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Major Thomas Leslie Ward: Air close support of 8th Army in North Africa

After escaping from Dunkirk I remained the only staff officer with 69 Brigade. The other officers including the Brigadier, the Brigade Major and Staff Captain who had escaped Dunkirk a week before me had been posted elsewhere, however, they were soon replaced.

69 Brigade comprising the 5th Battalion East York’s and 6th and 7th Battalion Green Howard’s were next sent to the Middle East. The Germans were coming through the Caucasus with the intention of taking over the strategically important Iraq oil wells. We were briefed to go to Kirkuk to deny the Germans. As Brigade Intelligence officer and holding the rank of Captain I was selected to lead the Brigade in a convoy of 200 vehicles from Haifa in Palestine to Kirkuk in Iraq via Trans Jordan and Baghdad. The first half of the route was half along the oil pipeline where we achieved a convoy speed of about 24 mph and half across desert navigating by compass where the speed was about 18 mph. The trip took about three weeks and we made our tented camp in Kirkuk for Christmas 1941 where it was extremely cold. After about two months another Brigade relieved us and we then had to perform the same journey in reverse.

It was decided that I should be posted to special duties that would involve a role involving Air Close Support of the 8th Army and so I was dropped off on the way back in Tel Aviv, Palestine to take advantage of a training course for a couple of months. The convoy continued to Gazala in North Africa to reinforce the 8th Army where the Germans were trying to move east to Egypt with two German Divisions and one Italian Division but they were held on a 45-mile front from the coast to Bir Hackeim.

The course finished in April 1942 and I was posted to rejoin the 5th East York’s at Gazala but I was not able to make use of my air support training at this time. I was assigned to be a reserve Company Commander, as there were no vacancies, and my duties comprised taking out reconnaissance patrols to report back positions and strength of the enemy.

The patrols were carried out mainly at night on all fours creeping through the minefields up to the enemy trenches. It was extremely important to follow the lines through the minefields that the Royal Engineers had left and also to keep extremely quiet and not let our silhouette appear against the skyline. On occasions we heard the Germans and the Italians talking in their trenches.

I also got involved with the court martial of a very good junior soldier. He fell asleep on guard and I was chosen as the defence officer. I fortunately got him off and he was moved to other duties.

The Gazala battle was fierce and there were severe casualties with the 5th East York’s having only 170 men left from a contingent of 800 and the 4th East York’s being nearly wiped out. I felt extremely lucky to survive and sadly lost many friends.

Fortunately for me I now was withdrawn from the front line of action as I received a signal posting me as 8th Army Air Liaison Officer (ALO) to the South African Air Force Boston Bomber Wing. I was the first ALO and this was the beginning of the Army Air Support that was desperately missing at Gazala.

The main targets for the Boston Bombers were the moving German transport and supply lines and particularly tanks. At this stage it was important for me to follow the strength of such movements. My role was to brief the flight crew on targets and also to gain valuable information in the de briefs, which were keenly awaited by Army HQ to inform the decisions on future targets. The Wing was based some 10 — 20 miles behind the battlefront and it had to move from time to time in response the battle situation. An Air Force signals operator assisted me. I started with the Bomber Wing without transport so my home was in a slit trench to give me the necessary protection from enemy counterattacks. The pilots and I became very friendly mainly because I flew several sorties in the bombers and gained experience of taking photographs and dropping bombs whilst under enemy anti aircraft fire. There was very limited room for a passenger in the planes so I had to replace the observer in the leading aircraft of the formation of seven. I spent about six months with the South African Air Force and during this time I got given the nickname of ‘Tommy Ward’ after the wicketkeeper of the South African cricket team.

In that period the 8th Army were beaten back by the Germans some 250 miles towards El Alamein, which had been identified by General Auchinleck OC Middle East as a strategic location to resist further retreat. It had the Quattara Depression to the south that was a natural barrier and thus condensed the width of the battlefront.

General Montgomery then took command of the 8th Army and insisted on reinforcing the desert army prior to engaging with the Germans in further warfare. Part of the reinforcement strategy was the shipping in of Sherman tanks and anti tank guns and also fighter-bombers such as Hurricanes and Kittyhawks, which significantly strengthened air attack capability. Initially the Hurricane was modified to allow 6 x 40 lb bombs to be carried and the Kittyhawk was modified to carry a 250 lb bomb. The carrying capability was increased later on in the war. The British Navy control of the Mediterranean was vital at this stage to allow the reinforcements and the planes to be delivered. One of General Montgomery’s other ‘reinforcement’ ideas was to build mock tanks that deceived the Germans as to the 8th Army strength.

I was next posted to the Mobile Operations Room Unit (MORU) as a Senior ALO at the El Alamein line. MORU had been created in response to General Montgomery wanting better, coordinated liaison between the Army and Air Force.

Later in the war in Italy, Dec 1943, I recorded for training purposes the Organisation and duties of MORU. These were no doubt similar to the set up at El Alamein over a year earlier. My notes described MORU with Forward Bomber Control as being responsible for the operational control of all Fighter, Fighter Bomber, and Light Bomber Wings of the Desert Air Force. It was a completely mobile set up based in the back of adapted 7 x 3 ton trucks. The trucks were allocated to the functions of Ground Controller, Air Controller, Intelligence, Forward Bomber Control, Air Liaison Officer, Ground Operations Room and Plotting Table. As Air Liaison Officer I was responsible for coordinating all the intelligence between the Air Force and the Army, for briefing the various MORU functions on the military picture, briefing Wing ALOs and for attending daily Commanding Officer daily briefings. MORU had excellent radio communications with 8th Army HQ, the Division commanders and Brigade Commanders of the forward troops and the Wing ALOs.

