大象传媒

Hi Will, you do seem to have a soft spot for deep thinking mavericks, though they all seem to be of a certain ilk.
This guy has a pretty impressive set of credentials but I notice not in the field of evolutionary biology, which could be a bit of a drawback if you are trying to start a revolution in this particular field of scientific enquiry.
A quick google threw up what seemed to be fairly devastating deconstructions of his approach, so I would'nt waste too much time on this guy.
Next please!

From Genesis to Aristotle and Ptolemy, ancient philosophies proved in retrospect, you can't abstractly philosophise what they call natural law without coming out looking like a blithering idiot. When facts emerge from observation and logical deduction, they tear those philosphies to shreds every single time. Those trains of thought are turned into catastrphic train wrecks and their modern apologists ride them right off the rails into the cravasses below. It's so easy to disprove them with contradictory observable facts that few scientists even bother to prove at least some of them don't hold together when taken within the context of their own logic the way I demonstrated with Genesis on the thread about the bible being anti-intellectual. Why do we study philosophy? Because the unexamined life does not pay philosophers and philosophy professors a living wage.

Where did Science come from?

Foder's a great thinker. I've been following the correspondence battle in the London Review of Books with some of the big hitters from evolutionary biology (Steve Jones et al) responding to Foder's challenges. They take him seriously, and they should. His ideas represent the most serious attack on natural selection ever mounted. Foder's a committed evolutionist, so it's pathetic that some of his opponents have tried to call him a creationist for having the audacity to challenge the status quo.

Incidentally, nobledebee, your reasoning seems to be: read Foder's CV, his PhD isn't in biology, therefore he has nothing to say. Ridiculous. Thankfully, the serious players in evolutionary biology don't adapt that anti-intellectual approach. They deal with his ideas, not his CV. If your strategy worked, we'd have to dismiss Dan Dennett's contributions to psychology and biology too. Let's play the ball, not the man.

i agree augustine. + nobeld . . . whats the evidence that will has a soft spot for maverick thinkers? its an interesting article. more interesting is the fact that some darwinians are so closed minded that they have attacked this atheist philosopher for just having doubts about natural selection! like that's REALLY scientific.

Anyone who dismisses Jerry Foder as quickly as nobledebee really can't be taken seriously. I disagree with Foder on natural selection, which is just as well since I work in evolutionary biology (and in philosophy too, though that's a long story), but he is an extremely important contributor to this field. The questions he asks must be answered by those of us committed to a science that learns from and builds on Darwin's insights. I'll go further than augustine, in fact: if Foder's CV disqualifies him from the conversation, so would Darwin's.

Well, I'm slowly working my way through this, and while I (and a lot of people working in genetics and evodevo) have a great deal of scepticism about "evolutionary psychology", Fodor's (not "Foder") criticisms are MILES off. If anything they are criticisms of some of the terminology used in the field, or in how his little understanding is piqued by the terminology, but do not appear to touch the actual science *at all*.

Maybe he's seen as an "important thinker" in some quarters, but he needs to tighten himself up a bit, and maybe even finish his papers before he releases them. This, for example, is drivel:
...it鈥檚 perfectly obvious what鈥檚 wrong with this line of thought:
natural selection doesn鈥檛 have a mind; a fortiori, it has nothing in mind when it selects among frogs.
Likewise, if genes were intentional systems, there would be an answer to, for example, the question
whether natural selection favors creatures that really do care about the flourishing of their children or
creatures that really care only for the propagation of their genotypes. All you would have to do, if you want
to know, is find out which phenotype their genes prefer.
Except, however, that genes don鈥檛 have preferences. The logic of all these cases is always the same:
what鈥檚 selected underdetermines what鈥檚 selected for because outcomes always underdetermine intentions.
But if genes are themselves intentional systems, or if there is a Mother Nature who selects with ends in
view, then which creatures are selected can after all determine which traits they are selected for.

I mean, why even rehearse this nonsense? It is classic fallacy. Is Fodor making a point that he wants to shoot down? These points have all been addressed ad nauseam in *popular* evo books, never mind the proper literature. The paper (which seems to mean different things to philosophers than to scientists - can't see this crap getting past peer review) continues in this sort of vein, virtually deifying the reification fallacy. I'm going to have to struggle hard to complete it, because I'm half way through, and what Fodor has produced so far reveals him to be uncharitable, unknowledgeable, and a purely verbal thinker, with very little understanding.

Does that cut the mustard in the world of analytical philosophy? Perhaps. But Jerry's not in Kansas any more, Toto, and he would do well to actually get an understanding of biology before erecting such a ludicrous straw man (or set thereof).

So, how wrong do you have to *be* before you can be dismissed?

