大象传媒

This story was submitted to the People鈥檚 War site by Ian Ellis on behalf of Greg Drozdz, David Guyett, Remco Immerzeel, Albert Nuttall and Andrew White. The stories and pictures have been added to the site with their permission. The authors fully understand the site's terms and conditions.

This is Chapter 3 of 6 chapters and continues the story of the Lancaster Crash at Rebr茅chien with information about German Night Fighters and their defence against RAF Bombers.

German Night Fighters and Their Defence Against RAF Bombers
Increasing numbers of RAF bombers were falling victim to German night fighters, guided to their targets by ground controllers who could see the raids developing on their radar screens. Bomber losses varied from raid to raid, averaging about 2-3%, but sometimes reaching levels of 15% or more. Half of all Lancaster crews would not complete 15 operations. There was already a well developed screen of integrated searchlights and anti-aircraft guns (Flak) along the coast of occupied Europe as well as the defences of individual German cities. The ratio of losses for RAF and the Americans bombing by day was about two-thirds falling to German fighters and about one third to Flak.
In charge of German night fighters was Major-General Josef Kammhuber who organised the available Messerschmitt Bf-110 twin-engined two seater fighters (Zerst枚rer), the Heinkel HE219 and the newer Junkers-88 night fighters. The Freya ground based radar had a range of 75 miles and was used for general air warning. The higher frequency, shorter range Wurzburg radar was used as the bombers approached for guiding the searchlight and Flak batteries. Kammhuber organized these German defences into what became known as the 鈥楰ammhuber Line鈥� working the three aspects; lights, guns and fighters together. This stretched in a continuous line across Holland, Belgium and France to cover the approach of bombers. The night fighters themselves were further organized into defensive cells, boxes known as Himmelbett (Four-Poster Bed), each about 43 by 34 kilometres (about 27 by 21 miles) with a fighter patrol within each one. Ground controllers could direct the so-called 鈥榋ahme Sau鈥� (Tame Sow) to enter within the bomber stream.

Meanwhile the 鈥榃ilde Sau鈥� (Wild Sow) were German fighters free to roam in the hunt for bombers unless ordered to a particular intercept. All the German defences of Kammhuber were linked by radio to a ground based Control Centre. If a prediction could be made of where the bombers were heading, more Luftwaffe night-fighters could be directed to intercept them. Information about the developing Allied raids would be gathered from a variety of sources including reports from the searchlight and Flak batteries, ground observers and from the night fighters. Attempts to confuse the German early warning radar included dropping huge quantities of metal foil strips code named 鈥榃indow鈥�. This created false echoes, simulating a large bomber force.

Techniques and equipment were continually refined on both sides with W疟rzburg becoming W疟rzburg Riese or Giant W疟rzburg, a parabolic radar dish twenty-five feet in diameter with a narrower beam and a range of 40 miles. German radar searching for the approach of allied bombers could be jammed by Mandrel an allied airborne set sent with each bombing force. By the time the Lancaster was in operation with the RAF, Freya had been developed into the giant thirty-five foot high, ninety foot wide Mammut radar with a range of two hundred miles. Within the night-fighters, Telefunken had installed Lichtenstein radar sets with a range of two miles. Externally this was the 鈥楥hristmas tree鈥� or 鈥榬eindeer antlers鈥� seen on the nose of the German fighters.

The Lichtenstein radar could be used to close the final distance, even in cloud. The RAF bombers could be seen particularly if there was moonlight or from their engine vapour trails, or seen from above when silhouetted against the clouds or over the target lit from below by the fires of falling bombs. German night fighters were also able to track the increasing electronic noise coming from the allied bombers including their radio transmissions and the signals emitted by the Lancaster鈥檚鈥� H2S ground radar and 鈥楳onica鈥� a radar intended to protect against attack from the rear. 鈥楽chrage Musik鈥� (strangely termed Slanting Music) was an upward firing gun carried by Luftwaffe night fighters from late 1943 onwards. The canon would be angled up between 60 and 80 degrees allowing RAF bombers to be attacked from below. From this approach the bombers could not see approaching fighters and moreover, did not have guns to ward of their attackers. The Lancaster crew would usually have no warning of such a fatal attack. The first they knew of the threat, would be the spraying of machine gun fire under the body and wings of their Lancaster and a consequent fire.

