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The great majority of Canadian soldiers who took part in the ill-fated Dieppe Raid in France 62 years ago were based in a camp on nearby Witley Common.

The Dieppe Raid

August 19th 1942

The sky was glorious to see at Boulogne as the sun dipped over the horizon late on Tuesday 18th August 1942 and people stopped and pointed to the heavens. They seemed to take little notice as a small convoy, consisting of five Dutch motor vessels with a German escort of submarine chasers, slipped out of the harbour and hugged the French coast westwards the better to avoid radar detection.

The moon went down at 1 am, and mist came up affording the little convoy some protection. Two hours later, some 10 miles off Dieppe, the distant thud of engines was heard and the call to 鈥淎ction Stations鈥� was sounded as a precaution. Soon, the noises of strange vessels were picked up on the starboard side. The Germans, now fully alerted, immediately fired star shells, lighting up the sky and exposing a huge fleet of landing craft. The German convoy had blundered into the Dieppe raid!

WHY THE RAID WAS MOUNTED

Things were going badly for the Allies at this time. With the fall of Singapore went the losses of two British battleships, Prince of Wales and Repulse. Tobruk on the north African coast had fallen followed by the retreat of the 8th Army towards the Suez Canal.

Even so, Prime Minister Winston Churchill was being urged by the Americans to open a Second Front in France in September 1942. In fact, they had given the proposed invasion a code name 鈥� 鈥淪ledgehammer鈥�. Churchill remained cool about this. He had, it is true, supported a series of small raids on the French coast that had been quite successful; and the force known as 鈥淐ommandos鈥� was formed as a result. But these raids were in reality only mounted for propaganda purposes 鈥� to boost moral at home.

The Russians had made earlier calls for a Second Front after the Nazi invasion of the USSR in June 1941.

In the meantime, the Chiefs of Staff Committee, consisting of the three heads of the British armed forces, with Field Marshall Lord Alanbrooke as Chairman, had been meeting every morning in the Cabinet War Room in Great George Street, near St James Park in London, to debate war strategy. In March 1942 Admiral Lord Mountbatten was added to the Committee. He had been ordered to return to the UK from Norfolk, Virginia, where he was Commanding Officer of the aircraft carrier under repair there, HMS Illustrious. He was told he was to succeed the ageing Admiral Keyes as Chief of Combined Operations - a post that had only recently been created. A successful raid on St.Nazaire was a great spur to mounting further attacks on the French coast. But the big question was - where to go next? Captain Hughes-Hallett RN of St.Nazaire fame ruled out the Channel ports for security reasons. It had to be elsewhere 鈥� a target also within fighter aircraft range.

Dieppe, some 70 miles from the English coast, would allow the passage of any attacking force to be carried out almost in total darkness, thus reducing the risk of detection. The town was an ideal target for a full-scale raid with its good rail and roads, as well as an airfield.

OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the raid were 1. To destroy enemy defences, radar installations, power stations, docks, railroads, and petrol dumps in the vicinity of Dieppe. 2. To collect secret documents and to capture prisoners. 3. (most ambitious of all) To remove 鈥渇or our own use鈥� 40 invasion barges thought to be in Dieppe harbour.

PLAN OF ATTACK

Two battalions to be landed on the main beach in front of Dieppe half-an-hour after the flank attacks had gone in, to be followed by 30 Churchill tanks and engineers. There would be a floating reserve of one battalion and 30 tanks. After Dieppe had capitulated, forces would be re-embarked either over the beaches or from the harbour.

The earliest date for this ambitious venture was the night of June 20th or June 21st or any of the following nights. The Royal Navy was to be allocated 鈥減op gun鈥� firepower in the form of 6 Hunt Class destroyers with only 6鈥� guns 鈥� insufficient to dent heavily protected defences. Admiral Mountbatten realised this and tried unsuccessfully to get permission to have a battleship in support. The night bombing of Dieppe was grudgingly approved by Churchill and, on May 13th 1942, the Chiefs of Staff gave their approval for the outline plan code-named 鈥淩utter鈥�.
This plan, though, had bland misconceptions viz; 鈥淚ntelligence reports that Dieppe was not heavily defended, and that the beaches were suitable for landing infantry and armoured vehicles鈥︹��

