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PART TWO
AN AIRMAN IN SOUTH EAST ASIA COMMAND
by
Ken Armstrong

With breakfast over the unit prepared to move out to a predetermined site from which to carry out the day’s bombardment. The site was a clearing in the jungle, where the guns would be just within the tree line with only the muzzles protruding. We were directed to position the Radio Truck between the guns and also just within the tree line. It was with some difficulty that we had to pursuade the Officer in Charge of the guns that we could not operate within the tree line as the trees would completely block all radio signals. A compromise was reached and we set up the radios; this involved tying the aerial wire to a piece of timber or a rock and throwing it over a convenient branch of a tree which was not in a position to block the signals. A primitive method but it worked. Contact having been established with Squadron H.Q. we received a signal advising when the two aircraft detailed for this shoot would be arriving over the target which had already been agreed.

The two Hurricanes observed the original shoot as planned and it was agreed the shoot had been a great success. This was the pattern for the next few days until all targets had been heavily shelled. We then returned to Imphal. During a subsequent shoot, the Officer in charge of the Artillery asked if we could direct the planes to a new target; we were then given the map co-ordinates for the new target. This was radioed to the Pilots and in a very short while the Pilot radioed that they were in position over a group of huts in a jungle clearing, and to commence firing. This order was relayed to the guns and one gun fired. The Pilot radioed that the fall of shot needed adjustment and another single shot was fired. This time the Pilot radioed that the shot was on target and the Officer I/C ordered rapid fire from all guns for ten rounds. This was more than our 15cwt Van could take! It only had plywood panels and the blast from the guns blew all these off and for good measure shook all the Radios off tune, but we did hear the Pilot describing the fall of shot and the destruction of the huts which we were told was a Japanese H.Q. This was also declared a success, and it was agreed that further shoots would be arranged to develop the practice as more experience was gained.

On a later shoot a different Artillery Unit asked for assistance but as the one and only Wireless truck was in use, a Jeep was equipped with the required radios and was used successfully but it was not as good as the 15cwt Van, which we continued to use whenever the Army called for our assistance.

We did become the target of a few air raids, when we hurriedly jumped into slit trenches, or in some other way left the immediate area. My interest in Mobile Radio resulted in me being in charge of an official R.A.F. Mobile Radio Vehicle. This was an enormous vehicle roughly the size of a London Omnibus and it was completely fitted out with several radios, charging units and spare parts. It had a Dennis Petrol Engine, which was notoriously difficult to start. This required one of the sparking plugs to be removed, a small quantity of petrol poured into the plug hole, the plug replaced and a hearty swing on the crank handle when hopefully the engine would fire. Imagine having to go through this routine after the air raid sirens had sounded. Having successfully started the engine I would then drive to the hills which surrounded the Air-strip until the All Clear. It was a most unsatisfactory vehicle for Jungle warfare. It was far too big and unwieldy and as far as I am aware was never used in connection with any Artillery Shoot. A Japanese Air raid was very predictable. The aircraft approached in perfect close formation at a high altitude; we did not have any Aircraft capable of reaching this height. The leading aircraft was fitted with a bomb-aiming device, and when the bomb-aimer had the target in his sights he fired a machine gun as a signal to the rest of the aircraft to drop their bombs. It was a form of carpet bombing. The damage was enough to put us out of action for a couple of days.

Regulations concerning dress were very relaxed. The Khaki drill with which we were issued in England was quite inappropriate. The Topee was similar to those worn by The Marines. The shirts were very thick and course and the shorts came down to the knees. For working on aircraft the topee was useless and was speedily discarded. It was replaced by a pith helmet, which was certainly lighter, but it did not stand up to the Monsoons. We were then issued with slouch hats as worn by the Australians and these were much more suitable, but after a while most of us wore the forage cap. The shorts were very quickly cut down. At nighttime long trousers were essential as a protection against mosquitoes, but again, the issue ones were far too thick. Most of us bought lightweight trousers and bush shirts to match. Boots were replaced by shoes but for working on aircraft plimsolls were more suitable as I mentioned earlier.

The purpose of photographic support for the army was to safely deliver the photographs and to avoid any contact with enemy aircraft. If they were jumped by Zeros they were to run for it, and to respond with their own machine guns if battle was unavoidable. When waiting for aircraft to return one of the first things we looked for was whether the patches over the machine gun ports were still intact which indicated if the guns had been fired or not.

Apart from mail from home we had very little contact with events outside Imphal and very little news of the European war reached us. No-one in authority visited us until on one auspicious occasion we received a visit from the newly appointed Commander in Chief, Earl Mountbatten. As far as I know he flew in quite unannounced and asked to inspect the Squadron. We had no time to prepare for an inspection so he had to inspect us in our working rig. During the inspection he spoke with several of the men, after which he told us to break ranks and gather round an ammunition box on which he stood and gave us an encouraging talk. The 14th Army was generally known as the Forgotten Fourteenth with good reason, but after the visit By Earl Mountbatten the situation did seem to improve, and we did start to receive news of the War in Europe and the Far East. Early in 1943 we started to receive a series of lectures by an Army Lieutenant who told us that the Japanese had advanced into and partly through Burma. This seemed too close for comfort but he added that our lines were well prepared and there was nothing to cause us any concern. A week or so later we had another talk when we learnt that the Japanese were still advancing but our lines were holding! These talks continued for a while but every time the Japanese were still advancing and the time came when it was obvious the Japanese were not being held and that their advance was continuing with the clear intention of invading India, and Imphal was in their path.

The enemy was very close to Imphal when Orders came for us to be prepared to defend the Airstrip. This involved a considerable alteration in our routine. Guards were doubled and doubled again until we were on guard duty every other night. We still flew the aircraft, in fact flights were more frequent. The dispersal area was divided into ‘Boxes.’ Slit trenches were dug so that each Box had an all-round field of fire. In addition to the boxes being manned all night there was a patrol keeping in touch with the men manning the boxes. Around this time it was reported that a number of Sikhs had deserted from the Indian Army and joined the Japanese who had planted them in Imphal to hamper the defenders and support the Japanese if they should succeed in breaking through. By now the Japanese advance had cut the Manipur Road in several places and Imphal and Kohima were completely cut off. In addition the Japanese had captured the hills over looking the Air Strip and started shelling it with a light Artillery gun.

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