大象传媒

鈥淯p until the very hour that the first Jap bombs showered down on Singapore City the gay luxurious social life continued there 鈥� tennis, golf, cricket, bathing, boating during the daytime and crowded cocktail, theatre and dinner parties far into the night. By the way, except at top level the various 鈥榗olours鈥� did not easily mix together鈥�. (Owen) The people who lorded it in Singapore were caught on the hop on the 8th December 鈥�41 when (the day after Pearl Harbour) reports of Japanese war ships and heavy transporters having been received 12 hours earlier 鈥� the Singapore air raid sirens howled.

I quote Owen again:
鈥淗S ARP was not even manned. Though on December 1st an urgent warning signal 鈥楢LBERT鈥� (watch for hostile aircraft had gone out. Every streetlight was still glowing and remained so. Half an hour later police, APR and power station official were still scouring the town for the one man who had the key of the central switch for the blackout. (It should be recorded that only two practice blackouts had ever been held in Singapore during the previous September.)

The fact that the big guns of Singapore were immovably placed facing the wrong way (out to sea) is common knowledge.

The Underrated Enemy (Amran Stewart) 940.5425 STE

The small force of Hurricanes sent to Malaya suffered from every possible disadvantage. The Aircraft were old MK Is or early MK IIAs which had only 8 machine guns. Destined for the Middle East, their engines had been fitted with desert air filters that reduced their speed by some 30 mph. The pilots were newly trained, and although mustered together as 232 Squadron, had been assembled from 4 different, quite unconnected units.

On 20th January, 232 Squadron first saw action against 27 bombers raiding Singapore. One flight claimed to have shot down 8 of these. The other flight was engaged by the escorting fighters, 3 were brought down, but 3 Hurricanes were lost with all their pilots, among them the CO Squadron Leader Landles. The Hurricanes were more than capable of dealing with the Japanese bombers. Also, in many ways they were superior to Japan鈥檚 Army Airforce fighters. These could out turn and out climb the Hurricanes, but the latter could out dive their rivals, had greater fire power and could endure far more punishment. Unfortunately, the RAF pilots were completely uninformed about either the virtues or the defects of the enemy aircraft. Many fine men lost their lives needlessly while such combat knowledge was acquired.

In any case 232 gave its greatest services by attacks on the Japs land forces. The results were ruefully described by Col. TSUJI 鈥渢he Hurricanes flying low over the rubber forest were a serious challenge. Their intrepid pilots continually machine gunned our roads, shooting up motor transport and blocking traffic. Our mobile Corps had been advancing on the paved roads in broad daylight taking no precautions against enemy air raids. While the Hurricanes were flying even single cars moved off the road into the cover of the jungle and all convoys had to move off the road and get out of sight at the first alarm鈥�.

This illustrates the effect a large force of modern fighters might have had. Sadly, the Hurricanes available were too few in number to make a decisive impact. But at least 232鈥檚 intervention was partly responsible for the safe withdrawal of Gordon Bennett鈥檚 remaining Brigades from Northern Johore.

Anyway, any conflict between the citizens of Singapore and the armed forces didn鈥檛 affect me as we had very little time for sightseeing. Indeed only a week after our arrival we found ourselves 鈥榦n the move鈥�.

Our armies having been pushed further and further back it was decided to withdraw back to a line Batu Pahat 鈥� Kluang 鈥� Mersing, 90 miles of it in Johore. By January 21st the Japs were cutting across the road down the coast and the road between Batu Pahat and Kluang, just missing snapping up 2 Generals who didn鈥檛 realise that they had infiltrated across the road in places. (Generals Heath and Kay commanders of III corps and II India Division ). Retreat through Johore to Singapore seemed inevitable. However Kluang (the last aerodrome on the mainland in our hands) was
in danger of capture by the enemy before we could destroy its buildings, machinery and oil stocks. A general counter attack was raised and then cancelled. 鈥淭he Sikh battalion commander ignored his instructions and led his men forward in a bayonet charge which drove the Japanese helter skelter from the field leaving upon it hundreds of dead and dying. On the night of January 23rd all necessary demolitions, the destruction of stocks and the wrecking of the runways was completed and what oil could be got away was moved.鈥� (Owen)

Whatever equipment the Far East was short of it had certainly accumulated large stocks of oil and petroleum. One might say that this is not surprising as it had precious few planes to use up the stuff. Much of this stock was held at Kluang. Kluang was still in our hands (thanks to the Sikhs) and the railway was still operating between Kluang and Singapore.

January 24 1941.

Kluang鈥檚 position wasn鈥檛 very secure and it wasn鈥檛 expected to hold out very long, so it was important to get as much fuel away back to Singapore as possible before it fell. The stuff had to be moved from the drome to the railway, and as there was little transport available at Kluang some half a dozen lorries had to be sent up from Singapore. Obviously the trip wasn鈥檛 without its dangers and the lorries couldn鈥檛 just be left to the drivers so it was decided to send an armed escort of two men with each lorry. Twelve wireless ops of whom I was one were given the doubtful privilege. And so, Jack Spencer and I wearing steel helmets and gingerly carrying loaded rifles sat in the back of an open lorry moving across the causeway in the wrong direction, i.e. nearer to the Japanese. Our party was completed by the ACH corporal's regular selected hands who shared the driving and were supposed to be in charge.

This was January 2, actually the journey was full of interest but uneventful and it gave us an excuse to say that we had actually been in Malaya, even if it was only a matter of 70 or 80 miles inside. Naturally we got a little bit excited as we got near our destination (and the enemy) but some of the sights we saw made our own troubles seem very small.

