大象传媒

This is a transcript of a taped story done by Ted Powell who has given his permission for these stories to appear on the website and they have been submitted to the Peoples War Website by Wendy Young on his behalf.
He fully understands the site,s terms and conditions
On February 11th 1942, Vice Admiral Ciliax of the German Navy was in Brest France making final preparations for a daring breakout. Three of Germany's most important ships, the Battleships, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and the Cruiser Prince Eugen had been hold up in Brest for months and the allies had been expecting them to try and escape. in the event it was the largest fleet the Germas ever assembled, which put to sea at a quarter to ten in the evening of February 11th. With the three principle ships escorted by more than thirty destroyers, flagships and e-boats, incredibly through a series of mishaps and miscalculations on the British side, the German fleet had sailed right up the channel from Brest, without having been seen or challenged. For weeks rumours had been circulating about the anticipated breakout and elaborate preparations had been made.
At South Foreland on the Kent coast, second Lieutenant Hagger had been rehearsing with the 49.2 guns in his battery so persistant were the rumours, that officers not wishing to miss their first opportunity to fire their guns in anger cancelled their leave.
The admiralty had developed a sophisticated plan, on the assumption that the Germans would attempt to slip through the channel by night.
Thirty two motor torpedo boats and six torpedo carrying Swordfish aircraft would converge and attack both sides of the ships bows with flares from the aircraft lighting the way. They had been practicing this strategy for weeks but by February 10th the admiralty decided that the emergency was nearly over and removed most of the MTBs leaving only six boats in Dover under the charge of Lieutenant Commander Nigel Pumphrey.
828 Swordfish squadron had been on full alert at RAF Manston since their arrival there on 4th February, but on 11th February, their commanding officer Lieutenent Commander Eugene Esmond had an important appointment in London, he was to report to Buckingham Palace to receive the DSO from King George 6th for his part in the attack on the Bismark seven months earlier. The senior observer Leiutenant Williams took the opportunity to visit his mother in Denmark Hill in south London, and that evening some of the RAF officers, together with the Fleet Air Arm flying crews arranged a small party to celebrate Esmond's decoration.
The party did not go on late, as they had to be standing by their aircraft at 4 o'clock the next morning for the routine pre-dawn alert.
Early the following morning 12th February, seeing no sign of the German fleet, they were stood down as the freezing snow swirled over Mansdon, scattering its icy dust on the six obsolescent biplanes, which stood alone in a corner of the dispersal area. Meanwhile, back at the South Foreland battery, second Leiutenant Hagger was organising yet another practise drill session.
Out to sea there was a thick fog and all the coastal observers could see as they strained through their binoculars was swirling mist. Understandably then, that when radar signals showed the German fleet to be in the channel, the command post at Dover Castle was thrown into a state of uproar. In the middle of the confusion sat Brigadier Cecil Whitfield Raw studying the first radar reports. With the German ships only 32,000 yds away, as commander of the coastal artillry, he realised that the only weapons he could engage were Hagger's at South Foreland. He gave the signal to sound action stations, but Hagger assumed that like so many previous alerts, this one was a false alarm, and instructed his gunners to resume their practise drill session, then picked up the telephone to query the order with his battery commander, Major Guy Huddlestone, he got a sharp reply "This is the real thing, take post!".
At 12.10pm their radar showed the battleships to be 27,000 yds away approaching Cape Griz-nez travelling at an estimated speed of 22 knots, but in reality it was nearer 30 knots.
Brigadier Raw gave the order to fire at 12.19pm. Major Huddlestone's guns errupted, the two heavy armour piercing shells would take almost a minute to reach their target. Huddlestone who tried to catch a glimpse of the ships from his observation posts could only see mist. Without observation of the "fall of shot" there could be no accurate correction of aim, were they on target? No one knew. What's more, no one had ever fired these guns on radar alone, the radar blips showed that the early Salvoes fell well short. twice Brigadier Raw ordered them to add another 1000 yds to the range, but not one shell fell close enough to the Germans to cause any damage.
