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I joined the Royal Air Force in 1951, as a regular soldier and for the next five years, working as a policeman.

After the war I got a lot of information from Leonard Cheshire who worked closely with Bomber Harris during the war years.

I was interested in why Dresden was selected as a bombing target.
From Leonard Cheshire I found out that Sir Arthur would never discuss why Dresden was destroyed.
On occasions when the ´óÏó´«Ã½ approached him for information, he asked for notice of the exact questions, and then would give the answers to the best of his ability.
He warned that if there was any deviation from the questions, or asked about Dresden he would refuse to answer, stop the interview, and walk away.
This information is included in a letter kept by the Bomber Command Association.

Included in the letter is more information.
It appeared that his orders were to give priority to requests from Eisenhower to attack various targets.
He was doubtful about these plans, so he questioned the Air Ministry, who had received a directive that Dresden was a required target, this directive came directly from Eisenhower.
It appeared later, that Eisenhower was dealing directly with Stalin and was worried that Montgomery and General Patten were going to attack Berlin.
It was decided that they would cross at the Elbe and Leipzig and Dresden had to be removed.
This was where they planned to link up to the Russians.
In fact they didn't meet there but at Perbough, further down the Elbe, and the rest is history.

A few of the pilots I knew were amazing, completing really dangerous missions during the war.
There was my friend Norman Jackson VC.
He climbed onto the wing of an aeroplane travelling at 300 miles an hour at 20000 feet, crawled along the wing to put a fire out.
There was no way he could get back into the plane, but he had a parachute. He slipped off the wing.
At the end of the award citation it said 'And he saved the aircraft'.
They were more concerned about the plane than the crew.

The last great VC still alive is Group Captain Tate.
He was the pilot who bombed the battle ship Terpitz.
When he dropped his bomb it went straight through the deck.
Two days later he went back in a Mosquito plane with a photographer and a navigator.
He was shattered, there was the boat - still floating with just a little hole in the deck.
He presumed that it mustn't have exploded, in fact it did go off inside, killing nearly 1000 sailors, but the frame of the ship held. The side plates off the ship were made of 33 cms plate steel

Another interesting letter is from Dowding to Churchill, where he told Churchill he couldn't have the last 600 planes he had ordered.
He said France had capitulated before and they would do so again, and if we had sent those 600 planes there would be none left.
That cost Dowding his job at the time. In fact he'd retired previously but the government called him back to lead The Battle Of Britain

A Description and Report
Bombing And Surrender

Berlin itself is no longer a particularly important objective.
Its usefulness to the Germans has been largely destroyed, and even the Government is prepared to move to another area. What is now important is to gather up our forces for a single drive, and this will more quickly bring about the fall of Berlin, the relief of Norway, and the acquisition of the shipping and the Swedish ports than will the scattering around of our effort
I should like to point out that the so-called 'good ground' in Northern Germany is not very good at this time of year. That region is not only badly cut up with waterways, but in it, the ground during this part of the year is very wet and not so favourable for rapid movement as is the higher plateau over which I am preparing to launch the main effort.
Moreover, if, as we expect, the German continues the widespread destruction of bridges, experience has shown that it is better to advance across the head waters than to be faced by the main streams.

Eisenhower also explained his intentions fully to Churchill, who replied that he feared Montgomery's front might be so stretched that the offensive role assigned to him might peter out. He did not know why, if the enemy's resistance weakened, we should not cross the Elbe and advance as far eastward as possible:
This has an important political bearing, as the Russian Army of the south seems certain to enter Vienna and overrun Austria.
If we deliberately leave Berlin to them, even if it should be in our grasp, the double event may strengthen their conviction, already apparent, that they have done everything.
The Prime Minister did not consider that Berlin had lost its military, and certainly not its political, significance. Its fall would have a profound psychological effect on German resistance everywhere.
The idea that the capture of Dresden and junction with the Russians there would be a superior gain, did not commend itself to him. He would greatly prefer persistence in the plan that the U.S. Ninth Army should march with Army Group to the Elbe and beyond to Berlin. This would not be in any way inconsistent with the great central thrust, which you are now so rightly developing as the result of the brilliant operation of your armies south of the Ruhr. It only shifts the weight of one army to the northernmost flank, and this avoids the relegation of His Majesty's Forces to an unexpected restricted sphere.

