大象传媒

Will,
These days, logical positivism is rejected by most philosophers as a self-referentially wounded proposal (because, in rejecting all metaphysical claims as "nonsense", logical positivism, which is itself a metaphysical claim, falls on its own sword).

I'm not sure I agree with that! On what basis is it a metaphysical claim? I would class it as an operational procedure. Are you suggesting "most philosophers" are committing a category error?

[I haven't looked deeply into this - just firing one off quickly.]

-H

Why do religious apologists always seem to need to tell porkies about some atheist or other losing his marbles on his death-bed? If every single athiest that ever lived suddenly declared undying love for Jesus, Mohammed, Buddha or Ganesh in their dying breath, what exactly would that prove about the existence or otherwise of these beings or their supernatural overlords?

Time for a kit-kat again, Mr Moderator?

Who does the beeb pay for such a shoddy service?

H

"I would class it as an operational procedure. "

And the difference you are implying is?

Will, my issue was with your statement. That was not a metaphysical claim - is it? Do LPs make the TRUTH CLAIM that all metaphysical statements are false, or assert the more general principle that they are simply unacceptable AS truth claims, without evidence? That would seem rather uncontroversial. Besides, museums are leaky, as Plantinga's attempted resurrection of the dusty old ontological argument shows. Or the fact that some people view Aquinas's 5 ways as relevant.

BTW, as a mere dabbler in these areas, I've checked the Wikipedia article, and really I don't think I could be bothered mounting a defence of LP - when you slam an "ism" on things, you're generally on a hiding to nothing, so I'm happy to adopt the consensus view that LP is a philosophical museum piece (along with Aquinas, Augustine, anything theistic, the author of Ecclesiastes, Ptah-hotep and the others).

Life is too short, and there is too much science to be done to engage in simplistic sophistry. :-)

"the more general principle they are simply unacceptable AS truth claims, without evidence"

That's controversial. As Ayer came to see - there's no evidence for that claim (without getting into a circular argument). So it's self-referentially incoherent. And what do you mean by "evidence"? A valid, persuasive argument? An Inference to a Good Explanatory Scheme? The LPs wanted empirical evidence.

But it was the claim that only empirically verifiable statements & analytic truths are meaningful that was - in your terms - cabbage.
Because that's not an empirically verifiable statement or an analytic truth and we all know what it means.

Outside Popular Science books is anyone defending Logical Positivism today?

GV

If you say that metaphysics is meaningless you're making a claim about every possible metaphysical statement - which is a claim about metaphysics - which is a metaphysical claim.

It's worth remembering that the LPs would have dismissed Tegmark as a metaphysician, and any entity that cannot be directly observed as a metaphysical hypothesis. They didn't hold their fire for Theists.

GV

AND the moderator kills another conversation!

"when you slam an "ism" on things, you're generally on a hiding to nothing"

What? Like Atheism? Scepticism? Agnosticism? Humanism? Darwinism? Feminism? Pacifism? Determinism? Utilitarianism? Consequentialism?
Subjectivism?

They're all automatically false if there's an 'ism' attached?
*None* of those words helpfully summarise a set of coherent ideas held by great numbers of people?

So all 'isms' are false and useless?

Wow!
GV

@Graham#11, I'm not saying that the statements arising from isms are necessarily false. Just that isms are not helpful as containers for such statements. Saying something is not necessarily true is not the same as saying that it is necessarily false - surely you have enough philosophical background not to slip up on THAT banana skin!?

As for metaphysical statements, if I say that they are all useless, the correct way to refute that is not to point out that it is self-refuting, but to provide a single example of a metaphysical claim that *is* useful. Otherwise you run the risk of being accused of dancing on the head of a pin. We *know* about Goedel - it doesn't freak me out. What we are trying to gain is knowledge, not verbage.

We have already discussed the major problems some philosophers seem to have with nouns - they view "things" as indivisible items with "properties" or "attributes" (you will recall the ontological fallacy here), rather than *systems* that display certain *behaviours*.

Does this make me a systematist? Do I care?