-H [which puts me with nobledebee on this one]

Helio, that paper is in progress, I think. Some academics do in progress papers online and improve them before peer review. I hear he's working on a book about this right now too, to be published this year by Cambridge Univ Press. Here's an exchange of correspondence about his ideas from the London Review of Books:

Why Pigs Don鈥檛 Have Wings
From Simon Blackburn, Jerry Coyne, Philip Kitcher, Tim Lewens, Steven Rose WRITE:

Jerry Fodor persists with two provocative claims: first, that natural selection explanations are incoherent; second, that there is some alternative explanation for adaptive phenomena such as camouflage or beak shape (Letters, 29 November).
To show the incoherence of anything, you have to address it in the form in which its professional expositors deploy it. In large numbers of articles and books, published from 1859 to the present, evolutionary biologists use the following style of explanation. A characteristic of an organism (the colour of an animal鈥檚 coat, say) is as it is because of a historical process. In some ancestral population there was a variant type that differed from the rest in ways that enhanced reproductive success. (White polar bears, for example, more camouflaged than their brown confr猫res, were better at sneaking up on seals, were better fed and left more offspring.) If the variant has a genetic basis, its frequency increases in the next generation.
Is this incoherent? Nothing Fodor says bears on that question. Instead, he opposes a very particular way of presenting the explanation. Some people think we can talk of 鈥榮election for鈥� a characteristic, and identify rather precisely the traits that have been 鈥榮elected for鈥�. Fodor tries to argue that this is wrong: that there is no single correct answer (whether we know it or not) to the question of whether it was the whiteness of polar bears or their blending in with their surroundings that was 鈥榮elected for鈥�. Whether he is right is a philosophical issue about which people can disagree, but it has nothing to do with the coherence of Darwinian explanation. Natural selection proceeds if three elements are in place: variation in a trait, an effect of the variation on reproductive success, and some means by which the trait is inherited. Both the whiteness and the environmental blending emerged from the historical process that the selection explanation describes.
Although Fodor follows a long line of people, including Darwin himself, who recognise constraints on natural selection, he advocates something far more ambitious than his predecessors. He wants a replacement of natural selection, not supplements to it. Some of the signatories to this letter have emphasised the importance of constraints, and have written against the hyper-Darwinian practice of seeing adaptation everywhere. None of us has ever supposed that the appeal to constraints could eliminate all mention of selection.
Cases of convergent evolution are vivid illustrations of natural selection鈥檚 importance. Ichthyosaurs, sharks and dolphins share a similar body form; marsupial and placental mammals have counterparts that are almost identical in form. In different lines of descent, similar traits emerge. Fodor would have us believe that natural selection plays no role whatsoever in explaining these facts. Indeed, he doesn鈥檛 say how he thinks convergence 鈥� or any adaptation 鈥� should be explained, but merely tells us that he and a coauthor have something up their sleeve. The task they envisage is far more ambitious than that attempted by brilliant evolutionary theorists who have wanted to 鈥榚xpand鈥� Darwinism (for example, Stephen Jay Gould). Given the evidence that at least one of these would-be revolutionaries has little acquaintance with the biological theory he aspires to replace, we have little reason to think they will succeed.

Simon Blackburn, Jerry Coyne, Philip Kitcher, Tim Lewens, Steven Rose
University of Cambridge, University of Chicago, Columbia University, University of Cambridge, Open University

Jerry Fodor REPLIES:

Blackburn et al have a number of complaints about what I wrote. The first is exegetical: they say that the kind of adaptationism I鈥檝e attacked is not one that paradigm adaptationists endorse. I think that even a cursory glance at the relevant literature shows this is false. The standard current formulation has it that a main goal of evolutionary theory is to explain the distribution of phenotypic traits in populations of organisms, and that natural selection is the key to such explanations: organisms are selected for the ecological fitness of their phenotypes. Patently, any such theory is in want of a coherent account of what it is for a creature to be selected for some or other of its traits. But I don鈥檛 propose to argue the exegetical point. Let those the shoe fits wear it. I鈥檓 content if what I wrote serves a cautionary function: if you find yourself tempted to espouse this sort of adaptationism, don鈥檛!
Their second claim is that there is no incoherence (or, anyhow, none of the sort that I alleged) in selection theory as correctly understood. They don鈥檛, however, say what the correct understanding is. Rather, they offer some potted polar bear history: 鈥榃hite polar bears . . . more camouflaged than their brown confr猫res, were better at sneaking up on seals, were better fed and left more offspring.鈥� I don鈥檛 know whether this story is true (neither, I imagine, do they), but let鈥檚 suppose it is. They ask, rhetorically, whether I think it鈥檚 incoherent. Well, of course I don鈥檛, but that鈥檚 because they鈥檝e somehow left out the Darwin bit. To get it back in, you have to add that the white bears were selected 鈥榖ecause of鈥� their improved camouflage, and that the white bears were 鈥榮elected for鈥� their improved camouflage: i.e. that the improved camouflage 鈥榚xplains鈥� why the white bears survived and flourished. But now we get the incoherence back too. What Darwin failed to notice (and what paradigm adaptationists continue to fail to notice) is that the theory of natural selection entails none of these. In fact, the theory of natural selection leaves it wide open what (if anything) the white bears were selected for. Here鈥檚 the argument. Consider any trait X that was locally coextensive with being white in the polar bear鈥檚 evolutionary ecology. Selection theory is indifferent between 鈥榯he bears were selected for being white鈥� and 鈥榯he bears were selected for being X.鈥� What鈥檚 鈥榠ncoherent鈥� is to admit that the theory of natural selection can鈥檛 distinguish among locally coextensive properties while continuing to claim that natural selection explains why polar bears are white. Do not reply: 鈥楤ut it鈥檚 just obvious that, if the situation was as Blackburn et al describe, then it was the whiteness of the bears that mattered.鈥� The question is not what is obvious to the theorist; the question is what follows from the theory. Why is it so hard to get this very rudimentary distinction across?
Having got all that wrong, Blackburn et al add that 鈥楩odor tries to argue that . . . there is no single correct answer . . . to the question of whether it was the whiteness of polar bears or their blending in with their surroundings that was 鈥渟elected for鈥�.鈥� But I don鈥檛 argue anything of the sort. Since the hypotheses that the bears were selected for being white and that they were selected for matching their environments support different counterfactuals (what would have happened if their environment had been orange?) they can perfectly well be distinguished in (for example, experimental) environments in which one trait is instantiated and the other one isn鈥檛. I don鈥檛 claim that locally coextensive properties are indistinguishable in principle. I claim that, since the theory of natural selection fails to distinguish them, there must be something wrong with the theory. (I also don鈥檛 claim to have 鈥榮ome alternative explanation for adaptive phenomena鈥�; only that there had better be one sooner or later; and that it鈥檚 a plausible guess that, when there is, it will explain adaptive phenomena largely by appeal to endogenous constraints on phenotypes.)
Finally, they say that whether I鈥檓 right about all this is 鈥榓 philosophical issue鈥�. I don鈥檛 know how they decide such things; maybe they think that philosophical issues are the ones that nobody else cares about (a masochistic metatheory that many philosophers apparently endorse). Anyhow, the kind of philosophy I do consists largely of minding other people鈥檚 business. I am, to be sure, in danger of having insufficient 鈥榓cquaintance with the biological theory that [I aspire] to replace鈥�; but I鈥檓 prepared to risk it. A blunder is a blunder for all that, and it doesn鈥檛 take an ornithologist to tell a hawk from a handsaw. Tom Kuhn remarks that you can often guess when a scientific paradigm is ripe for a revolution: it鈥檚 when people from outside start to stick their noses in.