Both Eisenhower and I had always taken the view that considerations of politics were outside our sphere of responsibility. It was for the British and American Governments to determine the degree to which political considerations should outweigh, or balance, the dictates of military strategy. Until now, very late in the day, we had not been instructed to take particular points as far east as possible in order to forestall the Russians.
As Risen-bower at once remarked to Churchill, his telegram had introduced a new idea respecting political importance of the early attainment of particular objectives. I clearly see your point in this matter.
The only difference between Churchill's suggestion and Eisenhower's plan, in the Supreme Commander's eyes, was one of timing, which might yet prove to be unimportant. This would depend on the amount of resistance we met.
The Supreme Commander must concentrate first in the centre to gain the position he needed. He thought that the next move after that would be for Montgomery to cross the Elbe, reinforced as necessary by American troops, and reach a line, which included Lubeck on the coast.
If German resistance should crumble, there would be little, if any, difference in time between gaining the central position and crossing the Elbe. On the other hand, if resistance
tended to stiffen, it would be vitally necessary to concentrate and not to try and carry out all the projects at once.
Eisenhower signalled to the Prime Minister: I
I am disturbed if not hurt, that you should suggest any thought on my part to 'relegate His Majesty's Forces to an unexpected restricted sphere'. Nothing is further from my mind, and I think my record over two and a half years of commanding Allied Forces should eliminate any such idea.
The Prime Minister had by now sent a long and soothing telegram to Roosevelt expressing full confidence in Eisenhower, but emphasising again the high strategic and psychological importance of Berlin. Churchill wondered whether, if the Russians got the idea that they had made the overwhelming contribution to the common victory, this might not lead them into a mood, which would raise formidable difficulties in the future.
He considered that from the political standpoint we should march as far east into Germany as possible and that should Berlin be in our grasp we should take it. This course also appeared to him to be sound on military grounds

On 2 April, we received Stalin's reply to Eisenhower's message.
He said that the plan to cut the German forces by joining up with the Russian armies entirely coincided with the intention of the Soviet High Command.
Stalin agreed that the right place to join up would be in the area of Erfurt, Leipzig, and Dresden.
The main blow of the Soviet forces would be delivered in that direction. Since Berlin had lost its former strategic importance, the Soviet High Command would allot secondary forces to its capture. The plan to form a second ring by joining up Soviet and Allied forces in the area of Vienna, Linz, and Regensburg, was also approved by the Soviet High Command. Stalin added that the beginning of the main blow by the Soviet forces would be timed for about the middle of May.
This latter information, as Marshall told Wilson, was somewhat unexpected.
He had hoped that Anglo-American forces would reach Berlin by the end of April. He did not think Eisenhower's central thrust should go farther east than Leipzig; after that, it should be directed towards Berlin.
The British Chiefs of Staff's reaction to Stalin's telegram was that the delay of his main drive until mid-May strengthened the case to maintain the thrust in the north, and particularly towards Berlin.
Stalin had not indicated to Eisenhower the date on which the so-called secondary forces of the Soviet High Command would move towards Berlin.
The British Chiefs of Staff 'could not exclude the possibility that Stalin intended to take Berlin himself, and to keep the Allies out of it as long as possible'.
The United States Chiefs of Staff replied that the psychological and political advantages which might accrue from the possible capture of Berlin ahead of the Russians should not override the dominant military consideration, the destruction and dismemberment of the German armed forces. They thought that Eisenhower should be allowed to continue to correspond directly with Stalin, and that he alone could conduct the battle in the rapidly changing circumstances. Their British counterparts retorted that admittedly Eisenhower alone could conduct the battle from day to day, but he fought that battle in accordance with broad strategy laid down by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
I had attended the meeting of the British Chiefs of Staff in London on 3 April. I have no record now of what passed, though according to Alan Brooke's diary I explained that Eisenhower had been forced to wire immediately to Stalin, since Montgomery had put forth a directive with which the Supreme Commander did not agree. Brooke said, according to his own record, that he was astonished Ike found it necessary to call on Stalin in order to control Monty'.
Moreover, he could not accept this excuse, as the boundaries of the 21 Army Group and the U. S. Ninth Army remained the same in Eisenhower's order and in Montgomery's, the only difference being the transfer of the Ninth Army from Montgomery to Bradley. Rather more than a week later, Mr. Churchill, in a Minute to the Chiefs of Staff, abused me for allowing Eisenhower to telegraph directly to Stalin without reference to London. In so writing, the Prime Minister seemed to Brooke to be forgetting that he himself had entirely undermined Tedder's position by continually communicating direct with Ike and cutting Tedder out ….