"some philosophers seem to have with nouns - they view "things" as indivisible items with "properties" or "attributes" (you will recall the ontological fallacy here), rather than *systems* that display certain *behaviours*."


Yeah, we've talked about this before. I've no idea what your point is.
Are you saying thatthere are no fundamental particles with basic properties (spin or whatever); or that there are no secondary properties like colours; or what exactly?
Is it all systems, all the way down? Or are you just re-labelling substances as systems, properties as behavior, and calling it progress?

Because if you just want to re-label what everyone else means by property no one would mind...realist or nominalist. Stipulate away dude
(-;

Ah, to get involved or not to get involved... is that a question? How can I know?

And here, Helio, did Graham just say something about cabbage?

:-)

Peter, it's hard to say. Certainly the Graham-system is exhibiting very cabbagoid behaviour - a decidedly brassicaceous output, no doubt.

Graham, no, I don't think you do quite get the point (but I don't give up on you! :-)

Yes, it is systems all the way down. We speak of spin as a property (back to the EPR problem and John Stuart Bell again), but really it is an output of a system. Eventually, when we get right to the bottom, the universe IS mathematical. There are no fundamental particles - just a number, and the rule by which that number is converted into another number.

This does not need a host system (e.g. a "Matrix") to work, any more than the Fibonacci sequence needs to actually be calculated in order to be correct. It exists in the same way as the Mandelbrot set exists - no god can change the Mandelbrot set, which is as infinitely surprising to a hypothetical god as it is to us. This was my point from previously. Mathematics completely undermines ANY possibility that a god can be a basal "necessary" being. God is contingent on mathematicological relationships, just like we are.

New book out on the subject: (review in New Scientist: ) [Mods - it's a proper link. Thanks!]

Graham, you may think the distinction unimportant, but it is vital, and if you can start thinking in terms of systems, I think you are unlikely to get tripped up as often by ontological fallacies.

You're just re-labelling "property" as "output" H. Maybe it's the same diff, maybe not. So long as you don't stipulate a conclusion instead of building an argument, I'd say you can call them whatever you like.

As for the mathematical idealism, well, fair enough. But what makes you think that's not metaphysics? New Scientist reviewed it?

GV

Helio

All this maths stuff (or much anything)... how do you know?

Graham, settle the head. I am highlighting the essentialist fallacy. Try this: is a dog a dog because it possesses a property of dogginess? If so, what IS dogginess?

Pete, are you making a point? If you wish to argue the converse, go right ahead.

H
Did I sound grumpy? Eek, I'd better stop posting past 10pm. Over on the "inn" thread I wrote a post that sounded like I was defending the KKK.

Note to self: include more smileys!

Is there a real entity "dogginess" - as real as, say, Pi or Euler's number? I don't think so. That's not what it means (IMHO) to refer to the property of "dogginess".
There would just be a set of characteristics that all dogs have in common - so we can accurately use talk of dogs, or whatever, to tell the truth about the world. And we can identify those characteristics, and we don't invent those characteristics and impose them on the world. Our minds/brains can map reality accurately enough.
I can see why talk of systems and behaviors might prevent philosophers from sounding like Platonists. Seriously, that's a fair point on your part. But I'd worry that the po-mos would use the change in terminology to say that we can only impose conceptual schemes on the world, and that our conceptual schemes cannot refer to reality. So folk would just start tripping over other mistakes.
Yeah, there are Philosophers who think that there is a "form" of dogginess as real as numbers. But not many. I can't think of one off the top of my head, as it happens. (I've met a few refugees from scholastic phiosophy departments who hold to things *like* this).
You're much more likely to meet a philosopher who'll tell you that there are no beliefs or intentions in the real world, and that talk about beliefs, truth and knowledge is just "folk psychology". Which just seems to be the opposite extreme.
(As an example, it was Fodor's hatred of anything vaguely metaphysical that led to his really annoying article on Darwin).

Sorry about the grumpy sounding post. It was just meant to be brief.