By the way Helio, I generally find that when people dismiss another academic's work on the basis of the academic's actual discipline, they aren't really in a position to lecture on what constitute's a *fallacy*

gveale;

"Where did Science come from?"

God invented it....to confound theologians. It seems to have worked.

Gus, I don't need to appeal to a philosophy degree to spot some of Fodor's fallacies, and if you think that I can't comment on him, you can hardly think he is in a position to comment on biology.

Yes, maybe this is a "work in progress", but it's more like a train wreck.

Helio

It would depend on where he intends to publish. I haven't read the paper, but if he has important things to say about incoherence or explanation, as opposed to Natural Selection, then he could have completely misunderstood Darwinism, but still have valid logical points.
So you could critcise Aristotle to illustrate your point, because you are focusing on logic and inferences. Aristotle or a naive view of evolution can be your "patsy". So you might write a paper on Anselm's Ontological Argument (as *he* intended it to be read), even though it's universally rejected, simply because you have some point about set theory.
But that doesn't seem to be what Fodor is up to from what I've read. I have to say that *I'm* a bit bewildered by the description of Natural Selection that you quoted. Isn't he just retreading old ground? I thought biologists had moved on from this picture of Evolution quite a while ago.Maybe there are Evolutionary Psychologists who still get away with this description of Evolution in their work - sneak it in through the back door to make their explanations work. But why not just point that out?
A good Philosophy of Science Journal wouldn't publish a critique that obviously has the science wrong.
I should probably read the paper, but I've never rated Fodor, and this isn't a topic that interests me all that much.
As for philosophy and science - Mach, Boltzmann, Einstein, Schrodinger, Planck etc all valued philosophies importance to science. Einstein and Planck worked to create a chair for the Philosophy of Science in Berlin's Physics department. Mach and Boltzmann both held chairs in Philosophy of Science in Vienna. Just because someone produces a *bad* piece of philosophy of science doesn't mean it's all bad.
In fact, all Dawkins does is repeat Hume's arguments. Scientific arguments don't really advance his case at all - they serve as "consciousness raisers". The arguments remain philosophical. And very poor philosophy at that. But that doesn't mean that Scientists should keep their noses out of Philosophy or Religion.

GV

I've just read Gus's posts. I'm not sure that you got his point about fallacies. Your attack on Fodor was ad hominem.

But I'm not sure that Fodor has even got an argument against the view of Natural Selection that he outlines(call it NSJF). I can't see that NSJF is "incoherent" at all. Just rule out anything but a vanishingly small probability that there are properties coextensive with the whiteness of Polar Bears. What else would distinguish them from other bears in that environment?
Well, *logically* we could imagine that invisible pixies favour the reproduction of White Bears, and bless them with many children. That's not logically incoherent. But we've no reason to give this a prior probability anywhere close to the prior probability that Polar Bears are white!!!!Doh!
We don't know *with certainty* that this is why Polar Bears are white. But if our standard is certainty, there goes Science, History - and Philosophy.
A cursory glance at the literature on Bayesianism or Explanation would rule out this sort of critique. Maybe I should read the paper just to see if this is his argument.