CANADA FORCE

The force chosen by General Roberts, commander of the Canadian troops, to take part were to consist of 4th Brigade (Battalions from the Royal Regiment of Canada, the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, and the Essex Scottish ) all from Ontario. In addition the 6th Brigade (French Canadian Fusiliers Mont-Royal from Quebec, Camerons from Winnipeg, and the South Saskatchewan Regiment plus the 14th Tank Battalion - 鈥淐algary Tanks鈥�). On May 20th all infantry units were stationed on the Isle of Wight which was sealed off and a programme of rigorous training initiated.

The plan for aerial bombardment was abandoned and instead dawn strikes by cannon firing fighters were to be mounted. A bombing diversion was to be started at Boulogne. Meanwhile, American pressure for a Second Front in the autumn continued, to be joined by the Russians urging similar action.

DIEPPE RAID CANCELLED

In spite of misgivings, for instance the act of using unblooded troops, Operation Rutter was set for July 4th. The Canadian forces began boarding mainly converted Channel ferries consisting of more than 200 vessels. When safely aboard the true destination of the raid was revealed to the troops. Bad weather, however, intervened and, coupled with a German air attack during which two large ships anchored off the Isle of Wight were hit, Operation Rutter was cancelled on July 8th. Troops were disembarked and were dispersed. Some military leaders, including General Montgomery, were delighted thinking that this was the end of the plan to raid France.

DIEPPE RAID REMOUNTED

Churchill鈥檚 urgent need for something 鈥� anything 鈥� to appease the Americans and the Soviets was probably decisive in reviving the idea of an attack on France and of pushing ahead with the Dieppe raid. With this in mind Admiral Mountbatten argued that, even if the Germans got wind of Operation Rutter, they鈥檇 find it hard to believe that the British were stupid enough to try to mount the same raid again. Furthermore, there was no other target that could be reconnoitred by Combined Ops
in time to mount a raid that year.

Operation 鈥淪ledgehammer鈥�, the setting up of a Second Front, was abandoned on July 22nd. Nevertheless, the Soviets were impatient so Churchill travelled to Moscow to stress the dangers of a Channel crossing. Stalin was contemptuous and urged the British to fight the Germans tooth and nail, as his army was fighting. A sacrifice of some 5000 men, Stalin declared, thrown against the French coast to create a diversion to help his country defeat the Germans, was peanuts compared with the effort his country was making when 5000 men were lost in a single day.

By early August plans for the renewed Dieppe raid, now code-named 鈥淛ubilee鈥�, were complete.

Between Berneval and Dieppe stood the small community of Puys. This was Blue Beach, the destination of the Royal Regiment of Canada. Their task was to force a way to the cliff top, overrun a small battery and take the eastern headland overlooking Dieppe from the rear. Attacks on other beaches (yellow, blue-green and orange) would take place in the pre-dawn period - the so-called 鈥渘autical twilight鈥�. Destroyers and a gunboat would bombard the front of the town.

THE GERMAN VIEW

Field-Marshall Von Runstedt, overall commander of forces from Holland to the Spanish border, had the daunting job of protecting a 50 mile length of the French coast. The garrison at Dieppe was only 1500 strong, consisting of largely 鈥渓ow category鈥� troops. Strong reserves of 6000 and the 10th Panzer Division of tanks, however, were within 60 miles.

A garrison of platoon strength of 50 was assigned to cover Puys 鈥� by no means adequate.

THE ROYAL REGIMENT & H.M.S. QUEEN EMMA

The Canadian group to land on Puys beach (Blue) was divided between three ships: The Royal Regiment aboard Queen Emma and Princess Astrid at Portsmouth: A party of Black Watch of Canada attached to the Royal Regiment in Duke of Wellington at Southampton.

ARMY FORCE TOTAL

The Force numbered 6106 of whom the Canadian army provided 306 officers and 4658 other ranks. The rest were made up of Commandos, Americans, and official observers. The Royal Navy had assembled 252 ships and landing craft. Aerial cover consisted of 63 squadrons: light bombers, 2 bomb carrying Hurricanes, and 56 fighters 鈥� a concentration of fighters larger than the entire R.A.F. command that won the Battle of Britain.

