大象传媒

ss TEWKESBURY

The TEWKESBURY was operated by Capper, Alexander on behalf of her owners Alexander Shipping, and was built by Craig Taylor and Co Ltd at Stockton-on-Tees in 1927 as the GLOCLIFFE. She was registered as the TEWKESBURY in London in 1932, and was 4601 grt, 400鈥櫭�53鈥櫭�25鈥�; Engine 417NHP Triple Expansion 鈥� 3 cylinder 25陆鈥�, 42鈥�, 70鈥� 脳 48鈥�. TEWKESBURY narrowly avoided the ADMIRAL GRAF SPEE's visit to the Estuary of the River Plate in December 1939, and arrived shortly after Kapit盲n Langsdorff had her scuttled on 17th December following her damaging battle of 13th December with three British cruisers (The Battle of the River Plate). Alexander Shipping had a devastating war. They began the war with thirteen ships in operation, and a further ship on the stocks. During the course of the war they lost all fourteen.

TEWKESBURY's voyage begins in a convoy around the north coast of Scotland to join an ocean convoy

This narrative of a wartime 鈥渁dventure鈥� begins with the ss TEWKESBURY in Blyth, Northumberland loading 7,500 tons of coal for export to South America, on a cold February day in 1941. TEWKESBURY was a happy ship, and most of her crew were in fact signing back on to the ship. Previously they had voyaged to the River Plate and upon returning to the UK, had arrived in South Shields on 29 January 1941 when her crew took a spell of leave. Of her crew, the Master was Captain Theo Pryse, Chief Officer: David Howlett, Second Officer: Peter de Neumann, Third Officer: J. Jeffrey, Chief Engineer: Joseph Love, Second Engineer: Gerard Turner, Bos鈥檔: Jose Ramirez. Amongst the officers only Turner was new to the ship, and he had previously been studying for his Chief Engineer鈥檚 Certificate. Having loaded the coal TEWKESBURY made her way to Methil to join the next convoy (EN79) around the north coast of Scotland.

Coastal convoys came under regular attack (every two or three days) from Mid February 1941 until that June when much Luftwaffe strength was withdrawn to the Eastern Front. There were several hot-spots off the East Coast of Scotland of which the Kinnaird Head/Rattray Head area, where the swept channel inside the minefield was narrow, was one. Here shipping was forced into a narrow channel, convoys passing within five miles of each other. In the narrow swept channel up the East Coast, convoys were always marshalled into two columns about a quarter of a mile apart (colloquially known as tram lines). Convoys passed each other to starboard with much care in these waters, as a small error could lead to hitting a mine, or running aground. In the Pentland Firth, the tide, which runs at up to six knots, caused particular difficulties for long, two column convoys. Schedules were tight and, should the convoy be delayed by weather, it would become strung out over many miles with the last ships struggling against a contrary tide.

Convoy WN91 sailed from Gourock at 1830 on 26th February 1941 with the ss FORTHBANK as the Commodore-ship leading the port column. Escorts were HM Trawlers PIROUETTE and GAVOTTE, joined by Anti-Aircraft Cruiser HMS CURACOA. The convoy experienced a very strong gale for much of its passage. FORTHBANK was inbound with steel and general cargo from New York via the Mersey and the Clyde for Hull.

At Methil TEWKESBURY joined the awaiting convoy EN79 for passage around the north coast of Scotland to Loch Ewe, where she was scheduled to join an Atlantic convoy, to begin the ocean part of her passage to Buenos Aires on the River Plate. There she was to unload and then pick up cargo for return to the UK.

