大象传媒

From the book: Geo. Chippington鈥檚 book 鈥淪ingapore 鈥� The Inexcusable Betrayal鈥�

鈥淥n 8th December 1941 the following aircraft were usually available (in Malaya and Singapore)
- 43 Brewster Buffaloes
- 90 assorted planes:
o Blenheim MK1
o Hudsen MK2
o Wilderbeeste (maximum speed less than 100 mph)
o 3 Catalinas
all obsolete or obsolescent, and unfortunately inferior to the Japanese aircraft 鈥� an insult to the pilots who had to fly and die in them.

On the same day 23 of these Blenheims and 12 Buffaloes were destroyed by Japanese air attacks at Sunge, Patan, and Alor Star (Malaya)

Our first morning at Seletar saw the start of the fun. A formation of Japanese planes attacked the drome. As this was our first taste of it its amusing to think of the nonchalant way we met it. We didn鈥檛 even go to the shelters but sat in the canteen listening to the racket. We were determined to show the natives that there was nothing to be frightened about.

In a mere matter of days we were reaching the shelters yards ahead of the natives and demonstrating what real running was like. Two Catalina flying boats (the most modern aircraft then operational) were machine gunned and destroyed by Navy Os that morning, but little damage was done by the bombers. Then for a few days comparative quiet ensued 鈥� but during this period we wireless operators were elsewhere.

This is probably the appropriate place to say something about Singapore at the time of the outbreak of hostilities in the Far East. RAF Seletar was like a holiday camp. It had its own 9 hole golf course, tennis courts, theatre and cinema. The accommodation was excellent and the food good and plentiful. Drink and tobacco were cheap. The officers lived a life of luxury and most of the married ones had their wives with them. Even the O/Rs did very nicely and a softness and never never land atmosphere pervaded the place. Up to the war with Japan starting, many Japanese had been employed as servant and manual workers at Seletar.

An RAF pilot resident in Seletar with his wife wrote:

鈥淗URRICANE OVER THE JUNGLE鈥�

by Terence Kelly (Oldham Library 940.544 KEL)

SELETAR covered the greatest area of the four airfields in Singapore (Sembawang, Tengah, and Kallang{Civilian}). Landing field not large but vast with hangars, administration buildings, messes and billets (three floors).

Regular bomb attacks every am.
27 bombers in perfect formation escorted by Navy Os. Never in the afternoon and only once at night. Six main targets 鈥� 4 airfields, naval dockyards, and very occasionally, Teibu.

Slit trenches about 4 foot deep.

No doubt the easy going, high flying way of life of both civilians and servicemen alike in the months and years before the War has a good deal to do with the humiliations in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies and the intermingling in an active theatre of war of mainly executive class civilians and servicemen was unhelpful.

鈥淔ew of us in Singapore knew anything of the reality of war. War will never reach us, we had always thought and like ostriches with our heads in the sands of splendid isolation we enjoyed our lives. At night the clubs and restaurants were crowded with tuxedo-clad men and bare shouldered women drifting together round the dance floors. 鈥淚t can鈥檛 happen here鈥�. On Seletar aerodrome life was especially good. It was reputed to be the most comfortable of RAF stations in the Far East; it had its own gold course, its yacht club, its swimming pool and its private taxis available for all ranks at $8 ( about 拢1 ) for all day hire. The Singapore civilians accepted us with studied tolerance and most of the town鈥檚 amenities were open to us.鈥�

When he talks of the town鈥檚 amenities being open to us, he is of course referring only to the officers. Most of the haunts frequented by the civilians (white) such as the Raffles Hotel were out of bounds to other ranks. In Singapore the white civilians lived the good colonial life. They had little to do with the licentious soldiery of course, considering themselves very superior. When they decided that they did need the armed forces, it never occurred to them to do much about things themselves and not surprisingly the reaction of the forces was less than enthusiastic.

The Australians and Indians constituted the greater part of the land forces in Malaya. One of the Australians wrote:
鈥� I still have very vivid memories of my first mental reactions on our arrival in Singapore. We were equipped, even if only 59% equipped for war. Yet the first sight that met our eyes on the first evening was officers in mess dress and women in evening dress. It was not only incongruous, it was wrong. Either we were crazy or they were crazy.

鈥淯p until the very hour that the first Jap bombs showered down on Singapore City the gay luxurious social life continued there 鈥� tennis, golf, cricket, bathing, boating during the daytime and crowded cocktail, theatre and dinner parties far into the night. By the way, except at top level the various 鈥榗olours鈥� did not easily mix together鈥�. (Owen) The people who lorded it in Singapore were caught on the hop on the 8th December 鈥�41 when (the day after Pearl Harbour) reports of Japanese war ships and heavy transporters having been received 12 hours earlier 鈥� the Singapore air raid sirens howled.