Lieutenant Commander Nigel Pumphrey was in his office making out reports when the telephone rang. I t was captain Day, naval chief of staff to Admiral Ramsey at Dover Castle, who asked briskly "How soon can you get going? The German battle cruisers are off Boulogne!". Pumphrey didn't need telling twice, he slammed down the reciever and dashed into the operations room to order his MTBs to be manned, in fact, only five set out to intercept the Germans. Because Pumphrey's own boat was under repair he took another.
As they raced towards the smoke, made by the German E-boats screen it suddenly cleared and Pumphrey and Lieutenant Arnold Foster in the two leading boats had a clear view of the great grey ships straking through the strais in patches of hazy sunshine.
The Germans were about five miles ahead with some half a dozen destroyers astern and air cover totalling a massive 256 aircraft. The largest air umberella ever assembled was now circling above them, but between Pumphrey and the German ships were the E-boats, much bigger and faster than his MTBs, with 20 MM cannon against his machine guns. Suddenly their shells smashed into the hull of Pumphrey's boat and his engine died, letting the bows down into the water. As Pumphrey fought with the controls, the remaining four boats slowed up to maintain formation, then Pumphrey's engine spluttered to life again, and he turned to drive his small floatilla through the E-boat screen, running the gauntlet of their heavy fire with his quarry still some 4000 yds away. Pumphrey's intention was to reduce the range to 2000 yds, a dangerous decision which could result in the loss of all his craft, but as he charged through the screen the matter was taken out of his hands and his starboard engine failed and his speed immediately fell to 16 knots. There was only one this to do, to press ahead until the E-boat fire became too much and then to fire his torpedoes from a range of not much short of 4000yds.
Luckily the sea was too rough for the E boats to fire accurately, and Pumphrey chugged on. When German fighter aircraft began attacking the M.T.Bs Pumphrey oprdered the others to split up and make individual attacks. If he could just keep afloat until the battleship came abreast of him, he could fire his torpedoes from about two miles.
Finally the battleships came into his sight and Pumphrey pointed his boats nose ready to launch his weapons, but warning shouts from his gunners alerted him to two E boats which had raced up to within 800 yards and begun firing. As his gunners returned fire Pumphrey the lever and his two terpedoes splashed into the sea. Shortly afterwards he realised his torpedoes had missed. There was nothing more he could do but to swing his boat away from the battle and head for the British coast. The rest of his M.T.Bs fared little better, twisting and turning to avoid the swarms of enemy fighters diving at them. They launched their torpedoes from a range of 3,500 yards but the Scharnhorst had plenty of time to take avoiding action and their attacks came to nothing.
A German destroyer suddenly appeared through the smoke and against such odds the M.T.B. were forced to scatter.
Admiral Ramsey realised the only means left to him was to attack the convoy with the six old biplanes standing on the tarmac at Manston.
But how could he send these slow moving planes out in broard daylight against the ferocious flak and such a heavy fighter escort, he wopuld be committing them to certain death.
Troubled by his conscience, he picked up the telephone aand asked for the first sea lord, Sir Dudley Poundin Whitehall, pleading not to be asked to send these these 18 air crew on such a suicidal mission. He heard Sir Dudley reply "The Navy will attack the enemy, whenever and wherever he is to be found". Putting the telephone down, Admiral Ramsey nodded to his Air Liason Officer, Wing Commander Constable Roberts.
Minutes later at Manston, Lieutenant Commander Esmonde gave the simple instruction " The balloons gone up get ready".
To Ramseys credit he considered it essential that the slow lumbering torpedo carrying biplanes should be given fioghter cover for their run in. When Esmondes phone rang again it was number11 fighter group.
"We intended putting in the Biggin Hill Wing of three squadrons as top cover. The Hornchurch wing of two squadrons will act as close escort to beat up the flak ships for you. Both wings have been told to rendezvous over Manston. What time should they be there?" Esmonde told them " For the love of God be there by 12.25".
At Dover Castle there was some misgivings as Esmondes telephone rand again. This time it was Wing Commander Constable Roberts stresdsing that the Swordfish must only go if Esmonde was satisfied that the fighter cover was adequate.
Privately both the RAF and the Royal Naval Officers on the spot felt that even with a heavy fighter escort few Swordfish crews would return from the mission.

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