EN79 departed Methil at 0630 on 1st March 1941. TEWKESBURY as Commodore-ship led the port column, (ATHELTEMPLAR as Vice Commodore-ship led the starboard column). Escorts were HMS FOWEY, and HM Trawlers HUGH WALPOLE, and INDIAN STAR. Convoy WN91 (opposing route to EN79) was still en route on the evening of 1st March. Reconnaissance flights by the Luftwaffe during the day would have charted the speed of both convoys and forecast their arrival together off the Aberdeenshire coast. Three aircraft were commonly employed in such attacks and would have split-up off-shore, approaching the shore in line-abreast, about 15kms apart, to search for shipping. If an aircraft missed the convoy, it usually attacked coastal targets. The convoy progressed through a stiff north-easterly wind and sea, without incident until dusk that day. Sunset in the area would have been at 1738 GMT (1838 local time), and it was three days after a new moon, with the moon in the western hemisphere, setting at 2225. Thus the moon, if it was visible, was showing less than a quarter, and was close to its zenith. The weather over most of the UK was cloudy with poor to moderate visibility. Air cover of three hurricanes was provided throughout the daylight hours, and was withdrawn, as was normally the case 30 minutes after sunset. Then 45 minutes after sunset, with Girdle Ness bearing 276掳, distance 7陆 miles [TEWKESBURY position 57潞 09鈥� N, 1潞 46鈥� W], the convoy was attacked by enemy aircraft. Initially an aeroplane was sighted by HUGH WALPOLE [Range 2 miles, bearing NNW] approaching from the North, and challenged by her. The aircraft altered course and headed for HUGH WALPOLE who opened fire with Lewis guns when the aircraft was in range. A small object dropped from the aircraft, fell into sea and did not explode. The aircraft opened fire with machine guns, and after passing over HUGH WALPOLE headed for the convoy. Two minutes later a Norwegian ship was spotted by FOWEY showing her fore steaming light, so FOWEY began turning to order her to desist. During this turn ATHELTEMPLAR was hit on the navigation bridge and bridge deckhouse by three bombs. The enemy aircraft, a Heinkel 111 heavy bomber, was heard in the vicinity about two minutes before the attack, and then observed rapidly bearing down from right ahead at a height of approximately 250 feet, towards ATHELTEMPLAR at the head of the starboard column. The bombs that struck her exploded instantly and caused an immediate devastating fire. The Master, Capt A. Waterson, and all executive officers except Chief Officer J.M. Scott were killed, and the Chief Officer was severely injured as he was blown from the bridge to the forecastle by the blast. FOWEY opened fire four times with barrage fire, but hit nothing. At the same time the ss TEWKESBURY gave the enemy a burst from her starboard Hotchkiss to which he replied with his rear machine gun, causing minor damage to deck fittings, but no casualties were inflicted. The bomber flew down the length of the convoy, using his machine gun or guns and increased his altitude rapidly at the same time, before disappearing to the rear of the convoy but could be heard faintly at frequent intervals lurking in the vicinity. Simultaneously in WN91 an enemy aircraft was sighted flying 320掳 distance about 2 miles on port beam, and engaged from time to time by FORTHBANK, CURACOA, and other escorts and vessels in the convoy. Shortly after, it reappeared flying up the two columns being engaged continuously, and then flew out of sight. The fire aboard ATHELTEMPLAR was reported as being 鈥渁 ship on fire鈥� off Whinnyfold, Cruden Bay by coastguards (Register of Air Raids 1941). The ATHELTEMPLAR was much further away (three to four times the distance reported), amply illustrating the intensity and magnitude of the fire on board.

At 1940 an aircraft returned to EN79 and machine-gunned the port column of the convoy, using green tracer. At 1943 coastguards at Bullers of Buchan report two bombers at low level. One headed for EN79 out to sea, and the other climbed above the cliffs and headed inland. A minute later (1944) FORTHBANK of WN91 observed an enemy aircraft flying towards the column leaders athwart the convoy at an altitude of about 150 feet. The aircraft was engaged, and dropped a stick of bombs, disappearing in a steep climb in the poor light. One bomb made a direct hit on the wireless cabin demolishing it. The Second Radio Officer, Leonard J. Moser, a Canadian, was killed instantly, but no trace was found of him. FORTHBANK was hit twice amidships exposing the engine room and No 4 hold, and immediately burst into flame. She lost fire main pressure and a bucket-chain had to be organised to fight the fire. GAVOTTE went alongside and got fire hoses onto the fire, but was damaged due to bumping caused by the heavy swell running. FORTHBANK鈥檚 midships accommodation was burnt out and a mass of debris had fallen onto her engine, putting her main engines, steering and lighting out of action, but her hull was sound. HMS HASTINGS, who happened to be in the vicinity, took off three badly wounded men.