GV

Hi Graham, no probs :-) Actually, that theologian chappie Brian Leftow came over to Belfast a while back and gave the greatest dose of a talk, riddled with the essentialist fallacy. He was probably more interesting than Swinburne, who, while also apparently essentialist, is quite the most boring speaker I have *ever* listened to. But that is by the by.

My point in bringing up the systems & behaviour thing is in order to make what I think is an important point. We have to change our way of thinking of things. You may feel it makes no difference, but I rather think otherwise.

If we take an apple, you may suggest it has the property of redness. However, you KNOW that in reality it has no such property - to say this simply means that the skin reflects photons of a certain wavelength, and absorbs others. Redness is not something that the apple HAS, but something that the apple DOES (in certain circumstances).

The main thrust of what I am trying to say is that there is a better way of thinking about the world that avoids essentialist errors (and the various forms of the ontological argument, such as the one you put forward, are trapped in these errors).

Now there is a problem here for theists. For one thing, "sin" cannot be something you are tainted with - it can ONLY be something that you DO. Saintly relics do not have magical power; the host & wine are not in any meaningful sense suffused with the essence of Jesus, nor can/do they become his body & blood. Holy water is not holy; people are not possessed by demons. There is no crazy essence suffusing things.

That being the case (or, rather, that being the most constructive way of looking at things), we can see that the only "thing" a god can possibly be is a system. A system needs a host reality - mathematics, in fact. Thus, a system can be thought of as a number, and the rule for turning that number into another number. And that is all the reality that we need to explain the big question - WITAAA.

But essentialist thinking will continue; people will happily protect themselves from thinking these dangerous thoughts. They will purposely avoid that which causes them to open their eyes - just a wee slit, lest the light bleach their retinas and explode their brains...

;-)

H

Swinburne wouldn't be essentialist in the sense that you mean. Not at all like Leftow.
That said, I agree - he won't win any prizes for public speaking. His books aren't exactly page turners either. (Well, they are if you're interested in teh arguments).
Generally I'd prefer Swinburne to most of the other big names in Philosophy of Religion. When you disagree with Swinburne you know exactly *where* and *why*. You just need to be well motivated when reading his books.

GV

"Redness is not something that the apple HAS, but something that the apple DOES(in certain circumstances)"

Actually, I agree! Most realists would interpret the property of redness this way. They'd just add that it is the bringing about a certain sort of experience in certain types of observer. (*defining* that experience in words - that'll make your head hurt. But you'll see what I mean).

I wouldn't know a lot about Leftow's metaphysics.

GV

Helio

"Pete, are you making a point?"

Well, kinda. Read as rhetorical questions, "Ah, to get involved or not to get involved... is that a question? How can I know?" and "All this maths stuff (or much anything)... how do you know?" are making a point.

How do we know stuff: systems, redness, data, interpretations and so on? Please don't get me wrong, I'm not arguing for 'not knowing', or for 'po-mo fluff', I do think we know stuff, and I think the stuff we know is great, it's just that when we say we know stuff we're making assumptions about how we know. It's one of the reasons I continue to be happy with the assumption/premise/belief: 'god'.

So, Pete, you're saying that nobody really knows, my brain hurts, ergo Yahweh?
Interesting.

What, therefore, can be the problem with *un*belief? Why would/should you wish other people to believe what you believe, when you only believe what you believe because you don't know why anyone should really believe or not believe anything at all?