GV

Plowing throgh the arcane jargon philosophers use is tedious for someone not familiar with it like me. Working in a profession that has its own jargon, I can see where it is sometimes necessary as a shorthand for complex ideas but it seems to me that here, it is used so excessively as to exclude outsiders from understanding what is being said and instead to bluff and intellectually intimidate. Most people won't admit they don't understand what is being said for fear of being called ignorant or stupid. But I will admit it. I intend to figure it out if I have to look the words up in a dictionary one by one just as I did with the so called Red Lines for Britain in the EU Constitution, the Red Lines being forty pages of not opt outs as was advertised but time limited 5 year reprieves. There the legal jargon was used to hide the truth from the majority as it may have been here. Because of this, no one who voted for the EU Constitution ever claims to have read it through let alone understood it. Opinions about it were based on other than what it actually said.

Here's something like the classical Darwinian hypothesis which doesn't need to be explained by referring to a dictionary for the meaning of every other word. Frogs thrive on protien food like flies. Those most adept at catching them with the longest, fastest, stickiest, most accurately aimed tongues, the sharpest vision for seeing them, the quickest reflexes, and the greatest skill survive and prosper most, and therefore reproduce most handing down their DNA to successive generations. Why do they do this? Because they get hungry and like to eat flies. That is also part of their genetic makeup. Those who didn't or were less skilled at it died out and didn't breed as frequently. Now which word wouldn't Jerry Fodor understand.

Probably the word "like", in relation to a purely physical mechanism.

I could be completely wrong, and haven't read the full paper, but it seems to me that Fodor is making a wider point about teleology rather than about the precise mechanisms of evolution.

Marcus wrote

"Plowing throgh the arcane jargon philosophers use is tedious for someone not familiar with it like me. Working in a profession that has its own jargon, I can see where it is sometimes necessary as a shorthand for complex ideas but it seems to me that here, it is used so excessively as to exclude outsiders from understanding what is being said and instead to bluff and intellectually intimidate."

That's a pretty broad brush. But yeah, it rings so enormously true for some who produce lots of big words (and usually lots and lots of words in general, big words or small) but little knowledgeable or well-reasoned substance. No need to go looking very far (stay on this blog site) for examples of those who fall within that category.

Graham,
Your attack on Fodor was ad hominem

And that, my boy, is complete and utter tripe.

-H

Well, boys, I'm afraid an argument against something because you don't understand the terminology is no argument at all.

Marcus even offered his own suggestion...check the dictionary. even if you have to check every word, better that than make an argument based on your own ignorance.

[Or maybe you were addressing Gus, and not me?]

My concern is that Fodor dresses up his poor understanding of what natural selection IS and what it DOES in fancy-sounding jargon (and unnecessary jargon at that, taking 26 pages to say what could be said in 2) and presents it as if it's "anal ytical philosophy". Well, it's anal, for sure, but I don't know what the word "ytical" means.

The "Jack and Jill" story is a case in point. It's actually fairly meaningless to talk about "selection for" something in the case of individual organisms, but that is not what is being claimed, except in shorthand. What IS being claimed is that some genetic factors become more prevalent in a population over time because they have phenotypic effects that lead to their greater reproduction relative to their alleles. This is natural selection, and this is what results in adaptation. It is classic "Darwinism", and Fodor's long-winded poem fails to address it.

So what do we do with this magnum opus that has clearly given Jerry a few haemorrhoids in its production? Well, we might decide that there is a communication problem - some philosophers don't understand evolution. We might decide that there is a problem with our formulation and understanding of evolution, but this effort doesn't give us any grounds to think that. We might decide that some people are cognitively unable to think about what is actually going on, but have to think in terms of purely verbal constructs, leading them into the territory of that old reification fallacy.

Whatever. But do we have to take this seriously? No, but we could indeed use it as a patsy if we really wanted. Or a door-stop.

Hello Bernards_Insight,

"Well, boys, I'm afraid an argument against something because you don't understand the terminology is no argument at all."

You seem to have misunderstood both Marcus' post and mine. The point is not about not understanding it. The complaint is about those who fancy themselves to be deep philosophical thinkers making things needlessly and to some extent intentionally unclear. Thereby attempting to veil what little substance there is in the message they want to convey.

Well, Marcus has admitted that he doesn't understand it.

To say that the jargon is "needlessly" unclear you are implying that you fully understand what it means, and that it could be made clearer.....

but then again, if you fully understand what it means, there is no need for it to be made clearer....and if you don't fully understand what it means, then you should maybe take the jargon as being used for a purpose, and do some research into what it means.

I realise, of course, that you were really just having a cheap dig at philosophical discourse on this blog.

Perhaps you could give examples of this "needless" jargon, and allow us the chance to explain why it is not "needless"

Hello Bernards_Insight,

"but then again, if you fully understand what it means, there is no need for it to be made clearer."

I disagree. If I, and anyone else who read something, fully understood it, then it is generally still a good thing to avoid making it harder than necessary for people to understand things. I assume you would agree that making things clearer is in general a good thing in itself, even if people could figure out the same thing that was phrased less clearly?

"I realise, of course, that you were really just having a cheap dig at philosophical discourse on this blog."

It was bit more narrowly focuses than that. It was a dig at those whose posts are e.g. full of fancy words (like various 'isms') but mostly lack substance.

"Perhaps you could give examples of this "needless" jargon, and allow us the chance to explain why it is not "needless""

Ok. I'll go through some threads and dig up some examples. That is something that will take a good bit of time, it's unlikely I'll get around to that this week.

