大象传媒

In my tour of 30 operations as a Lancaster pilot with 619 Squadron, Bomber Command, many raids are now a distant memory but I can still recall the operation to Dresden on the night of 13/14 February 1945.

Firstly, that morning my Wireless Operator had reported sick and had been grounded by the Medical Officer. Secondly, my Flight Commander had informed me that I was taking a pilot who had recently joined the Squadron as 'second dickie' for operational experience. I told my 'second dickie' that I would also take his Wireless Operator as a replacement, which I believe, scared them both!

One of the responsibilities of the Wireless Operator on operations was to listen out at half hourly intervals in case there was a recall. After half an hour's flying, my Novice Wireless Operator, through the inter-com, reported that he was unable to make his set work. As it was not quite dusk and I could see Lancasters flying in the same direction, I told him not to worry but to keep trying. Half an hour later, I received the same report and again I said, "Don't worry but still keep trying to make the set work." Although it was now dark, I felt judders on my Lancaster, caused by the slipstream from aircraft ahead, which confirmed that there had not been a recall. In fact, by the time we reached Dresden, the Wireless Operator's radio was still unserviceable.

Strictly speaking, I should not have continued the operation but should have turned back. There was a fine line between heroism and foolhardiness in such circumstances. I was also very conscious of the indictment of LMF (Lack of Moral Fibre), and the inevitable Court of Enquiry.

We approached our target from the northwest flying on a southeast course and, at a height Of 17,000 feet, 1 was able to distinguish the River Elbe, which flowed through Dresden. About 50 miles from the city, I switched on my VHF Radio (quite separate from the Wireless Operator's set) and listened to the Master Bomber and his Pathfinders whilst they marked the target. I then received a coded message from the Master Bomber to begin our bombing.

I landed at RAF Strubby, an airfield 5 miles south-west of Mablethorpe, Lincolnshire at 03.20 hours, having flown my Lancaster for 9 hours 20 minutes. In order to remain alert for the whole of the operation, I never used 'George', the automatic pilot.

Our report at the de-briefing read:
"This aircraft was one of eleven detailed to attack the primary target, DRESDEN. Weather conditions - 10/10 medium cloud, base about 15,000 feet. Marking very, good and Ulough assessment difficult due to cloud, considered that the results good, the glow from the fires being visible when 150 miles away."

What may not be generally known is that Mr. Churchill initiated the plan to bomb Dresden towards the end of January 1945. With the Yalta Conference about to be held on 4 February 1945, the Prime Minister wanted to demonstrate to the Russians the contribution, which the Royal Air Force could make to the Russian campaign in the east.

Although Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, C in C Bomber Command received his instructions on 27 January 1945 for the bombing of Dresden, he queried his orders because Dresden was not on his list of priority targets.

Towards the end of March 1945, however, when a horror picture of the destruction of Dresden began to emerge, Mr. Churchill, for the first time, started to question the wisdom of bombing Gennan cities.

Previously, the Prime Minister had been the greatest protagonist of destroying Germany, city by city. Like many veterans of Bomber Command, I have to say that I totally resented his change of attitude to bombing.

In the briefing for the Dresden operation, I was told that the raid was to stop the German Army from using the city as a "staging post" in their efforts to stem the advance of the Russians - surely a military reason. In my judgment, it was a legitimate target, which is confirmed by the following publications;
Dresden Handbook 1942: Anyone who imagines Dresden only as a cultural city with its immortal architectural monuments would be surprised to be made aware of the extensive and versatile activity that made Dresden one of the foremost industrial locations of the Reich.

1944 Handbook of the German Army High Command's Weapon Office: 127 factories manufacturing weapons, munitions and military equipment employing huge numbers of employees.

Over the last 60 years, the media has seen fit to indulge in Bomber Command bashing and I am appalled at the attempts to denigrate the Bomber Crews. I would ask the writers to reflect on the distress it causes to the relatives, perhaps sons and daughters of the 55,000 aircrew out of a total of 125,000 who served in Bomber Command and who made the supreme sacrifice. It may come as a surprise to learn that every member of a Bomber Crew was a volunteer. I am also resentful at the unfair and unjustified criticism of Sir Arthur Harris, which, in my judgment, is ill-informed, badly researched and often downright malicious.

It has been suggested that the bombing of Germany was a war crime and that the Bomber Crews were all criminals. Is it really implied that my two 18-year-old Gunners, barely out of school who I was proud to have in my Crew were criminals? Need I say more?

This story was submitted to the People鈥檚 War site by Anastasia Travers a volunteer with WM CSV Actiondesk on behalf of John Whiteley and has been added to the site with his permission. John Whiteley fully understands the sites terms and conditions.

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