大象传媒

Before we moved to the place where I live nowadays, since the summer of 1959 , I lived in the Aylvalaan nextdoor the school-building . After the liberation of my hometown , a 'keyposition ' in the autumn for Simpsons 9th Army, he settled his restcenter in the building and called it 'Oklahoma'. There was a conference at 'Oklahoma 'on 7th December 1944.

The first transport of 'Muzelmannen '(prisoners declared unfit for work in the German industry).
After WVHA (SS Main Department of Economic Administration) transformed P.O.W. Camp Bergen Belsen ('Stalag 311')to a special camp for exchange, 'Bergen Belsen civilian internment camp' , RHSA ( Reich Security Main Office)the political Nazi-security-wing, pointed out that it was necessary 'for tactical reasons ' to change the name to 'Bergen Belsen detention camp'. The reason given is highly instructive : 'The change is necessary since according to the Geneva Convention civil internment camps must be accessible for visits by international committees.'
From this moment on the camp was integrated immediately upon foundation into the system of concentration camps which was administered by the WVHA. This decision had grave consequences since it predetermined to a considerable degree the subsequent development of the camp, which culminated in the catastrophe of spring 1945. The higher functionaries of the concentration camp administration saw their main task from 1942 onwards as the full-scale mobilisation of the labour power of prisoners for the German arms industry. The 'detention camp', whose inmates could not be assigned for this compulsory labour, was therefore completely neglected by the central administration of the concentration camps. WVHA functionaries soon tried to ascribe further tasks within the 'proper' scope of the WVHA to the camp, thereby tying to go beyond its original function as a 'detention'camp 'and turn it into a 'genuine'concentration camp...When it eventually became clear that the 'stay'of the 'exchange Jews' in Bergen Belsen was going to be longer than originally anticipated, WVHA officials were unwilling to maintain the camp merely for 'exchange Jews' Instead they added another task more central to the aims of the WVHA. Since Bergen Belsen was situated far away from any large industrial plants, no prisoners who had to perform forced labour in the armaments industry could be sent there. Therefore Bergen Belsen was earmarked in March 1944 as a reception camp for sick and exhausted prisoners of other concentration camps, who were incapable of working any longer - in the cynical euphemism of SS jargon this was called a 'recuperation camp'('Erholungslager')
The first transport of invalids, which arrived in Bergen Belsen at the end of March 1944, consisted of 1000 mostly tubercular prisoners from the Dora camp near Nordhausen [ underground V2 factories] (in the Harz mountains)
(Eberhard Kolb, Bergen Belsen from 1943 to 1945, Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht, third edition 2002)
I thought the third Armoured 'Spearhead' Division liberated Nordhausen V2 assembling caves.
Please read my Journal-entry called 'Heinz'

'HEINZ'
Message 2

This is my final conclusion on the subject of the KZ Belsen.
In the KZ Mr. Kramer was the commander '44/'45 and mr. Kramer had been a commander of Auswitz Birkenau before he was sent to Belsen. He came from a 'Vernichtungslager' to Belsen Lager II ; an 'Erholungslager'.
I believe that it was a coincidence and that it was due to the chaotic circumstances in Germany that my uncle died in Belsen. At least that is what the survivors of the evacuated KZ 's Hertogenbusch enjoined upon me. ( all were evacuated into Germany on 5/6th September 1944). When my uncle was caught early in 1944 he had lived in the woods for a week and before this he lived in a chickenshed for several month's. You could probably smell him from miles away. And that is suspect because he was used to dress himself properly and probably wearing his Waltham pocket-watch. In the woods the boys don't bring the early morning-papers. On the very day that my uncle had to report to his regio-commander, the newspapers had published the decree of the occupier that there was the approval of a capital-punishment for the robbery on centres of population-registration. And he had participated in a robbery like this a few weeks before. I never found a sign in his messages or secret messages that he had been aware of this thread. Neighter had he been warned not to travel in broad daylight as far as I know.I spoke to a former inmate of Dora at the reunion of the group that had been evacuated into Germany on 5/6th-Sept.'44 .
I'm to become a verger in our church. It's really great. My family lies buried at the burying ground of the neighbouring church where I'm a help of the verger. This is a very special place ; St.Pietersberg in Maastricht. During the war Dutch most precious paintings like Rembrandt's the 'Nachtwacht' were kept there inside the mountain close to the burying ground.