Yes, i perhaps wasn't as clear as I could have been. (ironically)

The point is, if someone is needlessly complicating matters to avoid argument, and you can see through that complication, then it doesn't hinder you from giving a reply.

You can plead for the slow-witted and ask everyone to be more clear....that plea could be made to lots of people on this blog.

But if you suspect that people are deliberately obfuscating, then, by dint of your catching them at it, it hasn't worked.

I'll look forward to those examples.

Actually, this isn't really relevant to anything, so feel free not to bother. the only reason I mention it is because I can probably guess at some of the things you would consider obfuscation, whereas I would consider them much needed detailed clarification, which often involves dense jargon.

I suppose it just depends on the background knowledge of whoever reads it,doesn't it.

Perhaps some of us are guilty of sopeaking in a philosophical language that non-philosophers may not immediately grasp.

Scientists often speak in a language that non-scientists may not immediately grasp. If the writer feels it neccessary, I think it really is up to the reader to do some background reading, or to simply ignore it.

If something isn't clear enough for you, look into it in greater detail.

Like theories of the use of "analogy", for example.

Marcus has recently accused me more than once of playing "word games" by speaking of analogy.

If he bothered to do some research into analogy, not only would he see the relevance to the argument in question, but he'd amusingly realise that using the term "word games" was unintentionally apt...:)....That's a clue.

but no, instead of that, he just accused me of needless jargon and playing word games.

The point being, had he inquired into the meaning of that jargon, he'd have realised that it was far from needless, and was actually very relevant....

Hello Bernards_Insight,

"The point is, if someone is needlessly complicating matters to avoid argument, and you can see through that complication, then it doesn't hinder you from giving a reply."

Agreed.

"I suppose it just depends on the background knowledge of whoever reads it,doesn't it."

I'll agree with that as well, and that language from philosophers and scientists be troublesome for others.

"I'll look forward to those examples. Actually, this isn't really relevant to anything, so feel free not to bother."

Thanks for relieving me of that obligation.:) While I would have dug up some examples if you hadn't said that, the time required will be happily spent on something else now.

So it's an easy dig to accuse somebody of using "needless" jargon....but the writer may well have thought that it provided much needed clarity and qualification, given and understanding of what it means. So people should really study the jargon in detail before crying that it's needless.

Anyway, evolution...is there a need for all that jargon about "selection" and "adaptation"?

I just saw your post 25 appear.

"Marcus has recently accused me more than once of playing "word games" by speaking of analogy."

I had seen a few blips of that long exchange, but I think I'm going to pass on getting into that one. Reading that whole thing over carefully to see who of you two I agree with might require the same amount of time as digging up those needless jargon examples, which you fortunately just relieved me of. :)

Ha, fair enough. How did we go so drastically off the point here again....

oh wait, it was Marcus, wasn't it!

:)

H

Sorry if I annoyed you old chap. Didn't mean to sound snippy.

It's just that you said something like "Fodor doesn't get the science right" and then left lesser mortals unsure as to where your problem lay, exactly. I can guess - but your knowledge would be worth sharing here.

If I get the chance I'll look at Fodor's paper tonight; I have to say that the argument in his letter doesn't seem to compute. And that's just the argument, never mind the issue of the science.

SO on the evidence *on this page* even if he had the science right, I'm not sure that he has much of an argument.

And you're telling me that my suspicion about his description of the science is correct - he's oversimplifying the science at the very least, just plain wrong at most.

GV

GV

Hi Graham,
Well, I just thought you were doing me a little injustice :-) No offence taken, old bean!

From what I can see, Fodor doesn't go near the science at *all* in this effort. It is all based on argument, and that argument is poorly thought-out. Has he even read any material on evolution post-Darwin? Part of his difficulty seems to stem from the language that we use in evolutionary biology - he has a problem with that because terms like "selected for" imply that natural selection is exercising a conscious *choice*, but this is just Fodor not having a damn clue what he is talking about. How is it that Fodor thinks that he can say "ceteris paribus" while the rest of us say "all other things being equal"? The answer - he cannot grant that other disciplines have their own jargon and shorthand - everything needs to be written in the pseudointellectual verbage of philosophy. Well, sorry, Jerry - some of us like our concepts clear and accessible. If you want us to explain what "selected for" actually means in biology, why didn't you just ask, instead of going and making a twit of yourself?

Will, your assessment of this Fodor individual is way too generous. There are two kinds of clever - smart clever and stupid clever; from this "contribution" I am getting the impression that Fodor is the latter.

-H

H
I'd like to take a look at Fodor's paper over the weekend. So I'd like to make sure that *I've* an adequate definition of evolution. You've a scary knowledge of matters biological. So I'd like to run my understanding of the theory by you.

It was my understanding that Evolutionary Biology is offering a "Statistical" Explanation. Evolutionary explanations do not state initial conditions and give laws which predict exactly what will happen next. Rather you sketch an evolutionary scenario that includes a number of mechanisms that produce genetic variation.

These mechanisms include simple "point" mutations, but also include polyploidy (chromsonal doubling),chromosonal inversions, chromosonal translocations, gene insertion, gene deletion, mutations that stop the expression of a gene, and gene duplication. New information can enter a population through "gene flow". And of course there is "recombination" which has the effect of "gene shuffling" in gametes.(Is that a sufficient list, or have I missed something important?)