I quote Owen again:
鈥淗S ARP was not even manned. Though on December 1st an urgent warning signal 鈥楢LBERT鈥� (watch for hostile aircraft had gone out. Every streetlight was still glowing and remained so. Half an hour later police, APR and power station official were still scouring the town for the one man who had the key of the central switch for the blackout. (It should be recorded that only two practice blackouts had ever been held in Singapore during the previous September.)

The fact that the big guns of Singapore were immovably placed facing the wrong way (out to sea) is common knowledge.

The Underrated Enemy (Amran Stewart) 940.5425 STE

The small force of Hurricanes sent to Malaya suffered from every possible disadvantage. The Aircraft were old MK Is or early MK IIAs which had only 8 machine guns. Destined for the Middle East, their engines had been fitted with desert air filters that reduced their speed by some 30 mph. The pilots were newly trained, and although mustered together as 232 Squadron, had been assembled from 4 different, quite unconnected units.

On 20th January, 232 Squadron first saw action against 27 bombers raiding Singapore. One flight claimed to have shot down 8 of these. The other flight was engaged by the escorting fighters, 3 were brought down, but 3 Hurricanes were lost with all their pilots, among them the CO Squadron Leader Landles. The Hurricanes were more than capable of dealing with the Japanese bombers. Also, in many ways they were superior to Japan鈥檚 Army Airforce fighters. These could out turn and out climb the Hurricanes, but the latter could out dive their rivals, had greater fire power and could endure far more punishment. Unfortunately, the RAF pilots were completely uninformed about either the virtues or the defects of the enemy aircraft. Many fine men lost their lives needlessly while such combat knowledge was acquired.

In any case 232 gave its greatest services by attacks on the Japs land forces. The results were ruefully described by Col. TSUJI 鈥渢he Hurricanes flying low over the rubber forest were a serious challenge. Their intrepid pilots continually machine gunned our roads, shooting up motor transport and blocking traffic. Our mobile Corps had been advancing on the paved roads in broad daylight taking no precautions against enemy air raids. While the Hurricanes were flying even single cars moved off the road into the cover of the jungle and all convoys had to move off the road and get out of sight at the first alarm鈥�.

This illustrates the effect a large force of modern fighters might have had. Sadly, the Hurricanes available were too few in number to make a decisive impact. But at least 232鈥檚 intervention was partly responsible for the safe withdrawal of Gordon Bennett鈥檚 remaining Brigades from Northern Johore.

Anyway, any conflict between the citizens of Singapore and the armed forces didn鈥檛 affect me as we had very little time for sightseeing. Indeed only a week after our arrival we found ourselves 鈥榦n the move鈥�.

Our armies having been pushed further and further back it was decided to withdraw back to a line Batu Pahat 鈥� Kluang 鈥� Mersing, 90 miles of it in Johore. By January 21st the Japs were cutting across the road down the coast and the road between Batu Pahat and Kluang, just missing snapping up 2 Generals who didn鈥檛 realise that they had infiltrated across the road in places. (Generals Heath and Kay commanders of III corps and II India Division ). Retreat through Johore to Singapore seemed inevitable. However Kluang (the last aerodrome on the mainland in our hands) was
in danger of capture by the enemy before we could destroy its buildings, machinery and oil stocks. A general counter attack was raised and then cancelled. 鈥淭he Sikh battalion commander ignored his instructions and led his men forward in a bayonet charge which drove the Japanese helter skelter from the field leaving upon it hundreds of dead and dying. On the night of January 23rd all necessary demolitions, the destruction of stocks and the wrecking of the runways was completed and what oil could be got away was moved.鈥� (Owen)

Whatever equipment the Far East was short of it had certainly accumulated large stocks of oil and petroleum. One might say that this is not surprising as it had precious few planes to use up the stuff. Much of this stock was held at Kluang. Kluang was still in our hands (thanks to the Sikhs) and the railway was still operating between Kluang and Singapore.

January 24 1941.

Kluang鈥檚 position wasn鈥檛 very secure and it wasn鈥檛 expected to hold out very long, so it was important to get as much fuel away back to Singapore as possible before it fell. The stuff had to be moved from the drome to the railway, and as there was little transport available at Kluang some half a dozen lorries had to be sent up from Singapore. Obviously the trip wasn鈥檛 without its dangers and the lorries couldn鈥檛 just be left to the drivers so it was decided to send an armed escort of two men with each lorry. Twelve wireless ops of whom I was one were given the doubtful privilege. And so, Jack Spencer and I wearing steel helmets and gingerly carrying loaded rifles sat in the back of an open lorry moving across the causeway in the wrong direction, i.e. nearer to the Japanese. Our party was completed by the ACH corporal's regular selected hands who shared the driving and were supposed to be in charge.

