大象传媒

The German air ace Adolf Galland recalls the sort of preparations that were made in his book "The First and the Last" and no doubt the Germans have always thought that they had won through because of these preparations but I can assure them now that the one man who more than anything else gave them success on February 12th was their 鈥淯" Boat commander that had sent three torpedoes into the hull of the Ark Royal on November 13th 1941. Thus bringing about panic on the part of the Navy in view of the pending Gibraltar convoy and so much confusion at St Eval that it would have easily been possible to have moved the ships from Brest there and then. It should have proved fairly simple for German intelligence to deduce that something had gone wrong at St Eval by noting that planes marked ZS that were patrolling Brest were now appearing at North Front, Gibraltar.
It is inconceivable that any war cabinet or commander in the field would deliberately remove the very key to the success of the undertaking and then carry on as if no change had taken place.
The British high command were fully aware of the changes that had been made and the understanding was that once it had been established that the special aircrews of 233 Squadron would be able to undertake the Gibraltar operation then a new policy concerning the Battleships at Brest would include a proviso to the effect that a failure of early detection that the ships had sailed would bring into question and probably preclude any further intervention with their movement.
Obviously the lines of communication didn't function too well or indeed, was it possible to communicate such a message? So that in the end things were just allowed to drift and this seems to be bourn out by the sort of confusion that ensued on the day in question.
From the sinking of the Ark Royal to the escape of the German Battleships from Brest the pressures attendant upon the British High Command must have been so great that by the time it happened so much had been accomplished in the furtherance of a long term ongoing war as to make a small tactical defeat seem unimportant.
What was really unforeseen was the reaction of the British nation to what seemed to them a most humiliating defeat and they were angry. National pride ran way with them and the newspapers of the day instead of playing down what had happened only incensed an already critical situation. Any average war correspondent should have got some idea about what had really happened from the obvious clues that were available to all and in that way newspapers could have played a much more responsible role so as to enable all concerned to press on with the more important task of winning the war.
However it seemed that was not to be and so with continuing mounting criticism from all sides Churchill was forced into holding an inquiry.

Churchill stood aloof from taking any part in the inquiry and this would seem to me quite an understandable attitude for the man to take if one stops to consider some of the items that had been on the agenda since the day the Ark Royal had been sunk.

1. To deal with the almost impossible task of supplying immediate air cover at Gibraltar.
2. December 6th. 1941 Japanese raid on Pearl Harbour.
3. As a response to Pearl Harbour America committed to all out war as allies on December 8th and from my vantage point there at North Front it was obvious that immediate agreement had been reached with the Americans on how to transform the place as quick as possible into a modern airfield for use in the forthcoming North African campaign.
4.December 10th a naval disaster in the Far East H.M.S Repulse sunk by the Japanese with heavy loss of life.
5.Singapore on verge of surrender.
6.How to supply urgently needed spitfires to Malta.

And yet all the British people wanted to talk about was the escape of the German battleships.
It must have been a somewhat frustrated Churchill and little wonder he was completely out of sympathy with the British people over the issue. When after the war he stated: 鈥淰iewed in the after-light and in its larger aspects the episode was highly advantageous to us鈥� I believe he was again referring to the complete war picture as he had viewed it at the time and not as is suggested the small single issue of three German Battleships passing through the English Channel.
Coupled with the entry into the war of the Americans the other most important single item in bringing about the turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic had been the endeavours made by Coastal Command at North Front.
The literary pundits of course are unable to let things rest and the book 鈥淔iasco鈥� written by John Deane. Potter does nothing but reiterate all the abuse that seems to have been heaped upon Coastal Command over the episode, ironically at a time when great credit was due. The book recounts from official and other dubious sources all the seemingly muddle and inconsistencies of the day and places on record for all time the outright condemnation of Joubert's Coastal Command that took place in the aftermath of the escape of the Battleships.