Importantly, mutations do not occur because they would be useful to the organisms in which they occur. Some physical events raise the probability of a mutation occuring. But a beneficial mutation is not more likely to occur because it would be beneficial. The causation goes through the physical facts about the organism and its environment.

Speciation occurs when one population of organisms ceases to interbreed with other organisms. This can occur by allopatric mechanisms(populations become separated geographically) or sympatric reasons (two subpopulations can no longer interbreed for morphological reasons or differences in behavior).

The change in genotypes leads to organisms with phenotypes that promote the passing on of the mutated genotypes. SO some set changes in genetic information and environmental interactions will eventually occur in a way that raises the probability of a species containing new features (like "acute vision")that give a reproductive advantage to that species. And these features should be described in sufficiently general terms.

The point is that within the boudaries set by certain initial conditions, certain developments (increased intelligence, dexterity etc) that bring reproductive to different populations of organism are not unlikely given Neo-Darwininan Evolution.

Is that definition fair enough?

GV

Hi Graham,

Er, yes, sort of. It's very very simple at the bottom level. Populations consist of individuals. The genepool is the effective pool of alleles available for reproduction into the next generation. The phenotypes of organisms are (principally) determined by the genes that they as individuals possess. When we talk of evolution, *really* what we are talking about is the distribution of alleles within a population. So natural selection is not really about competition BETWEEN species, but WITHIN species. When one species is replaced by an invader (think red & grey squirrels, for example), that's not natural selection - that is more like niche invasion, and extinction of the former niche holder - effectively, the environment changes faster than the adapted population is able to evolve to. NS still occurs in these contexts, but the gene pool gets smaller and smaller.

But I digress. The mechanisms by which genetic variations occur are pretty well known, and you've mentioned some of them. They are "random" in that they don't have an eye to the phenotype - they just occur, and over time the variation in a population increases. Natural selection is just the name we give to the simple fact that some genotypes make it less likely that the organism will reproduce (so will decrease in their proportion in the population), while others will be more conducive to their propagation, so will increase in frequency. There are thousands of genetic loci, and all this is going on in perhaps millions of individuals simultaneously. It is information processing on a gargantuan scale, if you think about it. Indeed, not only is it scientifically robust, it is completely logical and *inevitable*.

We can replicate this sort of heuristic search of "fitness space" using genetic algorithms, where competing solutions rapidly converge on their local optima, even with completely random starting conditions. Those optima are often not obvious in advance - teleology is no use whatsoever when you don't know what you want. To quote Monsters vs Aliens wrt brains, "It turns out you don't need one!" And to quote the Poynter Sisters, "It's Totally Automatic".

Indeed it's sweet. So sweet that a/ some people think it's bad for you, b/ some people can't handle it, so they try to get their buzz from cheap rubbish substitutes, c/ some people can't bear the fact that other people get it and they don't, so they pour on the sour grapes treatment, and d/ some people get it, love it, find it nourishing and fun, and want more and more and more.

Mmmmmm! Evolution!!

H

Thanks - I tried to keep "Selection" out of my description as it seems as if it has become like the "Selfish" in "Selfish" Gene. It means too many things to too many people. Your explanation of what the "Selection" in Natural Selection means was very helpful. That will keep me on the straight and narrow.

A few questions.

(i) Your definition (and mine) is focused on genes. I've heard grumblings about this sort of definition. Are they worth taking seriously? I take it the "gene - centred" explanation is the majority view?

(ii) If we take Fodor's frog example - and ignore the fact that he's focusing on one frog. NS is simply saying (i) that given a number of froggy populations, we can predict that one will gain a reproductive advantage through changes in it's genepool. (ii) we can't predict *in advance* what the advantage will be, but NS makes the specific change in phenotype *less surprising*. In that sense the appearance of frogs that snap at flies is explained by NS. It is more likely on NS than on pure chance, and just as likely on NS as on a teleological explanation. So teleology is "explained away".
(If anyone is wondering why teleology is explained away, it is because we have no more idea what a designer would do *in advance of his action* than what NS would do. And there is no a priori reason for saying that a designer couldn't use the mechanism of NS. And if we want to get all theological there are Christian reasons for keeping direct divine interventions down to a minimum. If miracles happen everyday then there ain't no such things as miracles.)
(iii) Do you want to go beyond the defence of NS that I've given in ii? Are you saying, along with Simon Conway-Morris and co., that there are only certain pathways that evolution can take? And that this explains phenomena like convergence? I've only glanced very briefly at Fodor's article, but if you do then I think you've killed his argument. I don't see that he has addressed that possibility at all.
(iv) Am I a little too hung up on the concept of speciation? Should I just drop this from a definition of evolution?

Thanks for the help, this is great.

GV

Hi Graham,

Apols for quoting extensively here, but I want to answer the questions as best I can :-)

(i) Your definition (and mine) is focused on genes. I've heard grumblings about this sort of definition. Are they worth taking seriously? I take it the "gene - centred" explanation is the majority view?

In terms of population genetics, the gene-centred view is certainly top. Some of the "group selection" arguments are relevant, but only in certain specific ways - the mechanics of the interaction of kin groups can influence the dynamics by which genes that "enable" them can spread through populations, and then there is the issue of replacement of population A by population B (like squirrels). However, WITHIN populations, it's the gene that rules (using the Dawkinsian ad hoc definition, rather than the precise molbio definition of a gene)


given a number of froggy populations, we can predict that one will gain a reproductive advantage through changes in it's genepool.