Just a minute later (1945) EN79 came under attack again when a He 111, similar to the one that had previously attacked, was observed approaching rapidly from the east at a height of approximately 350 feet obviously intending to attack the TEWKESBURY. Passing low over ATHELTEMPLAR which by now was very much afire amidships but still maintaining her course and speed, the enemy released a heavy bomb intended for TEWKESBURY but this fell into the sea and did not explode. His second bomb however, weighing 250 kgs, crashed through TEWKESBURY's engine room skylight casing on the Boat Deck and then hit a ventilator casing below the skylight, finally coming to rest on an iron grating deep in the of engine room, but did not explode. When the bomber passed over after releasing this heavy bomb, TEWKESBURY immediately gave it a burst from her port Hotchkiss at short range, and hit the Heinkel in its port engine. The bomber then began to lose height very quickly with heavy black smoke issuing from tail and fuselage, but the plane was not actually seen to fall into the sea from the ship, due to the dusk. As the attack on the TEWKESBURY developed Chief Engineer Godfrey onboard ATHELTEMPLAR realized that there was no one in command of his ship; there were no more engine-room telegraph orders, and the helm position was destroyed. Thus the ship continued on her way until the Chief Engineer ordered the engines to be stopped. When sufficient way was lost, attempts were have been made to lower the aft life-boats under the orders of the Chief Engineer. Only one was successfully launched, and those whose accommodation was aft disembarked into it. Those in the forecastle had no means of escape, and the surviving lifeboat could not get to them because of the sea. They were eventually taken off by INDIAN STAR, who then picked up the others from the lifeboat. Several of the survivors in the forecastle were badly injured, and great credit was due to those who rescued them by lowering them to the deck of INDIAN STAR. All were later transferred to HMS LEDA who landed the survivors at Aberdeen. There was no further action or attack on the convoy after this last bombing. Meanwhile the third bomber flew inland and dropped four HE bombs one minute later on Fountainbleu Farm, Cruden Bay, killing Henry F. Johnson, airman in charge of the RAF mobile beacon close to the farm. Jimmy Gall (aged 12) and his younger sister, Betty (aged 8), who lived at the farm, had a miraculous escape. Another HE bomb hit Slains Lodge, nearby. Then at 1957 the He 111 hit by TEWKESBURY鈥檚 gunfire crashed into the sea off Whitehills, Melrose Head. About an hour later the bomber鈥檚 crew of four led by pilot Oberleutnant H. K眉hn were captured as they tried to come ashore in a rubber dinghy, and eventually they were sent to Canada as POWs. The aircraft sank in the sea, and 35 years later, in 1976, one of its engines and a propeller were raised and put on display at Strathallan Aviation Museum.

