大象传媒

In the 60th anniversary year of the Battle of Cassino fought in the Italian Campaign during the Second World War, I feel it may, and should be of interest to those of us who are his descendants or who are related by marriage, to relate HKD鈥檚 part in the events of that significant episode. For a short time he was to play an important role in one of the bloodiest and more significant battles of that campaign. Indeed the severity of the conditions, the horror and filth, have been described as reminiscent of the worst of the Western Front in the First World War.

This is a very brief overview of a complex military situation with political overtones that occurred as the tide of war had turned in the favour of the Allied Powers.

The Allies had advanced up through Italy and were striving to capture Rome, the Germans had skilfully defended a number of 鈥渓ines鈥� based on rivers and hilly terrain. So to outflank them and to hasten the capture of Rome an allied force had been landed from the sea at Anzio, north of the front and within striking distance of Rome; a quick dash had been expected but enemy reaction had successfully contained the force in a small and vulnerable bridge head at the time we are considering.

The Cassino Massif lies on the western side of the Italian peninsula some 70 miles south east of Rome astride and overlooking Highway 6.
Cassino town lies on Highway 6 at the foot of the mountains in the Liri River valley which runs roughly west to east.
The Benedictine Monastery of Monte Cassino dominates the high ground above Cassino town and has a good view south over the river and it鈥檚 plain.

The US 5th Army (General Mark Clark) which had under it鈥檚 command, British, Polish, Indian, French and New Zealand troops as well as US forces was under pressure from politicians and the Chief鈥檚 of Staff to get up Highway 6 to relieve the Anzio Force and to capture Rome.
In early 1944 a New Zealand Corps was formed under General Freyburg comprising the 2nd New Zealand Division and the recently arrived 4th Indian Division from the British 8th Army.

Ken (aka Jack) Dimoline, a pre war Territorial Officer, had demonstrated remarkable skill and professionalism to have been promoted to CRA (Commander Royal Artillery 鈥� a Brigadier) of the highly professional Indian Army division in which he had seen service throughout the North African campaign.
The GOC (General Officer Commanding) of the 4th Indian Division was a Major-General Tuker, a very experienced soldier by all accounts, he was an original thinker and furthermore had considerable experience of mountain warfare.

The NZ Corps with the 4th Indian Division and HKD moved into the Cassino area in January 1944, they were tasked to plan and carry out the second attack at Cassino and to do this the high dominating ground must be captured.
The question as to whether the Germans were using the Monastery as an observation post was uppermost in the planners minds, it was known the Monks were still there, but evidence as to German occupation was conflicting.

The Vatican had been in touch with the belligerents in an effort to save historical religious buildings from bombing and shelling.
The Monastery at Monte Cassino, which had been re-fortified in the 19th century, was of world wide significance to the Benedictines and was well known as an important religious building.
With the Presidential elections due in 1944, President Roosevelt with the American Catholic vote to consider was under some pressure to avoid destruction of the Monastery.

Prior to the arrival of General Freyburg there was no belief in the necessity to bomb or shell the Monastery, the structural strength of the walls and buildings would require very heavy bombardment to destroy any forces with the precincts.

At this stage various strong personalities came into play, Freyburg was a hero 鈥� a VC in the first World War and a friend of Churchill, who was also directly responsible to the New Zealand government, who in turn could withdraw their troops if unacceptable casualties were likely.
New Zealand had put a high percentage of her manpower into the field, however, Freyburg had, by some accounts, limited capacity.

Tuker, also a strong character 鈥� advocated by-passing Monte Cassino around the adjacent mountains and Freyburg鈥檚 first battle plan reflected this.

Because of the pressure to 鈥済et a move on鈥� the plan was changed to a full frontal attack on Monastery Hill, therefore the question of bombing the Monastery had to be addressed.
The plan called for the New Zealanders supported by Tanks to capture Cassino Town whilst the Indian troops were to take Monastery Hill, but Commanders had not fully appreciated the problems of the terrain and few, if any, of the senior officers had been up near the ridges and gullies. Indeed they were not fully aware of who held what!

Space in this brief account precludes discussion of the detailed requests and permissions given that would be required to get bombers to attack the Monastery.

Suffice to say, Freyburg insisted on the right to request this and Tuker would be a key judge of whether to initiate such a request.

At this critical juncture Tuker was taken ill and evacuated with his caravan and wireless communications back to Allied Force HQ at Caserta, leaving HKD as acting GOC.
HKD was probably not the most senior nor most experienced of the Brigadiers in the Division but being at Divisional HQ and being a 鈥渟afe pair of hands鈥� the obvious and ideal choice, especially as Tuker was in the background to 鈥渃hivvy鈥� Freyburg whose limitations he obviously realised.

In accordance with the plan of the of the 4th Indian Division HKD requested the bombing of the Abbey on the 11th February.
On the 12th February Tuker memoed Freyburg supporting HKD鈥檚 request but again suggested by-passing the feature.
Freyburg鈥檚 HQ delayed passing on the request and there is evidence of disagreement. Tuker, who insisted on the need for aerial bombardment if his division was committed to a full frontal assault, won the battle of wills with Freyburg.

Two days after the bombing, the 4th Indian Division had failed to capture the key feature, Hill 593, and also Monastery Hill.
On the 18th February, HKD called off the attack 鈥� the assault on Monastery Hill was put off indefinitely. At the same time the New Zealanders failed to take Cassino Town in the face of fierce German resistance.

After it鈥檚 destruction, the Germans moved into the ruins of the Monastery and set up strong defensive positions. The Allies subsequently by-passed the Cassino area as had been suggested by General Tuker and the French Commander Gen Juin.
On the 18th May German Forces evacuated the area having been by-passed by the Poles.

As we now know, HKD was relieved of command of the Division and I believe this was shortly after the attack was called off 鈥� sometime in February, I would surmise.

The accounts I have read do not cover this aspect, HKD did not discuss this with me in any great detail but hearsay evidence is that he declined, rightly, if true, to implement a further attack based upon a similar plan and as a result lost the confidence of General Freyburg.

Ken Dimoline鈥檚 war subsequently took him to Burma.
He became Commander Royal Artillery in the 17th Indian Division and gave further distinguished service in the last year of the Burma Campaign.

This is a brief account and is not a balanced historical paper.

More material is now available than was in published form during HKD鈥檚 life, amongst books which are readable balanced accounts are:

鈥淢onte Cassino鈥� 鈥� D Hargood and D Richardson 鈥� 1984
鈥淐assino 鈥� the Hollow Victory鈥� 鈥� John Ellis 鈥� 1984

HDR Mackay 1994(revised 2004)

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