Back to my story:
[From the book :'Het Veldeke', Paul Bronzwaer, Stichting Historische Reeks Maastricht] ->
Who were there at Oklahoma on 7th December ?
Eisenhower, commander-in-chief ; air Marshall Tedder, Deputy ; commander 21st. Group Montgomery ; commander Bradley 12th. and 9th. Army commander Simpson.
Simpson was host his HQ resting in Maastricht untill March 1945.
On 20th. December Simpson's 9th. was joined to the 21 Group under Montgomery. They had to cooperate with 1st. Army to occupy the area between the rivers Meuse and Rhine from Aachen till Nijmegen. This operation would last untill March 1945 when the Americans crossed the Rhine.
conflicting visions in August 1944. eisenhower : broad-front strategy. An as broad as possible battle-front with as many as possible armies advancing at the same time.
Montgomery : 'Spearhead'-strategy. Originally Montgomery wanted to head for North NorthEast after crossing the Seine with a compact Army of 40 Divisions. The automn offensive jammed in the west at the harbour of Antwerp/Westerschelde (Montgomery) and in the east of Aachen (Patton)
Montgomery has two questions:
1) the strategy (go for the Ruhr-region; heart of German industry)
2) whose commanding the operations of the military.
No results at the conference; an 'Eisenhower-compromis'. Imagine : The American troops were mostly fresh from the U.S. their opponent 1 million experienced German soldiers. ( this is what a veteran told me last saturday.)
11 days after the Conference the Germans start a surprise-attack : ' Battle of the Bulge ' was on.
Battle 0f the Bulge : 16 December 1944. 3 German Armies attack on a 120km. broad front. Purpose to cross the river Meuse and march up to the harbour of Antwerp and the Belgian capital of Brusseles in order to separate the allied armies (north/south)
American and British forces north of the line Huy (40km. south-east of Maastricht) Antwerp to be cut of their supply and forced to surrender.
Secondly: three days after taking the offensive an attack at the Lower-Ruhr to recapture Maastricht; preventing American troops to enter the Battle-theatre of the Ardennes.
The precious 'Wilhelmina'-bridge over the river Meuse had been destroyed by the Germans at their retreat from the city ,13 September 1944.
(The veteran told me this story :
When the Germans retreated from Maastricht in September 1944, he was 17 years old and walked through the 'Brugstraat 'in our city when the Germans retreated , had crossed the bridge eastwards and their last Engineer-officer was about to blow up the third and last bridge. He said to the boys something like this : 'Und wo sind jetzt die Widerstand-k盲mpfer ? Sollte Ich mich ergeben wenn einer kommt mit eine pistole. '
He wanted to surrender without demolishing the third and last bridge.[ I will check on this by asking a former-resistance-member])

Two days before Christmas the bridge could be used again for Military traffic. The Americans held this to be a 'gift from heaven'(Conquer. The story of the Ninth Army 1944-1945, Nashville, 1993 p. 161)(the veteran said that Americans say this often)
By the end of the Christmasweek 1944 overcast and mist lifted. Americans and British flew 15.000 missions forcing the Germans into retreat again. (Chester Wilmot 'Battle for Europe',Amsterdam/ Brussels 1992 p.561-562)
After the Allied forces broke the attack Germany could be conquered following the compromis-strategy that was decided on at the conference in Maastricht early December '44.

['Air-power in War', Lord Tedder; chapter4, Hodder and Stoughton 1949] ->
von Rundstedt on the failure of the Ardennes-offensive: 'The root of the whole trouble was airpower, air power.'
Lord Tedder : 'Let me warn you against drawing too many conclusions from the days of military plenty towards the end of the war.
You may feel that I am falling into precisely that error in emphasising the decesive results achieved by the Allied Air Forces when they had been built up to the great strength they attained in 1944. I must remind you that as well as emphasising the success which strength made possible, I also pointed out some of the early failures due to weakness.
Before the war we had tried to be strong everywhere and only succeeded in being weak everywhere ; on land at sea and in the air.
Fortunately, thanks in no small measure to the Germans not understanding air power, we were just strong enough in the air to hold the fort for those first three and a half years, to push the enemy air force back, and to keep it back, from the heart of our war effort. By fighting back, our air force gave us that most precious thing-time.(p.122)

[Strategic bombing and the German air-defence-system during the war (it's my thesis KMA Jan.'79)but if you're interested I think you had better read the atricle of Teitler.G 'Luftwaffe and RAF a comparetive investigation on the rise of the air-weapon.'
German High command errors.
6.4 TacticalErrors
...In the beginning the German fighers Me-109/110, Fw190 could not stay in the air very long and where short-range fighers. They where bound to the 'Luftflotte' and confined to the (small) range of the 'J盲gerleitstellen'. This resulted in limited mobility of the figherweapon ; extended object-defense.
German leadership never succeeded in concentrating their power or modelling a main point.
When finally at the end of 1944 concentration of power was at hand (2 Geschwader in Luftkommando Reich)[?] German leadership did not succeed in shaping a main point. Shortage of pilots and fuel and above all things; frittering away the air power (tactical air support), the Germans did not succeed in modelling the necessary 2000 air defense fighters against 1200 bombers escorted by 800. The maximum has been 300 in the month of October 1944......
Policy Errors
6.5.3. Insufficient technical development
German technological development results find expression not before the end of the war at hand.
Scientific research into radar, jet-planes (Me-262) and rocket-technology had started before the beginning of the war. Results into production at the end of the war because of Hitler's decree not to start working on developments lasting longer than a year before resulting in production of the weapon/device. Apparently Hitler was expecting a war that would not take long before ending (in victory).(R.J. Roggeveen ; De Duitse Luchtverdediging in 1945
attachment VIII :
"...One principle bearing on leadership might be stated in relation to resources in war : an enemy with superiority in technology and war potential ,who makes a series of wrong decisions may, to be sure, leave in doubt the outcome of a battle but he never loses the certainty of ultimate victory.
On the other hand, his opponent, far inferior to him in these basic factors, will not be able to avert defeat in a long war, even though he avoids every error in command judgment."
From: 'Defeat of the Luftwaffe: Fundamental Causes '
Generalleutnant Adolf Galland ]

15 March 1945
Speer reported to Hitler, giving the figures
of coal deliveries from the Ruhr, and said : 'The final collapse of the
German economy can be counted on with certainty within four to eight weeks...after the collapse even military continuation of the war will become impossible. '(p.120)
In 1941 General Smuts spoke of air power as 'the Air, the architect of Victory'; properly understood and used, I believe it can be the guardian of peace until that happy day when nations realise finally that wars don't pay.(p.124)
It has been well said, 'If you wish for peace, understand war.'*(p.13)
* When Britain goes to War-by Liddell Hart

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