Whilst building up for the battle of El Alamein over the period of several months we had opportunity from time to time to visit Alexandria which was around 80 miles away. An opportunity for a bath was marvellous. One time at night, on our way back to camp in the land rover, we were following the oil drums in the desert but we missed an oil drum and got lost. We made the decision to stay put, as we did not know where we were: it was extremely cold. In the morning we found out that base camp was only a few hundred metres away.

I was at the briefing General Montgomery gave for all field officers at which he outlined the strategy for the forthcoming El Alamein battle. The plan was to deliberately let the Germans through at a predetermined point in the front line and have tanks in the rear positioned ready to cut them off. On 23 Oct 1942 the whole skyline lit up with a 1,000-gun bombardment from the 8th Army. It was a deafening noise. By 4 Nov, after stiff resistance Rommel’s army was in retreat.

At El Alamein I was not with my 5th Battalion East Yorkshire but had much satisfaction in being in support of them because they were exposed on the Ruweisat Ridge in the middle of the El Alamein defence line down to the Qattara Depression. There was many times in the period up to the main battle that they needed air support and got it. Previously the 5th Battalion East Yorkshire regiment were awarded battle honour Mersa Matruh.

The Army found the air support very useful at this time as is highlighted by a signal I received from General Montgomery’s HQ ‘Chief of Staff asks me to congratulate you on todays show pd well done pd try and get forward with your chaps doing leapfrog with Max one of you should always be in the air K Sixnine’.

After the battle of El Alamein, which was the turning point of the war I was sent to Kenya by flying boat. We followed the Nile ending our journey on Lake Victoria. I went to Nakuru, the Royal Air Force and Rhodesian Air Force training station to lecture the junior pilots who were preparing for operations with the Desert Air Force in North Africa. It was my duty to tell them about the conditions and desert war. After two months I wrote to Jock MacNeil at 8th Army HQ saying it was time I returned to the western desert. I was pleased that this request was agreed to and I to returned to MORU at 8th Army HQ in Egypt. We flew from Nairobi via Khartoum in Sudan where the mosquitoes were dreadful.

On arrival at MORU I was promoted to Officer Commanding Rover Paddy operating as a forward control directing the kittyhawk and hurricane fighter-bombers onto targets. The aircraft flew in a six formation known as Cabrank. The Cabranks orbited in the vicinity of the Rover Paddy observation post and waited to be briefed on a target. If a target was not available then each Cabrank had previously been briefed on alternative targets for bombing. On clear days during a battle it was usual for aircraft to operate Cabranks at half hour intervals during daylight. This enabled the forward troops to have continuous air support during an advance or protection during enemy counter attacks, an immediacy of support that was not available under the previous arrangements. Targets were submitted direct to Rover Paddy from forward troops and 8th Army HQ and either accepted or refused immediately. With continuous Cabranks it was possible to bomb a target 10 or 15 minutes after it originated, and possibly repeated 30 minutes later if necessary.

The targets were selected in order of priority and a briefing was prepared for arrival of the aircraft. The leading pilot of the Cabrank formation was equipped with a 1/100,000 scale map and a photo mosaic aerial plan of the battle area both specially gridded and numbered. The Rover Paddy Air Controller briefed the pilot from the same type of map and mosaic although when over the target area the controller then described the target in detail from a 1/25,000 map. If the pilot was in any doubt about finding the target or if the target was within 500 yards of the forward troops, then he would be told to stand by and wait for target indication by smoke shelling by the Royal Artillery. If the pilot was confident that the target had been identified, then Controller gave him permission to bomb, and direction in which to bomb in relation to the position of allied forward troops. After bombing, the pilots were asked to give results and a report was sent by wireless to Army, Corps and the originator of the target.

The staffing of Rover Paddy with attached personnel varied in the period through to the end of the war, it depended on operational needs but could be up to 6 officers comprising Army General Staff Officers, Royal Artillery Liaison Officers and Air Force Air Controllers and 34 other ranks comprising signallers, cooks, clerks, drivers etc. The transport was up to 5 jeeps with trailers, 2 armoured cars, 2 white scout cars, 1 - 2 radio transmitter vehicles and two 15-cwt trucks.

Rover Paddy started operations on the Mareth Line in March 1943. It was on the 50 Division battlefront that included the 69 Brigade, which was by the coast. I remember that machine gun posts and tank positions were our particular target. We were operating out of 15cwt trucks with two RAF officers talking to the aircraft, observation posts were not available in the desert terrain. The forward troops gave targets by grid reference or by feature but as the desert was largely featureless sometimes our job was to get the artillery to identify the target by smoke shelling. If possible the dialogue with the leader of the Cabrank was maintained to ascertain effectiveness of bombing and to identify future target.

The battle of Mareth was successfully won which marked a significant defeat of the Germans and the end of their stay in North Africa. We next spent two years fighting up through Italy but that is another story.

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