Not quite. Given ONE froggy population, consisting of lots of froggies built by froggy genes, there is genetic variation (we can go into that later). Given some stimulus (small black buzzy thing), some froggies will be more likely to decide to snap; some froggies will be better able to discern fly-like behaviour before they snap; some may be able to see whether it's a big thing or a small thing, and use that in their snap decision matrix. At least some of that variability will be genetic in origin. In general, given a lot of froggies, the genetic factors that end up giving their froggy owners the best meals with the least cost will come to predominate within the population, and the overall froggy phenotype will move towards a better fly-catcher, within the constraints imposed by other selective pressures. So all this is happening *within* the population, not *between* populations. This is how NS explains phenotypic adaptation.

(ii) we can't predict *in advance* what the advantage will be, but NS makes the specific change in phenotype *less surprising*.

Exactly. Sometimes it may be very counter-intuitive. NS is a short-range heuristic process; long-range teleology is simply not capable of generating the sort of organismal complexity that we observe in nature.

In that sense the appearance of frogs that snap at flies is explained by NS. It is more likely on NS than on pure chance, and just as likely on NS as on a teleological explanation. So teleology is "explained away".

Sort of - see above. NS heuristics can access areas of "gene space" that are really not available to teleology. For example, the recurrent laryngeal nerve in humans or the backward-wiring of our retinas are striking examples of "bad teleology", but they are readily explained by iterative short-range heuristics.

there are Christian reasons for keeping direct divine interventions down to a minimum.

Well, I must be *really* Christian, because I'm putting the level at nil! ;-)

If miracles happen everyday then there ain't no such things as miracles.)

Similarly if they don't happen at all ;-)

Right - enough gentle ribbing! Back to business...

Are you saying, along with Simon Conway-Morris and co., that there are only certain pathways that evolution can take? And that this explains phenomena like convergence?

The "you can't get there from here" scenario. Yes - this is well worked over in the evolutionary developmental biology (evodevo) literature. NS can really only access local optima in "gene space", even if there is a much better "solution" available just across that selective valley. So some evolutionary "decisions" may constrain the options available further down the line. Much as I would like a pair of tentacles coming out of my head, and even if that were extraordinarily useful to my fitness (the wife might disagree, but who knows) that developmental route is just not available to humans (yet).

Interestingly, this is relevant to so-called "irreducible complexity". Essentially, the argument of these people is that certain structures *do* represent isolated peaks in the fitness landscape, cut off from the rest of the landscape by deep surrounding chasms. This is a rather extraordinary claim when put like that, because it is readily possible in every case that has been mentioned so far to plot a route to the supposed peak, while avoiding the chasms. But I digress.

I've only glanced very briefly at Fodor's article, but if you do then I think you've killed his argument. I don't see that he has addressed that possibility at all.

Thank you :-) You're right though - his argument is based on a misunderstanding of biological terminology and the sense in which we use certain words. It's quite an embarrassing article in some ways - perhaps that's why he never sorted out the references or removed the typos. The response from scientists, of course, has been to point and laugh, and it has done his credibility no good at all.

(iv) Am I a little too hung up on the concept of speciation? Should I just drop this from a definition of evolution?

Well, speciation is important, but all it really is is population fission. One population splits by whatever means into two (or 3 or 4 or whatever), and over time the different populations accumulate different genetic characteristics that end up making them reproductively incompatible, even if they were re-merged. The mechanisms by which this can happen are many and varied, but the general process is pretty secure. There are some interesting examples of "ring species", such as northern hemisphere gulls. In the UK there are herring gulls and lesser black-backed gulls, which are considered entirely separate species. However, Euro herring gulls can interbreed with American herring gulls, which can interbreed with Vega herring gulls in Siberia, which can breed with Birula's gull and as you continue to move clockwise, you eventually end up with the LBB gull. So are they separate species?

Well, you could exterminate the intermediates, and then, yes, they would be. But there can be gene flow between the two populations, so no, they're not. It's complex and delicious. Species do not occupy defined discrete "boxes" - they are populations that are evolving all the time, and are defined BY their genepool, not by some platonic notion of "gullness" or "dogness" or "humanness". Human categorical thinking can (and frequently does) lead us into error when we approach the real world (and this causes more problems for some philosophers than it does for scientists; biologists at least have got used to this sort of thing).

Thanks for the help, this is great.

You are most welcome :-) Sorry for the long-winded reply!

-H

The more detailed the better! This is really helpful.

GV

Hi William

REF CS Lewis and evolution.

You have previously posted that CS Lewis was a theistic evolutionist.

Personally I fully accept Christians regardless of what their views are on this matter, but I am not so sure you have fairly represented CS Lewis' full position on the matter.

In Mere Christianity while not dismissing evolution, he certainly poured scorn on those who use evolution to bypass their conscience in order to do grubby deeds.

It would appear that as he neared the end of his life he was increasingly sceptical about evolution, saying;-

"I wish I were younger. What inclines me now to think you may be right in regarding [evolution] as the central and radical lie in the whole web of falsehood that now governs our lives is not so much your arguments against it as the fanatical and twisted attitudes of its defenders."


