大象传媒

This story was submitted to the People's War site by Nadine from the People's War team on behalf of Charles Peterson and has been added to the site with his permission. The author fully understands the site's terms and conditions.

In wartime most servicemen knew little, if anything of military intelligence, strategy, or tactics, although the latter became known as they were required to be carried out. Much can be learned of the former two by reading the many books written about World War II.

My most recent read has been "Intercept" by Josef Garlinkski wherein much information is given regarding the breaking of the enemy Enigma Code. This effort started in Poland, then to France, and eventually England.

After landing at Dover from Dunkirk the men of the 210th Heavy AA Battery RA were entrained for Blackdown Heath in the South of England. After a few days they were moved to Cardigan, South Wales, again to a tented camp. Once again the stay was short, and the next move was to Blackpool. There I experienced the best 3 weeks of my 6 1/2 years in the army: soft beds, good food and kind landladies. P.T. and route marches in the morning, afternoons free. Pity the army pay was insuffient to enjoy all the delights.

However our next move was to Middlesborough and a return to the war. We manned 2-4 gun sites. These were concrete emplacements with the guns 3.7", ceiling more than 3 times the height obtained by the 3" left in France. There were huts with palliases and stoves, even a canteen.

Unfortunately we were still short of over 40 men. The only leave to be had for about 3 months was every ten days 5-11pm. Re-enforcements did arrive eventually, but as they had come straight from "civvy street" they required to learn army discipline before being introduced to the gun site.

On these evening leaves, most men consumed a fair amount of ale in the bars of the town thus enabling them to have a decent night's sleep despite the thunder of the guns nearby.

The summer of 1940 was of beautiful weather continuing through to winter. There must have been some connection with the previous winter, described as the coldest of the century in Europe.

August 15th was a typically fine day and the commencement of the Luftwaffe raids with the object of destroying Britain's war effort. Duties on the gun sites were given out at first parade. I was detailed to take over the wireless connection to Gun Operations Room. There was one of these in every major town equipped with Radar and in touch with Observer Corps, gun sites and also airfields - in our case at Thornaby-on-Tees, just to the South.

About midday the order to 'stand to' was given and sirens sounded. Before me I had a map of the town and environs in numbered squares. The one and only plot I received was of 100+ enemy planes at the mouth of the Tees on course for Middlesborough. Tension was felt throughout the site. Was this pre-invasion, bearing in mind that four towns in the North East of England had been shelled in World War I by units of the enemy Navy without opposition?

The gun sites were in dual purpose role with co-ordinates painted in each gunpit to shell the beaches in event of landings. The AA sites would be prime targets and could not have coped with a daylight raid of this size.

On the same day two other enemy air fleets were attacking the South of England. Bletchley Park, where enemy messages were being deciphered, thanks to breaking of Enigma code, had passed all information on these raids to Fighter Command. I feel sure that Thornaby airfield has been re-enforced to meet the threat.

Here I must point out two errors in Garlinski's book. He writes of engagment "far out to sea". This did not happen. The enemy were always confronted no farther than Radar range. Strenuous efforts were always made to prevent enemy learning of the breaking of the code. He also writes of raids on Scotland that day. There was no report of such raids taking place.

The roar of the enemy planes was heard on the gunsite, then it began to lessen in a North Easterly direction. The fighters were attacking! The enemy planes were vulnerable, laden with bombs and extra fuel tanks having come from Norway and Denmark.

After about 15 minutes a sound like an earthquake occurred, even the ground shook. This went on for about 10 minutes. As no serious damage was reported afterwards the fighters must have driven the enemy inland where they dropped their bombs, probably in the Pennines, for a quick get away. The book relates 15 enemies were shot down for the loss of one fighter. Surely the highest success ratio of the Battle of Britain!!

This large day raid in our area was never repeated. There have been harsh words said about the RAF in and after France regarding the lack of air support for the troops, but never a wrong word after that day. Removal of the RAF from France was supreme strategy.

Following that day the enemy resorted to constant night raids, dusk till dawn. Their tactics were to prevent night shifts working in the large number of factories, etc. in the North East of England from Middlesborough to Newcastle. AA Command realized that searchlight sites could not succeed in illuminating raiders without the aid of radar, of which there just weren't enough sets. Searchlights and barrage balloons were phased out and the only give away in the complete blackout was the flashes of the guns.

Some attempts to bomb the sites were made without success, until 1941 when a bomber set fire to the huts on one site with incendiaries and the following plane dropped H.E. 4 dead and 15 wounded. The AA Command tactics against night raids was the firing of barrages in certain areas of the sky where the release of bombs would strike a vital part of the war effort. Enemy planes avoided these areas and of course bombing became haphazard. The tactics were successful. I never heard or learned of any severe damage to works, docks, etc. during that long winter with many "bomber moons".

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