Airborne Cigar (ABC) and the Special Radio Operators
An answer to this was developed at the Telecommunications Research Establishment at Malvern in Gloucestershire. 101 Squadron was selected to carry this equipment code named ABC 鈥楢irborne Cigar鈥�. ABC was devised to jam the VHF frequencies used by the German night fighter controllers. The equipment consisted of a panoramic receiver and three transmitters set to the wavebands of 30-33 MHz, 38.3-42.5 MHz and 48-52 MHz used by German radio. The roaring sound of the Lancaster鈥檚 Merlin engine was collected by a microphone and broadcast with a range of up to 50 miles. Airborne Cigar was operated by the 鈥楽pecial Duty Operator鈥� flying as the eighth crew member of specially equipped Lancasters. The Special Operators could understand German, but sometimes only to 鈥榮choolboy level鈥�! The role of the Special Operator was to search amongst the many radio messages filling the skies of wartime Europe for specific Luftwaffe transmissions. When he was sure that he was listening to the German night fighter master controller, the Special Operator jammed that frequency, hopefully before they could alert their night fighters to the position. If the Germans changed frequency he had to find the new frequency and jam that within seconds using one of the ABC transmitters. The only external manifestations of ABC were two large aerials fitted on top of the Lancaster's fuselage and another under the bomb aimer's window.

Trials with an ABC-equipped Lancaster were made on 4 September 1943 and on the 22nd October, 101 Squadron flew its first operation using the equipment during a raid on Hanover. The system worked immediately and more aircraft were modified. By the end of October most of the squadron's aircraft had been fitted with ABC. The ABC equipment weighed about 1,000 lb and with the extra crew member, ABC aircraft still retained their bombing role, but with a reduced capacity. From October 1943 all main force attacks on German targets were accompanied by a number of 101's ABC aircraft ranging from 6 to 27 on occasions. The Squadron's losses soon began to mount and, for a short while at least, were disproportionately higher than the rest of Bomber Command. Suspicions began to be aroused as to whether the German night fighters were homing onto the ABC aircraft's transmissions.
There was no direct evidence that this was happening. The heavy losses were more likely due to the increased number of major raids the Squadron was flying. On the night of 5/6 June 1944, the squadron took part in an elaborate deception plan in advance of the D-Day landings. Twenty four ABC Lancasters flew back and forth in the area of the Pas de Calais, simulating a large raid there. Not only diverting attention away from the intended landing beaches in Normandy, this also created an ABC barrier to protect the unarmed transport planes bringing the airborne paratroopers. Many stories about ABC have circulated after the war, including the incorrect story that they gave false instructions in German. Later on in the war more powerful ground transmitters became available, 鈥楪round Cigar鈥� that could be based in England. With this came the opportunity to broadcast misleading information in German code named 鈥楥orona鈥�. As tactics and counter-tactics were used, women were brought in by the Germans. The RAF responded accordingly, and one story even describes the use of German opera singers to sing out instruction to try and keep their controllers in contact with the fighters.
This operation was a great success protecting the Allied forces in the first stage of the liberation of France and Europe. The risks to the Special Operators who came down in Germany could be acute, especially as some of them were Jewish and may also have had German family connections. One such crew member is recorded as having taken his own life while in a German hospital. The importance of Airborne Cigar to protect Lancaster forces is illustrated by the equipping of 101 Squadron鈥檚 base at Ludford Magna with FIDO a fog dispersal system. FIDO (Fog, Intensive Dispersal of) was able to disperse dense fog by burning vaporized petrol alongside the runway. High-octane petrol was pumped along a system of pipes erected by the side of the airfield runway. The petrol in two pipes was heated and vaporised. Another pipe was perforated and the escaping petrol vapour was lit so that the petrol flames extended beside the runway like two walls of flame. The heat produced lifted the fog. Consuming huge quantities of precious wartime fuel, is an indication of the importance attached to the squadron鈥檚 role in electronic countermeasures.

THE Operations on Stuttgart
Stuttgart had already been bombed in 1943 and in March 1944. However it had been relatively spared compared to other cities due to its protected location in the middle of valleys and the fact that major targets in the Ruhr were very close and of more strategic importance. Nevertheless there were many major factories and municipal and cultural buildings which had to be destroyed and the morale of the population would also suffer from these bombings. Moreover there hadn鈥檛 been major raids to Germany for over two months and it was time for a major strike. As a result three waves were planned on July 24th -25th with 461 Lancaster and 153 Halifax bombers. The Germans realised the target was Stuttgart about half an hour before the target was hit and the surprise effect caused much damage to the city 17 Lancasters were lost as well as 4 Halifaxs. On July 25th-26th, 412 Lancaster and 144 Halifaxes were sent to Stuttgart. This was the most successful bombing and only 8 Lancasters and 4 Halifaxs were lost.