According to this author, see hyperlink, at one point he said he was not either attacking or defending evolution.

Apparently he was also a clear believer in a literal, fully developed Adam, whom according to this author he would dearly loved to have met;-




sincerely
OT

sorry...

ps by using evolution to bypass their conscience, I meant that he was criticising those people who used evolution to play down their belief in God, in order to allow themselves to do grubby deeds.

Peace at any price peter m?

I thought I was very realy about my own failings.

There are groups in the church where you can find reality and honesty, if we really want it.

Thanks for a very generous response portwyen.

shalom

CS Lewis is HUGELY overrated.

Is not!

Graham - I think you're thinking of CS *gas*. ;-)

Am not!

R2!

D2

[Here, where's Han Crawley?? Will - I hope the explanation for this is that you're taking a well-deserved break! :-)]

Yep, Will, new head of religious affairs or not, we want more threads.

Say, what about that new head of religious affairs?

H
You sure you're not mixing CS Lewis up with Alsiter McGrath?

Graham, it's Alister McGrath that commits that particular error, not me :-) [FWIW, Alister is also an over-rated windbag]

Agree with your point 47 though - I would have thought that would make an excellent topic. Somehow I don't even think an *atheist* would have created so much fuss for the slavering Mr Coulter.

One interesting thing is that the UK is only 70% Christian? If there's 5% Muslim, what is everyone else doing? Jewish & Hindu etc perhaps, but there'll be a lot of us godless in there, which is great!

"FWIW, Alister is also an over-rated windbag"

I haven't read much from him, but there was a link to some video of MacGrath and Dawkins on an older thread:

/blogs/ni/2007/08/on_the_cutting_room_floor.html

McGrath has complained that none of that was included in Dawkins' documentary. I think he should thank Dawkins. I watched the whole thing twice and could hardly distinguish any good points MacGrath made. His responses were covered in so much verbal diarrhea. If you gave him a blank piece of paper asked him to shortly write down his steps of reasoning point by point, I think it would remain just that, a blank piece of paper.

I'm really not too sure what 70% Christian means. Argyle in "Psychology and Religion" reports on surveys of religious beliefs in UK. About 37 % believe in a personal God who is concerned with us as individuals. Around 28% believe in an afterlife with a Heaven and Hell.
If you include concepts of God as an "impersonal force for good" or an "architect" (I'm working from memory here, but these are roughly the concepts surveyed) you get up to 70% with a belief in God. The sort of God the Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph like to defend.
Compare this to USA where belief in a Personal God stands at around 90%, belief in Hell over 70%. This gives you a comparison of traditional thesitic belief in two Western cultures.
So it is *a bit* simplistic to say that Britain is 70% Christian. A muslim might have a higher Christology (belief in the Virgin Birth, that Isa was a prophet, belief in the Second Coming) than an Anglican Priest.

Speaking of Anglicans, check out McGrath's Gifford lectures
especially lecture four; Evolutionary biology.

It'll make you wish Fodor was giving the lectures. A few tasters -
"Furthermore, whether evolution exhibits design, intentions or purposes or not, it unquestionably demonstrates a directionality."

Apparently the fact that organisms on earth *did* become more complex over time meant that they *had* to become more complex over time. Inevitably. And coscious observers were a foregone conclusion too.
Of course, Conway Morris and others *defend* such a position. But I wonder if they knew it was "unquestionably true"?

On Dawkins
"An excellent example is provided by the "genes-eye" view of
evolution, popularised by Richard Dawkins, which entails envisaging the
gene as an active agent...This anthropomorphic way of speaking involves the attribution of both agency and intentionality to an entity which is ultimately a passive participant in the process of replication, rather than its active director."

Now *I* know that's an unfair description of Dawkins' position. And what's worse, so does McGrath, because in "Dawkins God" he lambasted Mary Midgely for taking such a position.

It goes downhill from there. He's more interested in academic fashion ("the pendulum has swung in biology", "the latest writers say" and on and on it goes...) than rigorous argument. It's just embarassing at times.

Sorry 'bout the rant, but I figure you'd be one of the few sympathisers. I just cannot see why there is such a fuss about McGrath.

GV

Hi Graham,

"Compare this to USA where belief in a Personal God stands at around 90%, belief in Hell over 70%."

Those numbers may be slightly older ones? The American religious survey very recently published the outcome of their third extensive polling, carried out in 2008:



It states that non-belief is now up to 15% and that some 12% of Americans hold a deistic view. Subtracting a few Muslims, wiccans etc, that leaves at most three quarters for christianity, not all of them necessarily believing in a personal god.

PK

Yep, those figures are based on the International Social Survey Programme of 1991. It was one of the largest, and in keeping with the results found up to 2000. Another is underway - I think the surveys might be in, but I don't think there are published results yet.
The survey they're using is found here

[Unsuitable/Broken URL removed by Moderator]
I wouldn't be surprised if there had been shifts to deism and unbelief.

GV

Err, what did I say?

I've been away all day, I didn't hit the complaint button. ??

Graham, your assessment of McGrath is, I have to say, spot on. Intellectual integrity is not his forte; he's a showboater and a windbag.

Good work :-)

-H