On the TEWKESBURY Gerard Turner in the engine-room, was distracted by a noise above the din of the ship鈥檚 engine, and upon looking around for its source was startled to see a large grey-painted bomb with badly damaged tail-fins rolling on an engine grating. In He111s bombs hung vertically from a nose-lug in the bomb-bays, and as the attack was from low altitude, it seems likely that the bomb struck the ship tail-first. Turner could have fled the engine-room as quickly as possible, but he chose to grapple with the bomb and prevent it rolling off its precarious platform. He sat astride it as on a horse, whilst contemplating what to do next. Just then Peter de Neumann, who was directing the guns, left the bridge immediately following the terrifying crash as the bomb hit the ship, and rushed to see where the bomb had gone. He entered the engine room, and saw Turner, far below, mounting the bomb. De Neumann immediately went to Turner鈥檚 assistance, and between them, using Turner鈥檚 trousers鈥� belt, secured the bomb temporarily to a stanchion. As de Neumann did not return to the bridge, Capt Pryse sent a crew member to investigate what was happening. On learning the facts, Pryse had shear-legs rigged over the engine-room skylight on the boat-deck, and, possibly using the lowering tackle from one of the davits, prepared to lift the bomb. The dangers of moving it were immense, and exacerbated by the fact that TEWKESBURY was still under way using her engine , and avoiding the blazing ATHELTEMPLAR, less than a quarter of a mile to starboard, and likely to go out of control imminently. Meantime de Neumann and Turner made a sling to hold the bomb, and a rope was suspended through blocks into the engine-room. On hitching up, Pryse supervised a working party up on the boat-deck, who pulled via the pulleys to lift the bomb. The bomb had to be lifted more than 30 feet, and guided past various obstructions in the dark 鈥� the attack was at dusk, more than an hour after sunset, and the disposal took more than an hour. It would have been extremely imprudent to use lighting. Naturally the bomb type was unknown to the two officers lifting it. The officers concerned had to guide a 550 lb bomb suspended from hastily constructed sheerlegs from more than thirty feet of rope in a rolling ship, steering the bomb past obstructions and at one time had to balance on the dangerously hot cylinder tops of the (open) moving engine during one manoeuvre. The bomb effectively acted as the 鈥渂ob鈥� on a pendulum of period approximately 6 seconds. One nudge from the bomb in its swinging, or an inopportune roll by the ship, and they would have fallen to severe injury, or, more likely, painful death amongst the crankshaft, connecting rods, and main bearings of the engine. The bomb emitted distracting clicks and other noises throughout the disposal process. De Neumann, many years later, once said that the real danger was from the moving engine, the precariousness of Turner鈥檚 and his position on it, and the distraction and discomfort of both the intense heat and noise, and that if the bomb exploded then neither of them would know anything about it. [No doubt both officers would have expressed the same sentiments as Petty Officer Thomas Gould, who was awarded a VC for a similar incident aboard HM Submarine Thrasher, and who said when asked what he was thinking about as he manoeuvred his bomb, 鈥淚 was hoping the bloody thing wouldn鈥檛 go off!鈥漖 Once the bomb had been lifted out and laid carefully on the deck, another sling was made, and the bomb lifted again, possibly by the lifeboat lowering tackle reattached to the davit, or by the after derrick, and lowered over the side. Turner and de Neumann maintained a proprietary and close interest in the bomb throughout. The bomb detonated shortly after its release from the ship. Capt Pryse opened some cans of beer, and he, de Neumann, and Turner, enjoyed a well-earned rest sharing the beer and unwinding. Turner and de Neumann became close friends following this incident, and found that they both were to be married upon return from this voyage. Despite CURACOA鈥檚 defensive r么le to the two proximate convoys as a specialised anti-aircraft cruiser, and the presence of Fowey as further anti-aircraft cover, only one aircraft was brought down during the sustained air-attack, and that was by the merchant vessel ss TEWKESBURY.

Some five hours after the attack on the ATHELTEMPLAR, the minesweeper HMS SPEEDWELL, travelling up the east coast from Hull, spotted a massive fire over the horizon. She went to investigate, and with much caution placed men on board to extinguish the fire and then took the vessel in tow. On the morning of 3rd March, with her flag at half mast, the ATHELTEMPLAR arrived at anchorage off Methil. Mr S. Hill, Second Officer of the Athelsultan, bombed off May Island three weeks previously and returned to North Shields for repairs, was instructed to travel up to Methil to bring the ATHELTEMPLAR back to the Tyne. She too was to spend a further period under repair at Smith鈥檚 Dock having the entire amidship accommodation rebuilt.

