大象传媒

Background
Bomber Command losses to Luftwaffe night fighters were increasing. It was thought that an airborne set had been installed in the night fighters so jamming of ground control messages had become less effective. Over a number of night operations, a single aircraft had been tacked onto the bomber stream carrying special receiving equipment in the hope that it would be attacked. Up to the night of 3 December 1942, none of these aircraft had been attacked.

The following is a transcript from the Unit Operational Record Book for No 1474 Flight, held at the National Archives, Kew, London (AIR27/1156).

Special duty flight
Operation took place across the north coast of France to an area near to Frankfurt. The aircraft was engaged on the 18th sortie on a particular investigation, which necessitated the aircraft being intercepted by an enemy night fighter and up to this sortie, all efforts to get such an interception had failed.

At 04:31 hours, the aircraft was in position 4954N 0739E and set course for position 5030N 0737E. The Special Operator, P/O Jordan, had been reporting that he had been receiving signals on his special wireless equipment which he thought were the ones requiring to be investigated. He warned the crew to expect a fighter attack. On this northerly leg the signals grew stronger and Jordan repeated his warning. A code had previously been arranged, so that if the signals were picked up, the frequency would immediately be sent back to base, it being absolutely vital that this information should reach base at all costs.

Position 5030N 0737E was reached at 04:42 and the aircraft set course for the homeward leg. The special operator passed the coded message to the wireless operator for transmission to base, giving in the message the required frequency and that this frequency was very probably the correct one.

Jordan warned the crew that his receiver was being saturated and to expect an attack at any moment. Almost simultaneously the aircraft was hit by a burst of cannon fire. The rear gunner gave a fighter control commentary during the attack and identified the enemy as a Junkers 88. Violent corkscrew turns were used as evasive action.

Jordan was hit in the arm on this first attack and realising that now there was no doubt at all about the signal being the correct one, he changed the coded message, a change that would tell base that the frequency given was absolutely correct and that it applied without a doubt to the signal being investigated. Although hit in the arm, he still continued to work his sets and to note further characteristics of the signal.

The rear gunner fired about 1,000 rounds on this attack, but his turret was hit and made completely unserviceable and he was wounded in the shoulder. On the second attack, Jordan was hit in the jaw, but he still continued to work his sets and from the results told the captain and crew from which side to expect the next attack.

On the third attack, the front turret was hit and the front gunner wounded in the leg. The wireless operator went forward to let him out of the turret but he was hit in both legs by an exploding shell and had to return to his seat. P/O Barry, navigator, then went forward and let Grant out of the turret. Jordan was hit once more, this time in the eye, and although he continued operating his equipment and noting further details of the signal, he realised that he could not continue with the investigation much longer, owing to his condition and seeing that his intercom had also been shot away. He went forward and brought back the navigator and tried to explain to him how to continue operating the equipment and so bring back some more valuable information. By this time he was almost blind but although he tried hard to show Barry what to do, he realised that it was an impossible task and in the end gave up the attempt.

F/Sgt Vachon had by this time come out of the rear turret and had taken up position in the Astro Hatch, from where he continued to give evasive control, but he was hit again in the hand and Barry went back and took over from him in the Astro Dome. During this period the aircraft had lost height from about 14,000 feet down to 500 feet above the ground, violent evasive action still being taken by the captain. After ten or 12 attacks the enemy aircraft broke off his engagement and disappeared.

Hits had been scored on the Wellington in five or six of the attacks, resulting in the following damage:
1. Starboard throttle control shot away (starboard engine stuck at +3 boost all the way home).
2. Port throttle jammed.
3. Front and rear turrets unserviceable.
4. Starboard ailerons unserviceable and trimming tabs having no effect at all.
5. Air speed indicator reading zero in both positions owing to the pitot head or pipes being holed.
6. Starboard petrol tank holed.
7. Fabric shot and torn away on starboard side of fuselage.
8. Hydraulics unserviceable.
9. Both engines running irregularly.

The wireless operator Sgt Bigoray, in spite of his injuries, transmitted the coded message back to base but receiving no 'R' for it continued to send it in the hope that it would be picked up. It was received at 05:05 hours.

The captain kept the aircraft on the course for home and managed to climb up to 5,000 feet, at which height he came back. At 06:45 hours the aircraft crossed the coast at about ten miles north east of Dunkirk, where searchlights tried to pick it out - but these were dodged by evasive action and coming down low over the sea. When they were switched off, the pilot again managed to gain height.

The wireless operator put the IFF on to Stud 3 and sent out an SOS and a message to the effect that they had been attacked by an enemy aircraft. He again transmitted the coded message in case it had not been received the first time. At approximately 07:20 hours the English coast was reached. The pilot tested the landing light to see if he could ditch using it, but decided it was impossible. He decided to wait for daylight before ditching and asked the crew if anyone preferred to bail out rather than ditch. The wireless operator stated that he preferred to jump, as one of his legs had stiffened up to such an extent that he thought he would not be able to climb out of the aircraft in the water. He made his way to the escape hatch in the rear of the fuselage, from where he intended to jump, but having reached that position he remembered that he had not clamped down the transmitting key and, in spite of his injury, he returned to his set, clamped the key down, and warned the crew not to touch it. He jumped out over Ramsgate and made a safe landing.

The pilot ditched the aircraft at approximately 08:24 hours about 200 yards off the coast at Deal. The dinghy inflated but had been holed by cannon fire. The special operator tried to make it airtight by holding some of the holes but it was impossible and the crew got out of the dinghy and climbed onto the aircraft. About five minutes later a small rowing boat appeared, took them off and rowed ashore.

The following signal was received from the Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshall Sir Charles Portal, for P/O Jordan, P/O Paulton, P/O Barry, F/Sgt Bigoray, F/Sgt Grant, F/Sgt Vachon: 'I have just read report of your investigation flight carried out on Thursday, 3 December and should like to congratulate you all on a splendid performance.'

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