Why not just ditch that pixie and come and have fun with us real gritty explorers, rather than snaffle more ham sandwiches and too-sweet buns from the PWA while complimenting the minister on a sermon that was marginally less tedious than last week's? Look around your church - are any of these people really "saved" in any meaningful sense? Maybe that is what the vantage point of the pulpit offers to the preacher. OMG, he secretly intones as he stands up there, mouthing vapid nonsense that passes for deep theology. Mrs Miggins is going to heaven, but she has less than half a clue about anything. So is old Joe, the crusty old bigot. And fiery Nigel, who loudly murmurs "Amen" through the sermon. And loads of those fresh-faced youngsters - on fire for the Lord, but with zero knowledge of what life is about - they may learn, please god. But is ANY of this true? Did Jesus REALLY think he was dying for *us*? It hardly seems likely. Did he really rise? Hardly - those half-baked gospel stories are virtually worthless. Is he really the "son" of "god"? Nah - just a bloke like every other bloke; made his mistakes, kissed the wrong girls, did some wrong stuff, did some right stuff, and got caught up in events that were bigger than he was. Oh, my congregation, what a plastic Messiah you have created! I stand here, and I want you to *see* - I want you to challenge some of my ideas, to open your minds, to shake your fist at this inept fraud of a god that I have been preaching to you, to think about dinosaurs and stellar nurseries and black holes and the RNA world and australopithecines and quarks and sharks and the ice volcanoes of Enceladus and the Krebs cycle and the hydrological cycle and methane raindrops on Titan and sunset on Mars and hot Jupiters and Bose-Einstein condensates and double-helices and cancer and dark matter and Pi and Egypt and Sumer and the Himalayas and the Great Barrier Reef and Apollo and Artemis and optical illusions and sonic booms and people and love and curiosity and adventure and sorrow and loss and discovery and exhilaration.

And all I have is 15 minutes (8 now), and all you want is a jaunty hymn to close and set you up for your lunch.

Let us pray.

Helio

鈥漇o, Pete, you're saying that nobody really knows鈥�

Emm, nope, I said, 鈥淚 do think we know stuff, and I think the stuff we know is great...鈥�

Like knowing the buns are too sweet, but that you end up eating another one anyway, not that I go to the PWA (actually did you know that it鈥檚 the PW now? A sort of streamlining I suppose!)

And you know, you鈥檙e a good preacher (I mean that), and I think you and I could do a preaching double act, it鈥檇 be funny, we鈥檇 have the people with us, we could make money, we could laugh and inspire. You see, in many ways I鈥檓 with you and the little sermonette. It rings true. Odd me saying that, ain鈥檛 it?

You say, 鈥淟ook around your church - are any of these people really "saved" in any meaningful sense?鈥� And I鈥檓 with you. I ask it of me all the time. And 鈥渢hose fresh-faced youngsters - on fire for the Lord, but with zero knowledge of what life is about - they may learn, please god.鈥� With you there too. So many are being sold a pig in a poke. I know, I was one. They鈥檙e not on fire for Jesus, none of us are. Did you read what I wrote on post 18 - Can science answer moral questions?

鈥淏ut is ANY of this true?鈥� Well, that鈥檚 the only question you can ask if you鈥檝e asked the others. 鈥渨hat a plastic Messiah you (we/I) have created鈥�. You鈥檙e right you know. A plastic shrink wrapped one, off the shelf so we don鈥檛 have to think, so we don鈥檛 need 鈥減eople and love and curiosity and adventure and sorrow and loss and discovery and exhilaration.鈥� One that we sing about over and over with (sometimes) inane words, one that can be dismissed with, 鈥滸ood sermon today, pastor.鈥� One that can be dismissed with, 鈥淭he service was a real blessing.鈥� One which doesn鈥檛 marvel at, 鈥渟tellar nurseries and black holes鈥�, or 鈥渄ouble-helices and cancer and dark matter鈥�. Just one which sings a jaunty hymn and has the potatoes on low so they鈥檙e boiled by lunch time!

One that we have made up.

It鈥檚 an inspiring piece of writing, that last one of yours. You could sell this Jesus well, if you weren鈥檛 so honest. So could I. The tragedy is that I did, sometimes still do, when I whisper a little, 鈥淵es, good sermon!鈥�

When I let me and others off the hook pretending than an 鈥渕mmmm鈥�, or a 鈥淵es, Lord,鈥� means something.

Pretending that the music is the presence of God.

You鈥檙e right, it鈥檚 nonsense.

I gave up following that kind of Jesus too. That鈥檚 one thing I know for sure.

Helio,

They're just the PW now and you'll have to offer something pretty good if you want us to give up the traybakes.