FOWEY detached from giving anti-aircraft cover to EN79 at Duncansby Head, and CURACOA took over from Buchan Ness. EN79 did not continue without incident: With Tiumpan Head in sight, where part of the convoy should have detached to continue south whilst most made for Loch Ewe, they followed in error (one of the dangers of following ships closely, with most attention focussed on maintaining position). INDIAN STAR was dispatched to round them up, and, in the process, collided with MAURITZ, another ship in the convoy. MAURITZ then proceeded to Stornaway for repairs. TEWKESBURY was repaired following the convoy reaching Loch Ewe at 1300 on 3 March, and then joined the ocean convoy OB295 for the usual tense journey to the dispersal point at 19潞 West. These convoys were vast, covering many square miles of ocean, and so communications across the entire convoy, in which it was vital to maintain radio-silence, relied upon signal lamps and flag hoists, often took much time. Real threats to the convoy had to be dealt with quickly if catastrophe was to be averted, and this overall necessity to be constantly at the ready led to misunderstandings, and false alarms, caused by imagined periscopes, unrecognised aircraft, etc. Once a ship opened fire it was difficult to propagate the order to cease fire, and so there was a great danger of being caught in friendly fire from excited gunners firing at anything that moved. Friendly fire was also a considerable hazard when a convoy was under attack by low flying aircraft. From dispersal the voyage continued uneventfully, and the crew were able to relax a little and enjoy the tropical clime, but still they had to be wary of potential surface raiders. TEWKESBURY unloaded her coal at Buenos Aires and then steamed up the River Pirana to Rosario to load beef.

Regarding the TEWKESBURY incident, two distinguished bomb disposal officers, Don Henderson, GM, and Peter Gurney, GM and Bar, have both stated that the manhandling of 鈥渂lind鈥� EODs (i.e. armed and launched Explosive Ordnance Devices, which have failed to complete detonation) is extremely dangerous. Indeed Don Henderson specifically said that he would not have liked to clear the TEWKESBURY bomb. With 250 kg and 500 kg bombs, size did not matter, as they were the only two in the German range which could have two fuzes - the usual combination being a long delay and an 鈥榓nti handling鈥� fuze! Naturally the type of the bomb that hit the TEWKESBURY was unknown to the two officers in close contact with it.

The pilots of the RAF who flew convoy protection missions must have dreaded the task: During the passage of EN79 friendly aircraft overflew the convoy four times giving the correct recognition signal. On each occasion the ships in the convoy opened fire with machine-guns. One ship fired rockets, and HMS Woolston who was in the vicinity also opened fire.

By the end of the war 17 out of the 35 ships comprising EN79 were sunk. Many in the convoy were coasters, so, in fact, 65,778 grt of shipping was sunk out of a total of 96,123 grt.

Medal Citations

ss TEWKESBURY

London Gazette 7 October 1941
Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire: Captain Theo Pryse
George Medal: Second Engineer Gerard Llewellyn Turner and Second Officer Bernard Peter de Neumann
And both George Medallists were also awarded
Lloyd鈥檚 War Medal for Bravery at Sea

Published Censored Citation: For brave conduct when their ship was attacked by enemy aircraft.

Unpublished Uncensored Citation: The ship was bombed by a German aircraft. Her defence was so good that the enemy was last seen flying low, with smoke streaming from him. The air crew were picked up later, and the ship is credited with the kill.

After the attack, a large bomb of about 250 kilos was found unexploded on the second engine room grating. The vessel was rolling in a North-Easterly wind and sea, and Second Engineer Turner, who was on watch, sat on the bomb to prevent it being rolled off the grating. Second Officer de Neumann at once went to his help.

The Master, leaving the Commodore of the convoy on the bridge to attend to navigation, took charge of the disposal squad. The Second Officer and Second Engineer slung the bomb in a rope sling and guided it clear of obstructions, at one point standing on the cylinders to do so. Owing to the darkness and the deep and awkward position into which the bomb had lodged, the whole operation performed with ingenuity and skill without mishap, took over an hour to complete. A second sling was made by the Master and the two Officers and the bomb was dropped over the side.

mt ATHELTEMPLAR

London Gazette 10 June 1941
Member of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire Chief Engineer, Valentine Thomas Basil Godfrey
And
Lloyd's War Medal for Bravery at Sea. The Lloyd's citation:

The ship was attacked by enemy aircraft and set on fire. The chief officer was severely wounded, and all the other executive officers were killed. The chief engineer got the starboard boat away with 14 of the crew, some of whom were wounded, and transferred them to the rescuing ship. Returning to his own vessel with another party he found the fire was out, but that all the steam lines had gone, and there were about 2 ft. of water in the engine-room, covering the dynamos. The chief engineer at once arranged for towage and the vessel was brought into port.