On July 28th-29th, 494 Lancaster flew towards Stuttgart as well as 2 Mosquitos whose mission was to pin point the target. Peter Hyland who had flown to Stuttgart knew the way, as well as his Navigator Clifford Smith. There was a bright moon that night and bombers were easier to distinguish by night fighters who suddenly appeared as the aircraft were on the outward leg and shot down 39 bombers within a few hours. This was almost 20% of the aircraft which had been sent on operation! The LM462 was one of the first ones to be intercepted in the south west of Orleans less than an hour after take off. It might have been chosen as a target because of its strategic importance and betrayed by the three Airborne Cigar antennas. Although antennas were difficult to spot in the darkness, bombers were flying in formation and ABC bombers could be located in the middle of it. On the Operation Report from the RAF, we can clearly distinguish a cross near Orleans with the legend:鈥� bomber support attack鈥�. Peter Hyland must have thrown the aircraft into a 鈥渃orkscrew鈥� dive, dropping thousands of feet in a few seconds to get rid of a night fighter and then turn starboard as he was taught during trainings. This was of course a desperate, endless and nerve racking attempt and the crew could do nothing else than pray that the fighter would have given up the chase. This is probably the reason why the LM462 was isolated when it got finally shot down. Other crews have mentioned in their reports that it had been attacked, but none has apparently seen the last moments.
The SR-V2 had logged in 248 flying hours. Many other Lancasters were shot down minutes later, east of Paris, near Reims. The majority of the Lancasters managed however to get through and accomplished their mission.

There was no room for crew members to wear their parachutes, especially in the turrets, so they had to keep it with them and try to grasp it in case the plane was considered lost. When it occurred, it was often too late. Airmen had to locate their parachutes, wear it within seconds, in absolute darkness. While they were searching for the emergency exit, the plane was plunging, almost vertically, towards the ground. Besides, some of them might have been wounded. No wonder in these circumstances that only one aircrew out of five had time to bale out from a falling plane.

Aircrews knew the risks. They enlisted because they were young and more or less unaware of the terrible conditions. Had they known that 48% of bomber crews would not survive the war and that the life expectancy of a Lancaster on operation was three weeks on average, they would have thought twice! For instance, Wolf Engelhardt was assigned to Ludford Magna in June 1944, only one month before he was shot down.

The airmen would be given a six days leave after every six operations. Had they survived thirty missions, they would have a six months leave. Then they would have the choice between going on another fifteen missions or become ground crew! The crew were on their 10th mission when they were shot down. Their first mission was the bombing of Reims on June 22nd.

THE Last Days of the THE SR-V2 LM462 Crew
We know from operation reports from Ludford Magna what the LM-462 crew has been doing before the ill fated mission to Stuttgart. It took three night operations to destroy the Stuttgart target. We know that the LM462 crew participated in at least two of those missions: On July 25th, the report mentions: operations successful with the name Peter Hyland among the pilots. On July 28th, it mentions: "missing, no news since take off".

The following are some of the official activities performed by 101 squadron members between July 16th and July 28th 1944: (the airmen did not complete every single task each time, as some were group and specialised activities.)

- July 16th: Crews performed an air test, 2 rose turret trainings, a cross country, another cross country and a high level bombing.
- July 17th: Air firing, 2 high level bombings, 2 rose turrets trainings. 5 aircrafts were recalled from operations.
- July 18th: 2 air firings, 4 high level bombing practises. 49 crews were on day operations or night operations.
- July 19th: 1 air test, 1 air firing, 1 rose turret training, 2 high level bombing practises.
- July 20th: Fighter affiliation. 24 crews on operation, 3 crews missing. 1 crew abortive. Operation on the Nieppe Forest.
- July 21st: 2 rose turret training no other flying. 1 airman decorated. Operation on Joigny Laroche.
- July 22nd: 5 cross countries.
- July 23rd: 1 an air test, 1 rose turret training. 19 crews went on operation.
- July 24th: 2 rose turret trainings, 1 cross country. 14 crews went on operation.
- July 25th: 1 air firing test, 1 a rose turret training, 1 cross country, 1 high level bombing. 16 crews went on operation (Stuttgart), including the LM-462.
- July 26th: 2 rose turret trainings, 2 cross countries, 1 high level bombing.
- July 27th: 2 rose turret trainings, 1 cross country.
- July 28th: 1 rose turret training, 4 cross countries (3 recalled). 21 crews on 鈥� operation (Stuttgart and Hamburg). The SR-V2 LM462 was reported missing.

Chapter 4 continues the story of the Lancaster Crash at Rebr茅chien with information about searching for the families and stories about the crew themselves.

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