大象传媒

Shortly after the outbreak of war a third COL station was erected, on a jungle hilltop near Kota Tinggi, 30 miles north of Singapore, followed by a TRU at Serangoon, on the north side of Singapore, and a CD/CHL on top of Changi Gaol. This was an Army set, similar to a COL but intended originally as a range-finder for the battery of 15-inch guns at Changi. At the end of January, 1942, after the Japanese had landed at Endau, on the east coast of Malaya, the TRU at Mersing was withdrawn, converted into an MRU, and erected near Tengah. As the Japanese advanced further south, the other radar stations on the mainland were withdrawn, reconditioned and shipped to Java on 6 Feb 1942, together with about 300 radar personnel, under Wing Commander Cave. I remained in Singapore, running the four remaining radar stations, the communications unit, the filter room and the remaining Part of the Radio Installation and Maintenance Unit, together about 250 personnel.

Three days later the Japanese succeeded in landing on Singapore Island, and in the next six days they overran all of it except the neighbourhood of the City and the Harbour Board's area. The radar stations were operated as long as possible, but all except No 243 AMES had to be progressively destroyed to prevent the secret equipment from falling into enemy hands intact. By Friday, 13 Feb 42, No 243 AMES had had to be moved for a third time and was in need of repair pending re-erection. That afternoon, however, word came that AVM Pulford had obtained an allocation of space for all remaining RAF personnel in a flotilla of small vessels - they eventually totalled 44 - that Admiral Spooner was organising, with the intention of sending them to Java. I gave orders for the remaining secret equipment to be destroyed and all 250 RAF personnel to embark that afternoon, evening or night, moving to the docks in small parties as they were under continuous bombing and shelling; and as I thought it likely that the journey out of Singapore would be very hazardous, each unit was to carry not only its own nominal roll but also copies of those of the other six. By 2200h I was able to report to AVM Pulford that embarkation had been completed; he was then in a naval launch with Admiral Spooner. I then embarked. Most of the vessels sailed that evening, some the next morning. What I had not foreseen was that 42 of the 44 would be sunk by bombing or naval gunfire, including six of the seven carrying the RAF personnel, and that all copies of all the nominal rolls would be lost. I was picked up by one of the two ships that survived and was taken, with a few other RAF survivors, to Tembilahan, a small port on the Inderagiri River in the east of Sumatra; from there we went to Padang, on the west coast, along a route that had been reconnoitred by the Special Operations Executive (though we did not know this at the time). We collected some more RAF survivors on the way. From Padang we were taken to Colombo aboard a destroyer, HMS Tenedos, which had put in for fuel, and two cruisers, HMS Dragon and HMAS Hobart. Thirty-four RAF survivors reached Colombo, out of the 250 who had embarked at Singapore.

The dockside at Colombo was jammed with stores and equipment that had been shipped from the UK intended for the Middle East, diverted towards Singapore after rounding the Cape, and rediverted to Colombo when it became apparent that Singapore would fall. It included equipment for at least one Mobile Radio Unit. The RAF in Ceylon had by now been transferred to India Command, which had no radar whatsoever. It had been decided to form a Radio Branch at Air Headquarters India, and Group Captain C.C.Morton had just arrived in Delhi, from Iceland, to become the first Command Radio Officer. He had no staff and there were no transport or communications aircraft in India, so when he heard that we had arrived in Ceylon he borrowed a Hawker Hart trainer of the RIAFVR, flew to Colombo and gave me orders. Equipment for an MRU was to be collected together in Colombo and taken by ex-Far East radar personnel to Trincomalee, where it should be brought into operation as soon as possible, telling to the RAF station at China Bay, where some Hurricane fighters were expected shortly. I was also to choose a site for a COL at Mount Lavinia, near Colombo. Having set that in train, I was to make my way to Bombay and form a Radio Installation and Maintenance Unit to receive and accommodate a large amount of radar equipment with 500 personnel that were in a convoy expected soon from the UK. I was then to choose sites for, and set up, radar defences for Bombay: a TRU, a COL and a combined Filter/Operations Room. The rest of the radar equipment due at Bombay was to be assembled, checked and despatched by rail, with its personnel, to Calcutta; by then he would be in a position to decide on its employment. He then flew off to Bengal and Burma, where it would be impossible to contact him for an unknown period while he chose sites for radar defences there.

The MRU was erected at Trincomalee and on 9 Apr 1942, the day after it became operational, it detected a large number of aircraft approaching from the east. They were from a Japanese carrier task-force in the Bay of Bengal. All available fighters at China Bay were scrambled and were waiting for the Japanese when they arrived. This was what Churchill later described as the most dangerous moment of the war.

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