King鈥檚 Commendations for Brave Conduct Boatswain John Richard Bell, and Gunner Thomas Newton

ss FORTHBANK

London Gazette 9 July 1941
King鈥檚 Commendation for Brave Conduct Gunner Eric Vernon Smith

The return ocean voyage of TEWKESBURY

Having loaded beef at Rosario TEWKESBURY proceeded down river to Monte Video, finished loading and then began the return leg of her voyage at 2200 ATS on 4 May, carrying 1928 tons of tinned meat, 2000 tons of wheat, and 3549 tons of general cargo. She was scheduled to return to the United Kingdom via Freetown, and Oban. TEWKESBURY proceeded according to route instructions until 18th May when Pryse received orders by wireless to proceed to St Vincent, Cape Verde Islands instead of Freetown, and immediately altered course accordingly. Up until the late afternoon of the 21 May the voyage of the TEWKESBURY had progressed normally, and when Jost Metzler spotted her just before sunset, TEWKESBURY steamed on oblivious to the threat, until 2145 GMT when she was rocked by a tremendous explosion. Captain Pryse and the Chief Engineer were having a conversation on the main deck when the torpedo struck on the starboard side, and both were thrown into the air by the jolt; the Chief Engineer landed heavily and both were washed along the deck struggling to take a hold on anything to prevent themselves being washed over the side. One of the gunners had spotted the track of the torpedo just before it struck, but did not have time to shout a warning; the lookouts saw nothing. Seawater was thrown high into the air and fell back on the ship pouring into the engine through the skylight and ventilators and washing the starboard jolly boat away. The engine-room skylight ventilators were open to their fullest extent as they were in the tropics. The Third Engineer was in his room on the port side at the time of the explosion. When he felt the crash he immediately got up, but before he could get to the door, water rushed into his cabin and swept him against the bulkhead and he was momentarily unable to move. The strong smell of cordite pervaded everyone鈥檚 nostrils; the ship gave an upward lurch and took on a starboard list of about 10 degrees. There was a moderate swell at the time with wind variable force 2. The weather was overcast, and it was dark but the visibility was good.