On the edge of the jungle at the side of the roadway lay hundreds of exhausted and beaten troops. It was easy to see that the fight had gone out of them and that Malaya was doomed. How could it be otherwise 鈥� they scarcely saw a British plane in the sky but they were certainly very conscious of the Japanese planes. The Japanese navy dominated the seas and landed reinforcements behind them whenever they attempted to make a stand.

Through the mass of dirty and beaten men we went to the town of Kluang 鈥� deserted like a ghost town 鈥� then on to the drome, bomb pitted and abandoned except for a skeleton staff and the Sikh regiment who still waited there to defend it should the Japanese appear over the hill.

January 1942
We had been expected to come back the same night by rail after having delivered the lorry but our two dim corporals seemed incapable of explaining the position and we were kept to help with the evacuation.

I鈥檓 not sorry really 鈥� never have I quite come across the same peace anywhere during my overseas travels as I found on an almost deserted Kluang airfield. Maybe it seems ironic in view of our position and of course we didn鈥檛 know then of the events leading up to our arrival. The drome was in a hollow with hills surrounding it. The billets were situated on the hills. They had a certain amount of difficulty in finding accommodation for us in view of the bombing and our own demolitions. Eventually they put us up on the hill in what had been the officers quarters. Walls were dirty, the floors were littered with debris, but the showers still worked and it wasn鈥檛 really uncomfortable.

Of course, as we had only set out on a kind of long day trip we had absolutely nothing with us in the way of kit 鈥� no soap or towels even. However, they managed to find some mosquito nets for us and we had a shower without soap and dried ourselves on the mosquito nets.

The Japanese couldn鈥檛 be far away but we didn鈥檛 actually see any of them whilst we were at Kluang. It was all so very quiet, deserted and peaceful 鈥� particularly at night with the hills around us and here and there an Indian soldier, immovable at his post. Unfortunately a mosquito bite on my knee was getting a bit troublesome. We had got pretty filthy on our trip up, dirt had got in, the medical staff had left Kluang and the foundations of a really beautiful septic knee were laid.

As almost all our squadron signals section was at Kluang after a couple of days had passed we were not only getting rather anxious about our own position, but wondering how they were getting on at Singa if our planes were becoming operational. The two corporals we had with us were apparently afraid of approaching the CO and as long as they were with us no-one else could very well see him so we conspired to get them out of the way. As it happened, a few men were required to go on a trip a few miles away on the road to Singapore to do some superficial repairs to a lorry and to bring it back. We managed to persuade both corporals to volunteer as it was in their line of business and would be a quiet 鈥榙o your own thing鈥� trip away from the moving of oil drums. They fell for it and volunteered thus breaking two laws 鈥� the first unofficial which says 鈥榥ever volunteer for anything鈥� and the second official which says that a unit shouldn鈥檛 be left without a non commissioned officer at the very least.

This left us for a few hours with nothing but AC2s, the lowest form of animal life in the RAF. However this meant that as there were no officers or NCOs to do so, the senior O/R was entitled to approach the CO on anything of importance that arose. We hadn鈥檛 an LAC. We hadn鈥檛 even an AC1. All we had were AC2s.

My colleagues said a number of very flattering 鈥� and untrue 鈥攖hings about my eloquence and delegated the task to me. What they really felt was that they didn鈥檛 want to approach the CO themselves and they had to find some stooge for the job before the NCOs returned. Anyway, off I went and found the CO who turned out to be a very charming chappie. I painted a horrifying picture of the situation 鈥� how the most important squadron in the Far East was without its Signals 鈥� how we had been sent on a one day trip with no kit at all and how we shouldn鈥檛 have been allowed to come at all if the powers that be in Singapore had known we would be away so long. He seemed quite upset about it all and said that we must certainly go back immediately.

Then he offered me a cigarette and started chatting quite matey-like. It gives you some idea of the dreadful chaos of our Far Eastern campaign when I tell you that he asked me if I could tell him about the position of the Japs around Kluang. He said that a short while before he had spoken to HQ at Singapore on the secraphone to find out the position and they had reluctantly informed him that they were sorry but they hadn鈥檛 any information as to how near to Kluang the Japanese were or whether the road was still open.

Oddly, it wasn't until February 1994, 52 years after the event that I fully realised the seriousness of our position at Kluang and on the way back to Singapore.

I got a book out of Oldham library called 鈥楽ingapore. The Inexcusable Betrayal鈥� by George Chippington. His unit had fought their way back from Jitra cover just north of Alor Star in Malaya to Senggarana (map page 27). A magnificent achievement. Their aim was to get back to Singapore.

26/1/42 The same day that we left Kluang (26/1/42) they found themselves blocked by overwhelming Japanese forces. Senggarana is about 15 miles SOUTH of Kluang. They were blocked in every direction but the sea. A battle had been fought at MUA cozen her excellent work in the four days earlier (before we even arrived at Kluang). The British forces were surrounded and Lieutenant Colonel Anderson VC ordered all guns, vehicles and heavy weapons to be destroyed and told those who could walk to take to the jungle. Out of 4000 only 400 Indian and 550 Australian troops succeeded in rejoining. The wounded who were left behind were massacred in cold blood. The Japanese were many miles south of Senggarana by this time. Chippington and unit were lucky in finding a way through the jungle to a river which brought them to a beach from which the Navy evacuated them to Singapore.

The Senggarana Road, the Kluang Road and 13 the railroad joined at Johore Batavia.. Between them was mostly jungle.

It seems incredible that we made our way gaily South in our two trucks without meeting any of the enemy (except for the short burst of rifle fire. See page 30). In fact, we were so sure of ourselves that we stopped in Johore in Batavia for a look round and food before making for the causeway. (A shortage of small change in Johore meant that we got our change in worn and dingy Johore postage stamps).

If only we had known.

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