This was January 2, actually the journey was full of interest but uneventful and it gave us an excuse to say that we had actually been in Malaya, even if it was only a matter of 70 or 80 miles inside. Naturally we got a little bit excited as we got near our destination (and the enemy) but some of the sights we saw made our own troubles seem very small.

On the edge of the jungle at the side of the roadway lay hundreds of exhausted and beaten troops. It was easy to see that the fight had gone out of them and that Malaya was doomed. How could it be otherwise 鈥� they scarcely saw a British plane in the sky but they were certainly very conscious of the Japanese planes. The Japanese navy dominated the seas and landed reinforcements behind them whenever they attempted to make a stand.

Through the mass of dirty and beaten men we went to the town of Kluang 鈥� deserted like a ghost town 鈥� then on to the drome, bomb pitted and abandoned except for a skeleton staff and the Sikh regiment who still waited there to defend it should the Japanese appear over the hill.

January 1942
We had been expected to come back the same night by rail after having delivered the lorry but our two dim corporals seemed incapable of explaining the position and we were kept to help with the evacuation.

I鈥檓 not sorry really 鈥� never have I quite come across the same peace anywhere during my overseas travels as I found on an almost deserted Kluang airfield. Maybe it seems ironic in view of our position and of course we didn鈥檛 know then of the events leading up to our arrival. The drome was in a hollow with hills surrounding it. The billets were situated on the hills. They had a certain amount of difficulty in finding accommodation for us in view of the bombing and our own demolitions. Eventually they put us up on the hill in what had been the officers quarters. Walls were dirty, the floors were littered with debris, but the showers still worked and it wasn鈥檛 really uncomfortable.

Of course, as we had only set out on a kind of long day trip we had absolutely nothing with us in the way of kit 鈥� no soap or towels even. However, they managed to find some mosquito nets for us and we had a shower without soap and dried ourselves on the mosquito nets.

The Japanese couldn鈥檛 be far away but we didn鈥檛 actually see any of them whilst we were at Kluang. It was all so very quiet, deserted and peaceful 鈥� particularly at night with the hills around us and here and there an Indian soldier, immovable at his post. Unfortunately a mosquito bite on my knee was getting a bit troublesome. We had got pretty filthy on our trip up, dirt had got in, the medical staff had left Kluang and the foundations of a really beautiful septic knee were laid.

As almost all our squadron signals section was at Kluang after a couple of days had passed we were not only getting rather anxious about our own position, but wondering how they were getting on at Singa if our planes were becoming operational. The two corporals we had with us were apparently afraid of approaching the CO and as long as they were with us no-one else could very well see him so we conspired to get them out of the way. As it happened, a few men were required to go on a trip a few miles away on the road to Singapore to do some superficial repairs to a lorry and to bring it back. We managed to persuade both corporals to volunteer as it was in their line of business and would be a quiet 鈥榙o your own thing鈥� trip away from the moving of oil drums. They fell for it and volunteered thus breaking two laws 鈥� the first unofficial which says 鈥榥ever volunteer for anything鈥� and the second official which says that a unit shouldn鈥檛 be left without a non commissioned officer at the very least.

This left us for a few hours with nothing but AC2s, the lowest form of animal life in the RAF. However this meant that as there were no officers or NCOs to do so, the senior O/R was entitled to approach the CO on anything of importance that arose. We hadn鈥檛 an LAC. We hadn鈥檛 even an AC1. All we had were AC2s.

My colleagues said a number of very flattering 鈥� and untrue 鈥攖hings about my eloquence and delegated the task to me. What they really felt was that they didn鈥檛 want to approach the CO themselves and they had to find some stooge for the job before the NCOs returned. Anyway, off I went and found the CO who turned out to be a very charming chappie. I painted a horrifying picture of the situation 鈥� how the most important squadron in the Far East was without its Signals 鈥� how we had been sent on a one day trip with no kit at all and how we shouldn鈥檛 have been allowed to come at all if the powers that be in Singapore had known we would be away so long. He seemed quite upset about it all and said that we must certainly go back immediately.

Then he offered me a cigarette and started chatting quite matey-like. It gives you some idea of the dreadful chaos of our Far Eastern campaign when I tell you that he asked me if I could tell him about the position of the Japs around Kluang. He said that a short while before he had spoken to HQ at Singapore on the secraphone to find out the position and they had reluctantly informed him that they were sorry but they hadn鈥檛 any information as to how near to Kluang the Japanese were or whether the road was still open.

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