Pryse immediately went on to the upper bridge and rang the telegraph to "stand by", but received no answer from the engine room; it had been evacuated following the great inrush of water through the skylight. As the ship slewed slowly to starboard, Pryse scanned the eastern horizon using his binoculars in order to try and spot the submarine, as he was certain that the ship had been torpedoed, but could see nothing. Quickly Captain Pryse decided to abandon ship as he fully expected that the ship would be torpedoed again at any moment. He went to the boat deck and found Chief Officer Howlett and Second Officer de Neumann in charge of their respective boats and told them to clear the boats away. Pryse then returned to the bridge in order to go into the chart room and collect the confidential books and to salvage the sextant and chronometer. However, he found that the cement protection round the bridge had collapsed, and had to crawl on hands and knees to get into the chart room. He was unable to get the confidential books which were in a weighted bag as they had become buried under the cement slabs, however he managed to get the sextant and chronometer, which, he thought, would be most useful in the boat as he knew that they were about 750 miles from land. Whilst Pryse was attempting to search the chart-room, the boats were lowered into the water, but by then sharks were investigating the noise and the smell of blood from the meat in the cargo that drifted through the water. He returned to the boat deck and lowered them into the starboard boat, crossing then to the port boat to see how they were getting on. This boat had been lowered and most of the men in it, but the Chief Officer and four others remained on the ship. Somebody had let go the after boat fall and the boat was hanging on to the forward fall and slewing about in the water. As he watched a large shark attacked the boat, and was driven off by an axe blow administered by Bos鈥檔 Jose Ramirez. Captain Pryse got the Chief Officer to shin down the fall into the boat and then persuaded the others, who were fearful of falling into the water and the jaws of the gathering sharks, to follow him. Things were made more difficult as the Engineer had shut off the main steam and the boilers were blowing off a tremendous amount of exhaust steam, which made a terrific noise. After seeing everybody into the port boat he returned to his own boat on the starboard side and found that they had pulled clear. This was quite in order as he had given instructions that when the starboard boat was ready they were to cast off without waiting for him and that he would get away in the Chief Officer's boat. He therefore returned to the port boat climbed down the fall and they pulled away about 500 yards when the submarine opened fire with a star shell. Captain Pryse estimated that the U-boat was about one mile away on the port bow. Immediately afterwards at 2158 the submarine commenced shelling the ship; she fired about 25 rounds and hit the TEWKESBURY every time, mostly in the superstructure. The ship, despite the punishment, remained afloat and at 2238 the submarine fired a second torpedo that struck the ship in the stokehold. There was a terrific explosion and flash and the ship broke in two and sank completely, bow section first about seven minutes later, carrying with her many of the crew鈥檚 cherished possessions. No one saw the submarine, even when she was firing. In the morning Captain Pryse discovered that the sextant he had gone to some risk to collect was not in its case 鈥� it either fell out as he dragged it beneath the fallen concrete blocks on the bridge, or when it was lowered into the boat. Pryse, having been previously sunk on the AYLESBURY, recognised the importance of well-stocked lifeboats and had about 200 lbs of biscuits, 12 gallons of water, a case of tins of condensed milk, as well as about 24 lbs of tinned meat and some tinned sardines placed aboard each . He had also seen to it that a supply of cigarettes and tobacco was kept in the boats in readiness. TEWKESBURY鈥檚 lifeboats would have been wooden and therefore would have leaked rapidly until the joints tightened up after a few days in the water.

At 0430 ATS on 22nd May Captain Pryse and the Chief Officer agreed that it would be best to sail for Fernando Noronha, about 750 miles away to the west . By this time Pryse had transferred to his own boat, taking over command from de Neumann, and the Chief Officer took charge of his own boat. The two boats stayed within sight until about 0330 on 23rd May. Pryse鈥檚 boat sailed and drifted until 0242 GMT on 27th May when they spotted a steamer with her lights on heading towards them, and they lit their flares to attract her attention. She duly stopped and picked them up from the water, and then they were treated royally by the American crew, and feasted on luxuries they had dreamt of in the lifeboat. The ship turned out to be the American Export Lines steamer EXHIBITOR bound for Bombay , and she picked them up in position 5掳 09' N. 24掳 54' W, meaning they had travelled just over 60 miles in a south-westerly direction since the sinking. They remained on the EXHIBITOR for a week, standing watch and becoming good friends with the American crew who could not do enough for them. The American Captain wanted to sign them on and take them on to Bombay, but then one morning first one ship and then another appeared on the horizon, closed, and ordered EXHIBITOR to stop and identify herself. During this exchange, when it became clear that the two ships were British armed merchant cruisers, EXHIBITOR revealed that she was carrying survivors from the TEWKESBURY. TEWKESBURY鈥檚 survivors were then transferred to HMS CILICIA in one of her cutters, and remained on board for 12 days until they were landed at Freetown. The other ship that accompanied CILICIA throughout the next few days was the Armed Merchant Cruiser CARNARVON CASTLE. For the first part of the time they were aboard Cilicia she was searching for raiders, and afterwards she escorted CAMERONIAN to Freetown. During their time on Cilicia some of the survivors signed T124 articles and served in appropriate capacities; de Neumann, for example, being placed in charge of one of her 6鈥� guns. They enjoyed the excitement of going to 鈥渁ction stations鈥� when a ship came into sight, or just before dawn, but did not encounter any raiders. Cilicia and the occupants of the Captain鈥檚 boat all arrived safely in Freetown on 17 June, and disembarked to await passage back to Britain.