The absolutely essential need of the day was to have immediate knowledge that the ships had left Brest and the book goes on to make what I consider to be the only relevant point therein as far as Coastal Command is concerned and I quote: "To make these patrols effective intensive crew training was needed and this had not reached as high a standard as it should have鈥�.
Had the author then gone on to investigate why that was so with as much zeal as he applied to the condemnation of Coastal Command he would have soon discovered that an event of much wider implications had been forced upon the command. Events that Joubert's Coastal Command had successfully carried through, so to speak, "off the cuff" and yet for all the immense efforts that had been made by the command Joubert was about to be made the scapegoat for something that events had practically forced him to abandon.
One of the most astounding aspects of the whole piece was the acceptance by the high command of a report angrily written by a Flight-Lieutenant Kidd the following day. Kidd first of all showed this highly emotional and appallingly inaccurate report to Admiral Ramsay. Ramsay, who at the time was worrying about his own skin readily agreed with everything Kidd had written and the report, should be passed on to the High Command.
Now it has always been my understanding that emotional outburst in anger or anything else whether written or spoken could never be allowed to play any part in politics, wars or judicial enquiries but strangely Kidd鈥檚 report is placed on record and remains there to this day.
With all concerned busy passing the buck there seems to have been almost complete circle of conspiracy going on at the time over the whole affair some of it intentional some accidental and some coincidental. It surrounded Joubert and his Coastal Command to such an extent that he must have felt isolated and sorely tempted to blow the gaff on the whole show but in order to maintain complete secrecy over the Gibraltar operation he knew he had to remain silent and no doubt more important to him was the fact that any disclosures that he might like to make would only increase the already dangerous situation facing his aircrews at North Front.
Such was the man and yet down through the years the abuse has gone on with writers like Potter in his book 鈥淔iasco" when he sums up Joubert thus 鈥渁 fuddy duddy a career officer of the old fashioned type, slightly out of touch with the sudden emergencies of World War two air warfare鈥�. Such observations of course are completely untrue, as this report makes clear.
Sir Phillip Joubert in those days knew more about the destruction of "U" Boats from the air than any other man alive and saw to it that his squadrons were equipped with all the latest gear available.
But the British people needed a scapegoat and wanted it to be seen that even their wars were run democratically and so just four days after the event a committee of three was quickly convened to inquire as to why three German Battleships were able to sail through the English Channel in war time. Under the chairmanship of a Mr.Justice Bucknell the tribunal took about three weeks to complete its inquiries and produce a report.
The report, of course, was a disaster for Coastal Command for without the knowledge of this belated report how could it be otherwise the information was vital. The St Eval Squadron, now just over two months in that God forsaken place would have reached rock bottom from the morale point of view, were found to be lacking in application and a damp ignition plug in one engine and a blown fuse in another A.S.V. unit had managed to gum up the Brest patrols.
The real purpose of the inquiry will probably never be known but that it became a farce and nothing more than a whitewash to suit the ends of that moment is sure. Some poor devil of a Flight Lieutenant C.L.Wilson got the blame for the vitally wrong misinterpretation of the A.S.V. Screen and was reprimanded and chief of Coastal Command, Joubert, got the sack.
We at North Front heard nothing of the row that had gone on over the escape of the three Battleships so that the news that our chief had been sacked was received with a somewhat shocked surprise, which left one or two other very angry and disgusted Flight Lieutenants about the place and for that matter Squadron Leaders as well. The reaction of Squadron Leader Deavey to the news of Joubert's sacking was instant anger and he came striding away from the operation hut across the dispersal to where a group of us were busy servicing a Hudson, stopped a few yards short and angrily shouted at us "What dyer think they've sacked Joubert". He was obviously very upset and told me some while later during a conversation that he thought Joubert had a pretty raw deal.
A more appropriate item for an inquiry at about that time would have been to do with the sinking of the Ark Royal which would have shown up the true story behind the escape of the Battleships. How a modern aircraft carrier sailing only thirty miles from its home base under perfect conditions and with the additional facility of having landing and refuelling space at Gibraltar, as primitive as they then were Swordfish could manage very well, to then get sunk by three torpedoes fired from a German "U" Boat is difficult to imagine. Operating from the flight deck of their own great ship those Swordfish were unable to stop the attack and yet, low and behold, just about one month later apparently they were so good the few that survived the sinking, as to be able to operate from a land base at Gibraltar to prevent attack on the homeward bound convoy against a mass of "U" Boats out in the Atlantic, the mind boggles.
In fact what happened over that first ever inquiry into a battle of war just goes to show how futile such an exercise was.
Public opinion was disturbed by the escape of the three ships, and an inquiry was ordered by the Government but the findings were not published. The failure to detect the ships earlier, when it was known they might sail at any moment, was the inexplicable feature of the operations.
So wrote Admiral Sir W.M.James in what was probably one of the first naval books to be published after the war and is used extensively as a: reference book; "The British Navies in the second world War" first published 1946.
At the time of writing his book I am sure Admiral James was fully aware of the reasons for the inexplicable failure of the early warning and so were other Admirals but by then it had been realized that to allow any clue as to what had, really happened could have embarrassing repercussions for the navy as for sure the "inexplicable failure" had been entirely of their making. Obviously another hand had hold of the pen and on careful examination of what was written earlier of the homeward bound Gibraltar convoy against the back ground of this report it can only be concluded that what has been written is for the sole purpose of hiding the true facts.
One other "Inexplicable failure" is on the part of the Royal Air Force who for some obscure reason seem reluctant to give even the smallest piece of recognition to the part played by their airmen in the country鈥檚 hour of need and in a nation renowned for honouring it's dead. From the time of the emergency at the end of 194l and in the following twelve months at least thirty of our Hudson's were lost in their missions from North Front. With a crew of four in each it can be estimated that about One Hundred and Twenty of our best airmen gave their lives in keeping the seas around Gibraltar secure and free, In that area of operations survivors would have been few. Flying down the Mediterranean, towards Malta in those days became so hazardous that at the end of one day鈥檚 flying patrols during the ill conceived Malta convoy four of our Hudson's failed to return to base. It was after that day's flying that one of our pilot's refused to carry out any more patrols down the Mediterranean. unless some fighter protection be given. For refusing that pilot and crew were then grounded for period although when they were allowed to resume flying duties again they never returned from their second trip out.
There does appear to be one or two slightly disturbing and inexplicable features concerning the period from the sinking of the aircraft carrier Ark Royal to the escape of the German Battleships.

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