We now realised that the end of the war was in sight. It is my purpose here not to describe the now familiar military operations of the last month or so, but to distinguish the roll played by air power in the concluding stages.
After I had consulted with Portal and Bottomley on 9 April, it was ruled that Bomber Command should undertake no more bombing designed solely to obliterate the industrial areas. There might still be special circumstances when enemy resistance could best be destroyed by this method, but in general the main object of the Strategic Bomber Force would now be to give direct assistance to the land campaign.
I was much concerned lest, during this last period of the battle, we should allow ourselves to wander from the agreed bombing policy. The evidence concerning the serious state of enemy rail communications, and their vital importance to him, accumulated every day.
Now that a heavy blow had been struck at the Luftwaffe, I thought that all our efforts should be concentrated against rail communications, especially in the area of Halle-Leipzig.
This was the largest remaining industrial area in German hands and the most important nodal point in Germany.
East-west and north-south traffic passed through it. Bottomley agreed that the current directive should be amended, though the effort against oil, which was not now great, should be maintained. He agreed that at this stage the application of the strategic bombing effort,
except against oil targets and the Luftwaffe, should be guided mainly by the needs of S.H.A.E.F. This rule this prevailed for the last month of the war.
The armies were now advancing rapidly. By mid-April Eisenhower was considering how to sub-divide the enemy's remaining forces and capture the areas where the Germans might make a last stand.
For these purposes, he thought the best way to divide the enemy in north would be to drive forward to Lubeck, and in the south to join up with the Russians on the axis of their advance down the Danube valley.
It would also be most desirable to make the thrust to Berlin, since the enemy might group forces around the capital and its fall would have a great effect on the morale of the enemy and of our own peoples.
In this respect Eisenhower adopted, at least in part, the views which Churchill had urged on him. The main areas where the enemy could offer prolonged resistance were the national redoubt in the south and Norway in the north. Into the former area we must break before the enemy could man it properly, and in the north we must negotiate with Sweden and the liberate Denmark as a method of setting Norway free.

As the Supreme Commander summarised his intention:
The essence of my plan is to stop on the Elbe and clean up my flanks.... While it is true that we have seized a small bridgehead over the Elbe, it must be remembered that only our spearheads are up to the river and our centre of gravity is well back of there.
A few day s later, Eisenhower told Marshall that the Red Army was in a perfect position to 'clean out' Czechoslovakia. It seemed that the Russians would certainly reach Prague before we could.
His intention was to destroy any remaining organised resistance by (Germans. If a move by the Allies into Czechoslovakia was then indicated as desirable, we should probably take Pilsen and Karlsbad, joining up with the Russians:
I shall not attempt any move I deem unwise merely to gain a political prize, unless I receive specific orders from the C.C.S.

Such specific orders were not received by S.H.A.E.F. For the failure to take Prague, Eisenhower has been much blamed.
For myself, I doubt whether the capture of that city would have prevented the eventual incorporation of Czechoslovakia in Stalin's empire. Much more probably, we should have withdrawn our troops quickly, after which overwhelming Russian strength would no doubt have asserted itself soon.
On the evening of 4 May, the German armed forces in Holland, NorthWest, and Denmark, surrendered to Montgomery, who had reached Lubeck on 2 May and had sealed off Denmark just before the Russians arrived. On 5 of May, German plenipotentiaries arrived at S.H.A. E. F. to discuss surrender terms.
It transpired that they were not authorised to sign any capitulation. They were allowed, therefore, to send a message to the German General Staff asking that a representative with full powers should come to S.H.A.E.F. at once.
Next day, Colonel General Jodl, Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht, came to negotiate the surrender. The talks went on throughout the afternoon and evening.
In the early hours of 7 May the formal instruments were signed.
Later we received signals from Moscow-.
It was decided that I should go to Berlin, accompanied by French representatives and S.H.A. E.F. staff officers, to sign with the Russians and Field-Marshal Keitel a ratification of the surrender just agreed at Rheims.
We would all meet in the remains of Berlin on 8 May.
I had precisely two hours in which to get off with my colleagues at 8.30 a.m.
The party consisted of myself as head of the delegation, Spaatz representing the U.S.A., De Lattre de Tassigny representing France, Leslie Scarman my secretary, and finally Philip Wintle, my pilot and personal assistant.
We were to land at Stendahl to join up with a party of Germans from the north and rendezvous there at 11 a.m. with some Russian fighters who were to escort us to Tempelhof.

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