The Chief Officer's boat, having lost touch with the Captain鈥檚 boat, continued on her course to the south-west, and was twice approached closely by curious whales who circled the boat so closely that they threatened its stability. On the sixth day a large shark made a ferocious attack on the lifeboat, and succeeded in getting its jaws and head onto the stern-sheets before being driven off by the Chief Officer with a large axe buried in its snout. All in all they were adrift for 11陆 days before being picked up by the US steamer ANTINOUS, en route for Cape Town. All occupants of both boats (21 in each) survived, and all but two made it back to the UK by the end of July 1941. The Chief Officer鈥檚 boat鈥檚 adventures were broadcast by the 大象传媒, and received much publicity in the press.

Long voyages in lifeboats were extremely uncomfortable, with constant movement of the boat in the sea causing increasingly aching muscles as one鈥檚 body sought to compensate for the motion; no back-rests to speak of; gunwale constantly chafing in the small of one鈥檚 back; nowhere to lie down; feet constantly wet with the seawater slopping about in the bottom of the boat; extreme climatic conditions including blinding sunlight or salt spray; little food and water; and no privacy. Such conditions were extremely arduous and wearing on the survivors, for whom time passed but slowly, and who had a continuous battle to keep their spirits up and maintain hope. Depending on preparedness, some of the occupants possibly may have been able to shelter from the elements, including the sun, under a canvas cover, but those on watch had no shelter from the elements. For those who could not shelter, wet clothing exacerbated any windchill effect. Lifeboats had no centre-board nor deep keel, and were thus not particularly good sailing vessels: they could not be sailed fast or close to the wind, and as a consequence were very much subject to the vagaries of winds and the whims of ocean currents. The constant ingress of seawater impeded progress still further, and caused the occupants to expend much energy baling. If they made landfall, after days at sea, they had to beach their boat in their weakened state, and hope that they were not capsized. For example, Second Officer R.H. Ayers of the GAIRSOPPA made a harrowing Atlantic voyage of 13 days in command of a boat carrying 32, but was the sole survivor of the seven left alive when the boat arrived off the Lizard, where it was dashed on the rocks when they tried to land in heavy seas. Having survived the spite of the enemy, the fickleness of the weather, and the malevolence of the seas, any survivors successfully getting ashore then had to contend with a generally unsympathetic bureaucracy. Merchant Navy survivors could not believe that the ignorant and unfeeling Assistant King鈥檚 Harbourmaster in Freetown was a naval officer; and one Civil Servant actually wrote in a report now in the Public Record Office: 鈥渢hat the landing of the crew of the ALLENDE in Vichy Africa was an example of naive ignorance as such seamen have, for the past year, been interned!鈥� Such gargantuan ignorance on behalf of officialdom led to great injustices for merchant seafarers during and after the war, and continues to this day, although the suffering and contributions of the US Mercantile Marine is now, at long last, recognised.

Chief Engineer Joseph Harold Love, who never went back to sea, died 5 September 1943 of his injuries at his home in Essex.

Medal Citations

ss TEWKESBURY

London Gazette 14 April 1942
Member of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire: Chief Officer David Garland Howlett, for his leadership and conduct during twelve days in his lifeboat.
King鈥檚 Commendation for Brave Conduct (posthumous) Boatswain Jose Ramirez , for his action when the ship was torpedoed and sunk.

Peter de Neumann arrived in Freetown aboard HMS CILICIA on 17 June 1941, and volunteered to sail as Second Officer aboard the RN prize ss CRITON. CRITON sailed in convoy SL78 on 19 June 1941, but, unfortunately, and unknown to the prize crew, she had been extensively sabotaged by her former Vichy crew, and could not keep up with the convoy. She was ordered to turn back for Freetown alone at noon on the 20 June, and was sunk by gunfire from the Vichy sloop AIR FRANCE IV at 1140 on the 21 June 1941.

(To be continued)

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