GERMAN ALERT

Because weather conditions prevailing made a landing a possibility the 鈥渢hreatened danger鈥� alert was issued (troops to be ready for action). The German commanding officer in the Puys area was assiduous; and on the night of 18/19 August the alarm sounded frequently.

THE LANDING

I sailed in H.M.S. Queen Emma from Portsmouth at about 21.00 hours on August 18th 1942 in fine weather. Just before 0300 hours on August 19th, when some 10 miles off Dieppe, the Royal Regiment embarked in LCAs (landing craft assault), including 100 in my larger Landing Craft Mechanised (LCM). The craft were then lowered but things went a bit wrong. We were supposed to be led into Blue beach at Puys following astern of a motor gunboat. Some craft, however, took up station behind another gunboat. A precious 15 minutes were lost because of this and we didn鈥檛 move away until 03.25 hours. In an effort to make up for lost time the gunboat鈥檚 CO went faster than he was supposed to. As a result, the LCMs and 4 LCAs were left hopelessly behind and lost contact with the guide boat. To make matters worse, the recognition signals from the Dieppe harbour mole were unanswered and as a consequence searchlights were brought into action and the invasion craft came under heavy fire.

I touched down with the first wave of landing craft at 0507 鈥� 17 minutes late. The sun was up by then and, as the ramps of my craft were lowered onto the shore, we immediately became targets and were shot at in broad daylight. The Canadians charged out but many were felled by machine-gun fire. Those that managed to make some headway forward came up against a 12鈥� high sea wall some 50 metres from the water鈥檚 edge at high tide. These brave men were either killed or wounded, many were captured. The second wave came in at 05.30 hours. Fortunately, the smokescreen laid by the RAF afforded some cover as I went in. Also, my boat was sheltered from direct fire by another on my port side which was badly hit. My cabin mate at the time I served in H.M.S.Glengyle, Brian Sargent, was killed.

After the troops had landed I pulled out with a kedge anchor and sped away to await further orders. We milled around for some length of time not knowing what to do. Should we try and rescue some of the troops on the beach? Was it at all possible? Eventually we learned from other craft that a complete withdrawal had been ordered and we made our way northwards for home. I lost touch with the convoy and sailed independently across the English Channel, hoping to make a landfall on the Seven Sisters cliffs. On the way we hauled on board the body of a dead RAF pilot that was floating past. I handed in his identity disc when I reached Newhaven at 19.30 hours that evening.

Of the 26 officers and 529 other ranks we landed at Puys only 2 officers and 63 other ranks made it back.

All told, 907 Canadians were killed. 2460 were wounded or captured 鈥� 65% of the total Force.

***

The Germans remained convinced for a long time that a Second Front was intended at the time; and a full alert was issued.

British newspapers later carried stories of how Canadian prisoners-of-war were led away to prison camps in Bavaria with their hands shackled together. Photos of this were later printed.

Postscript. After the Allied breakout from Normandy in 1944 General Montgomery said he was sure the Canadian 2nd Division would attend to Dieppe satisfactorily. In the event, Dieppe fell without German resistance.

After I reached Newhaven and had had a bit of sleep I telephoned my home in Hampstead, north London, early the next morning. My sister, Joyce, answered with a yawn and, after I had explained that I had just returned from Dieppe, exclaimed: 鈥淥h, I know the place well. It鈥檚 lovely. Did you have a good time?鈥�

NOTE

H.M.S. Queen Emma was a Belgian cross channel ferry in peacetime. She had been equipped with landing craft, and some anti-aircraft guns. Her commanding officer was a Captain Gibbs 鈥� a man aged 62 who had been recalled to the Royal Navy after retirement brought about by the so-called 鈥淕eddes Axe鈥� in 1922. The Government of the day considered that the armed forces had to be scaled down after WWI together with large numbers of munitions workers etc. The enforced retirement of so many officers and men was entirely arbitrary. My father, a Captain RN, was a victim of this 鈥淎xe鈥�. Had he not died so young in 1931, aged 51, he would surely have been recalled in 1939 and may even have reached flag rank.

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