies to Leo Tolstoy, that's what this blog will be called. No literary pretensions, just an attempt to drill down to the key issues - people around the world struggling for peace and security.
Comment number 1.
At 28th Jan 2010, jauntycyclist wrote:the history of the british empire is full of such debates? in those days they called it the white man's burden. which language highlights the essential quality of arrogance behind such 'liberal interventionism' .
we should not have such questions because we should not be involved?
did you find out what was the name of their nation building textbook? or are they just making it up as they go along?
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Comment number 2.
At 29th Jan 2010, sizzlestick wrote:鈥渢he more of these people who go there, the less capable the Afghan state must appear to its people鈥 I thought the opposite is more true. If there is no Coalition Forces present, Afghanistan is no country, essentially a failed state. The geographical area marked out as 鈥楢fghanistan鈥 is really an area of conflict, tribal warfare and cultivation of illegal drugs which was the case for a long time since the Soviet invasion of that bordered area marked 鈥楢fghanistan鈥. Even when the Taliban set a theocratic state, it was not a united country as there were other tribal areas not under its control. Did Afghanistan have an outstanding grievance or overt conflict with the USA before 911 attacks? Did Afghanistan declared war on USA during the 911 attacks? The answer is no to both questions. Yet the Taliban sheltered Al Qaeda鈥檚 Osama Bin Laden. Is this defiance an act of a legitimate country? It did not care that its own people could get hurt if USA responded militarily.
大象传媒 news of the 鈥楲ondon conference on Afghanistan鈥 reported that there is 鈥淭he plan is that, province by province, the Afghans will take over the lead role, starting in quieter areas late this year or early next鈥. This got to be a British-inspired idea. And had worked in the Malayan Emergency, the local newspapers always mentioned the efforts of the locals in British-led military operations. There were action reports of elite soldiers of the Malay Regiment, Chinese Special Branch officers, the Dayak jungle trekkers and so on.
News of speeches from sympathetic and allied politicos from the local population will always be perceived as 鈥榩aid-for advertisements鈥. In the Vietnam War, USA escalated its involvement thinking it could do better without a more active South Vietnamese role. And we know how it ended.
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Comment number 3.
At 29th Jan 2010, sizzlestick wrote:And another thing: 鈥渋ncreasing emphasis on the plans to turn Taliban by financial and other incentives鈥. This should not be done under the cloak of anonymity unless it is part of a covert operation. There should be not be paying out money and expect the Taliban-man to just disappear. If the Taliban-man turned, show him on TV, interview him to extract his disenchantment with Taliban and be sure to broadcast and tell the whole of Afghanistan. This is a tried and tested psychological method.
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